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
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NO. 2.

On a Significant Property of Postulate-sets

By

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INTRODUCTION

Purists in mathematical logic will undoubtedly be shocked at the attempt, to be made here, to couple pragmatism with the postulational technique. The former deals with practical conduct in the concrete realm, while the latter is concerned with the universe of abstract symbols, symbols so abstract that they have shed the last vestiges of significant connotation usually attached to them. We accept this delimitation of the fields of operation for pragmatism and postulationism; yet we shall attempt to show that there is an intimate but unsuspected relationship between them.

The postulational technique has been made popular recently through the writings of the pioneers in mathematical logic, of Whitehead and Russell (10, 13), and of Sheffer (11, 12), Lewis (5) and Huntington (4). Though the *Principia Mathematica* is an imperishable monument to the efficacy of the postulational technique, yet the credit for analysing the theoretical implications of the technique goes to the last group of writers, particularly to Sheffer and Lewis. Eaton (3) and Chapman (1) have also contributed, in a limited measure, to the development of the theory of the technique.

AXIOMS, POSTULATES AND POSTULATE-SETS

For purposes of our argument it is necessary to define three terms very clearly, namely, axioms, postulates and postulate-sets,

A very suggestive distinction is drawn between *axioms* and *postulates* in elementary geometry.¹ Self-evident truths, on which mathematical reasoning is founded, are called *axioms*, while *postulates* are 'requests' which should be granted before any mathematical demonstration can proceed. 'Things which are equal to the same thing are equal to one another,' is an *axiom*: that a straight line may be drawn from any one point to any other point,' is a postulate which should be granted before Euclidean theorems can be proved. Not only is this distinction convenient, but it is essential to a clear comprehension of the mathematical method. Jean Nicod (6) sees no difference between an axiom and a postulate. He says,² 'The difference between a postulate and an axiom is only a matter of degree in regard to evidence, and does not exist for us because both, deprived of any fixed meaning, lack altogether any self-evidence.' As against this position, we maintain, that the distinction between axioms and postulates is fundamental. Nicod was keen on establishing the empirical foundations of geometry, and so belittled this distinction; yet even his unique purpose would have been served better, had he maintained the difference between axioms and postulates, and then showed that the necessity for the latter could be demonstrated only through empirical verification. That such a distinction is basic to mathematical reasoning is revealed by an interesting remark made by Huntington (4). In stating a set of postulates Huntington says³, '....but these laws are to be regarded no longer as 'axioms,' since they are merely blank forms, not in themselves either true or false, but rather as 'postulates' because we demand arbitrarily, that the system considered shall conform to these conditions.' Huntington is one of the small band of investigators of the theoretical foundations of the postulational method, and so his statements in this connection are of special value for us. According to him, *an axiom is true in itself, while a postulate is a proposition whose truth is arbitrarily granted for the sake of the consistency of the system to be built out of it.*

There is a certain property of an axiom, discussed by J. C. Wilson (14), which marks it out as distinct from a postulate. Discussing the intuitive nature of the apprehension of the truth of a proposition, which is axiomatic, and deprecating the distinction that is usually drawn between an axiom as intuitive and a demonstration as deductive, since every step in a deductive demonstration is seen in its proper relation to

1. Vide Hall, H. S. and Stevens, F. H., *School Geometry*, pp. 1 and 7.

2. Op. cit., p. 19 F.N.

3. Op. cit., pp. 3 and 4.

its preceding and succeeding steps only through an act of intuition, Wilson⁴ finally concludes that '...the act of thought in which we apprehend an axiom or a demonstration is exactly the same in kind.' An axiom is intuitively apprehended, while there is no such intuitive compulsion about a postulate.

Our conclusion is that :

AN AXIOM IS A SELF-EVIDENT TRUTH; ITS CONTRADICTION IS INCONCEIVABLE. A POSTULATE IS A PROPOSITION WHOSE CONTRADICTION IS CONCEIVABLE, BUT WHOSE TRUTH IS TAKEN FOR GRANTED IN THE INTERESTS OF THE SYSTEM WHICH IS TO BE DEVELOPED OUT OF IT.

An admirable definition of a postulate is given in the *Principia Mathematica*. 'Some propositions must be assumed without proof, since all inference proceeds from propositions previously asserted.....Such propositions will be called 'primitive propositions'.....These are to some extent a matter of arbitrary choice.'⁵ Postulates, then, are arbitrary, and challengeable, yet assumed to be true without proof. Different postulates, generating different systems (as in alternative geometries) may all be true of the same aspect of our experience.

A postulate-set is a set of propositions, such as the five primitive propositions and the three definitions of the *Principia Mathematica*, from which a complete and consistent system could be deduced. It is, as Eaton (3) points out, '....a short-hand description of formal or structural properties that would be compatible with one another in some system-actual or possible. These formal propertiesconstitute logical maps of systems; and the logician pores over these maps, not to discover the actual terrain they may represent, but to see what principles of map-making they involve.'⁶

THE POSTULATIONAL METHOD

The postulational technique consists in starting from a postulate-set (having the characteristics to be discussed below) and drawing out of it all the logical consequences. We take a given postulate-set and ask, 'What, if it were known to be true, could be known about the truth or falsity of other propositions by reasoning alone, and without additional empirical information.' There is a wider application of the technique with

4. Op. cit., Vol II, p. 466.

5. Op. cit., Vol. I, p. 12.

6. Op. cit., p. 474.

which we are not concerned, but which we may state here in the words of Lewis and Langford (5). 'Here,.....we propose to deal with the logical consequences of a set of premises in another and more general way. We shall write down a set of conditions and then define, in connection with the set, an infinite class of properties, with a view to showing that each member of this infinite class is logically dependent upon the set in question, in the sense that either it or its contradictory is a logical consequence of the set.'⁷

Since the postulate-set is the starting point for the postulational technique we have to enquire what the conditions are which the set should satisfy. Eaton (3) remarks that, 'It is not enough to trust to our intuitions of what would be true as principles of logic, and to write these principles down haphazardly. We must find some systematic mode of procedure that will enable us to derive as *theorems* from a few *primitive propositions* or postulates all the general truths . . .'⁸ Our intuitions are helpful only in connection with axioms; in dealing with postulates we want certain universal principles for our guidance. What, then, are these principles? These principles may be summed up in a single sentence; the elements constituting the postulate-set should be (1) consistent, (2) sufficient, (3) independent and (4) as few as possible. Self-evidence is sometimes added as a last characteristic of the postulate sets, but is not insisted on, as it leads to several difficulties (one of which is that it obliterates the distinction between an axiom and a postulate).

The constituent propositions of a postulate-set should, in the first place, be consistent, that is, they should not contradict one another. In the second place they should be complete and comprehensive. No recognisable principle belonging to the system should be outside the scope of their deductions. Thirdly no postulate should be deducible from the others of the same set. Superfluity should be strictly avoided; and this leads us on to the last requirement that the postulates should be as few as possible.

POSTULATES AND HYPOTHESES.

We now hasten to state the most important point of this paper. Let us compare the requirements of a postulate-set with the requirements of an inductive hypothesis. The conditions which a good hypothesis is to satisfy are five in number; consistency, relevancy, sufficiency, parsimony and clearness.

7. Op. cit. p. 398.

8. Op. cit., p. 365.

A hypothesis should be conceivable, that is, it should involve no self-contradiction. Besides it should not contradict other hypotheses which have already been established as laws, and have thus entered into the system of scientific knowledge. (There is, of course, an exception to this requirement under certain extra-ordinary circumstances). The hypotheses should not violate the law of contradiction. The criteria of relevancy and sufficiency demand that the hypothesis under investigation should have a direct bearing on the facts to be explained, and that it should cover all the known facts. The requirement of parsimony is only one aspect of the general insistence on simplicity characteristic of the scientific method as a whole. Hypotheses should not be multiplied beyond necessity. The last requisite is self-evident.

When we place the requirements of a postulate-set by the side of the criteria of an inductive hypothesis, we discover a resemblance, *hitherto unnoticed*, a resemblance, we say, that amounts to identity. The obligation of conformity to the law of contradiction is laid upon both postulate-sets and hypothesis; both should be relevant to the task on hand, and neither should fail to take account of any element of the system they are dealing with. Absence of superfluity and the greatest parsimony are demanded of both.

It would be hardly true to say that this remarkable resemblance is the result of anything but a community of nature. The resemblance is an index of a deep-lying unity in the aim of the postulational and hypothetical technique.

Reasoning, let it be remembered, is a problem solving activity. Contemporary psychology has demonstrated, beyond the shadow of a doubt, that the human mind reasons only when there is a pressing need for resolving a doubt situation. The arousal of a doubt, its resolution through reasoning and the final satisfaction secured through action guided by such resolution, are highly pragmatic activities. The general theory of scientific method⁹ tells us that, in such activities, there are four stages as outlined below :

1. The observation of facts and the formulation of a tentative explanation of facts called hypothesis,
2. Development of the hypothesis,

9. Pragmatism has been very widely misunderstood. It is nothing but the generalised philosophical form of the theory underlying the practice of scientific method. It is in this sense that the term and its adjective are used throughout this paper.

3. Verification of the results of 2,

and 4. final acceptance, rejection or modification of 1. Now, the postulational technique which we have been considering is an integral part of the empirical hypothetical method of science constituting, as it does, only the second of the four stages mentioned above. It is now plain that the whole edifice of deduction, with all its admirable extensions and modifications, has been erected in the interests of just one (the second) stage of the needs of science. The postulational method must, therefore, find its natural culmination and its only justification in the larger method of which it is but a part. In the interests of specialisation, which has become inevitable with the enormous development of human knowledge, it is necessary to isolate the second stage, and study it by itself. Such isolated study has produced various types of logistics. But we should not lose sight of the wood for the trees.

We have shown that the postulational technique has important affiliations with the hypothetical technique, and in spite of its high degree of refinement and accuracy, is only a stage in the latter. Both in its origin and in its course of development it has important points of contact with the empiricism of science. We have gone further and asserted that the former can find the fulfilment of its natural purpose only in the latter. Hence the pragmatic test of the latter serves as the supreme test, either directly or indirectly, for the former too.

SOME MATHEMATICAL LOGICIANS ON THE POSTULATIONAL TECHNIQUE.

The self-sufficient and self-contained nature of postualtionism may be seriously disputed if we follow carefully the arguments advanced by Ramsey (8) in his paper on 'Mathematical Logic'. Speaking about the development of Mathematical logic since the publication of the *Principia Mathematica*, he there¹⁰ points out that Hilbert has shown that higher mathematics may be regarded as a sort of game involving the 'manipulation of meaningless symbols according to fixed rules.' What, then, is the use of such a game? Ramsey asks, 'What *use or merit* there is in this game the mathematician plays, if it is really a game and not a form of knowledge. . .? That he should ask for use or merit of the game points immediately to the ultra-mathematical consideration even in formulating the question; but the answer given is still more significant. '...the only answer which is given is that some of the mathematician's formulae have or can be given meaning, and if these can be proved in the symbolic

10. Op. cit., pp. 63-81.

form their meaning will be true.' We would put it the other way: if these meanings are true then the operation is valid. The moment we speak of meaning, we leave the realm of abstraction and enter into the concrete pragmatic realm.

Ramsey examines Hilbert's and Weyl's definitions of general and existential propositions, then attempts to amend that definition in the light of Wittgenstein's theory of propositions in general, and finally makes use of Whitehead and Russell's theory of types to get out of the difficulty involved in designating the distinguishing characteristic of logical propositions (specially the primitive propositions of the *Principia Mathematica*) as tautological. Yet he concludes his paper with a very pessimistic note. '... although my attempted reconstruction of the view of Whitehead and Russell overcomes, I think, many of the difficulties, it is impossible to regard it as altogether satisfactory.' This note of pessimism need not have been sounded, if Ramsey had pushed further than the traditional limits, and entered the realm of the pragmatic test for mathematical operations.

In the course of the analysis of the contradictions which he is attempting to resolve, Ramsey (9) speaks of the psychological contradictions. '... the second set of contradictions are none of them purely logical or mathematical but all involve some psychological terms, such as meaning, defining, naming or asserting.' It is possible to rule out these contradictions as belonging to the realm of meta-mathematics, but that they should have entered into a pure mathematical discussion is, in itself, significant. They point to the only way of overcoming the difficulty, namely, the way of the pragmatic test.

In the brilliant, but incomplete work of Jean Nicod (6), we get the necessary emphasis on the fruitfulness of applying logical and mathematical systems to the empirical world. It is true that Whitehead, using the method of 'extensive abstraction' works back from completed mathematical systems to entities analogous to sense perception, while Nicod starts from perceptual data and evolves various kinds of geometry. In the perface to 'The Foundations of Geometry and Induction' Russell remarks that Nicod 'made progress of the highest importance', by 'manipulating the psychological data in such a way that we may build logical constructions that approximately satisfy the axioms of physical geometry.' But the significant point is this: if, as Nicod says, 'Geometry does not come into nature before physics, but really through physics from whose more general canvas it abstracts its own perspective . . . ' and if 'its sensible truth is no other than that of the group of physical propositions that contain it' and if physics 'attains certainty or pro-

bability only to the degree in which experience verifies its findings,'¹¹ then the primitive principles which we obtain through abstraction, and which become later the starting point for the postulational method, 'certainly clamour for verification in experience if they are to give us any satisfaction. This contention of ours is strengthened further by the attitude which Nicod takes up in his article on 'Mathematics' in the twelfth edition of the Encyclopaedia Britannica. He there says, '*It may be pointed out that the motive for the choice of these premises, as well as for drawing certain consequences preferably to others, must lie in the region of possible meanings which mathematics itself ignores....*' '*.... it is clear that some of the possible and indefinite meanings of the mathematical terms and axioms are of fundamental importance in the fabric of the world. What are these meanings, and how do we know that they satisfy this or that set of axioms? Not even the 'pure' mathematician can wholly ignore this question; for the compatibility (or independence) of two given formal premises can be proved only by discovering some meaning which makes both premises true (or one true, and the other false).*'^{11a}

Ramsey's and Nicod's arguments, Nicod's more than Ramseys, stress the need for an empirical verification of the conclusions of the postulational method.

Huntington (4) too stresses the usefulness of the empirical test for postulates. He says, 'Any set of consistent postulates might be used as the basis of an abstract deductive theory, but only those sets of postulates are worth studying which are capable of some interesting concrete interpretation.'¹²

To strengthen our hands further, we may appeal to Wilson (14). In part *iv* of Statement and inference, Wilson¹³ restates the usual defence of the identity of the aim of inductive and deductive inference. His re-statement is refreshingly original and is accepted by us. When we combine this view with Wilson's insistence on intuition¹⁴ in his analysis of deductive inference, we find that the method used for testing inductive conclusions, is the only available method for testing the postulational conclusions too.

In a closely reasoned out paper on 'The Nature of Rigorous Demonstration' Dubs (2) points out the futility of self-sufficient deduction. He

11. Op. cit., pp. 12-21.

11-a. *Italics ours.*

12. Op. cit., p. 4. F. N.

13. Op. cit., pp. 578-583.

14. Op. cit., p. 465.

there shows that 'a rationalism which depends solely upon deduction from a small number of propositions is impossible', because each step of the deduction requires validating propositions which have to be established by non-deductive or empirical means.

THE ORIGIN OF POSTULATES

When we examine the actual origins of the postulate-sets, we discover the operation of empirical considerations in the choice of primitive propositions. There are no rules as to which postulates are to be chosen in any given case. There are conditions of good postulate-sets, but no statable principles as to how we are to make a postulate-set. It is the interest of the author, the purpose he has in view, his imagination, learning and talent, that govern the choice of postulates. '... what motives', asks Nicod (6), could have impelled the author to write it. Perhaps it was the unique charm of the logical adventure, the singular pleasure of deducing the implications of a group of propositions chosen like the rules of games of mental entertainment for the sake of the diversity and harmony of their consequences. Perhaps, on the contrary, the author has tried to imitate nature by making axioms in accordance with natural objects.¹⁵

We discover, therefore, the powerful nature of empirical consideration in the very origin of postulates.

We have drawn, at the beginning of this paper, a clear distinction between axioms and postulates. The significance of that distinction is now to be examined. An axiom by itself is utterly barren. To make it yield results, we have to assume certain postulates and apply the method of deduction to the latter. How are we to assure ourselves of the truth of the conclusion of this deduction except through empirical verification, unless we are going to satisfy ourselves with the barren meaningless conclusions which are avowedly neither true nor false. Huntington (4), it is true, points out that the only way of maintaining rigour of deduction and of avoiding the danger of reading unconsciously into the steps of deduction more than what is justified by the postulates (because our mind is familiar with the subject matter of the symbols dealt with) is 'to deprive the symbols of all significant connotation and make them bare forms.'¹⁶ But if the forms are so completely empty as demanded by Huntington then no kind of deduction would be possible. Absolute silence is the only course left open for the purist in rigorous deduction.

15. Op. cit., p. 19.

16. Op. cit., p. 2.

CONCLUSION

We have attempted to show that the pragmatic test is necessary for the conclusions of the postulational technique, and that the self-sufficiency of the latter is an artificial barrier which should be broken down without any hesitation. This conclusion we have sought to establish by examining (1) the implications of the distinction drawn between axioms and postulates, (2) the nature of the origins of postulate-sets and (3) the remarkable coincidence between the criteria of inductive hypotheses and postulate-sets. The last point is the most important, and the most significant one in the paper. The coincidence, we contend, is the result of deep-lying unity of purpose running through both. We have drawn attention to the fact that the postulational method is only a single stage in the larger empirical hypothetical method of science. It is, therefore, to find its fulfilment in, and is to be subjected to the same empirical tests as, the complete inductive method. Finally we have sought to support our contention by drawing upon the writings of accredited authorities on mathematical logic.

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The Development and Fate of the Operculum and Gill-Chambers in *Rhacophorus Maculatus*, Bouleng.

By

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INTRODUCTION

While I was engaged in embryological studies on *Rhacophorus maculatus*, Mr. R. V. Seshaiya under whose supervision I was carrying on my investigations, suggested to me that there might be a difference between *Rana* and *Rhacophorus* in the development and fate of the gill-chambers. This aspect in *Rhacophorus* has not been studied so far. Previous work on this subject was mainly carried on *Rana*. Balfour (1881) in his "comparative embryology" gave an account of the formation of the operculum in *Rana*. But this description is very vague regarding the manner in which the communication between the right and left gill-chambers is effected. Marshall (1882) gave a clear and complete description of their development in *Rana*. He pointed out that the opercular fold grows backwards and fuses with the body wall on the right and ventral surfaces while an opening is left on the left side. He also stated that the left anterior limb is liberated partly through the spiracle or primary branchial aperture. Latter (1923) suggested that branchial respiration is carried on side by side with lung respiration till the complete disappearance of the tail. He found the secondary branchial chambers acting as exits for the branchial current. Helft (1926) does not attribute any respiratory function to these secondary branchial apertures. He regards them, as mere openings sub-serving the liberation on the anterior limbs. Further he does not mention whether the spiracle or primary branchial aperture is also concerned in the liberation of the anterior limb or not. The investigations of Brock (1929-30) have confirmed the findings of Marshall (1902) and Latter (1923).

MATERIAL AND METHOD

Most of the earlier stages were supplied to me by Mr. R. V. Seshaiya who collected them some years back. For the advanced stages the tadpoles were reared in the laboratory itself from egg masses collected with in the university area. The metamorphosis was considerably speeded up by transferring the tadpoles to open air tanks in the university gardens.

The material was fixed in Bouin's fluid. It was washed in 70% alcohol till the yellow colour was completely removed. After dehydration and clearing in cedarwood oil the material was embedded in the usual way. In the case of older stages where the skull formation has started the material was kept in 2.5% nitric acid in 70% alcohol for 15 days and subsequently washed in 70% alcohol till the acidity was completely removed. In the case of the older stages cold impregnation with xylol and paraffin was also employed. In all cases, transverse, longitudinal and saggital sections of 10 to 12 μ were cut. All most all the sections were stained in Delafield's haematoxylin with eosin as counter stain. Some of the sections were also stained in Iron-alum-hoematoxylin.

THE DEVELOPMENT AND FATE OF THE GILL-CHAMBERS

A. Formation of the operculum and spiracle or the primary branchial aperture :—

The operculum arises as a fold of skin from the sides and ventral surface of the head region, just in front of the gill-clefts. In Fig. 1. the opercular fold (O.F.) has grown over the gills (G) and the right




Fig. 1.




Fig. 2.

and left gill chambers are formed (R. G. C. & L. G. C.). On the ventral side the operculum is fused with the body wall (B.W.) of the tadpole. The free edge of the operculum does not grow uniformly. Its growth on the right and left side is quicker than on the ventral side. In Fig. 2. the right and left sides of the opercular fold (R.O.F. & L.O.F.) are projecting down freely. The gill-chambers (R.G.C. & L.G.C.) are open below. The ventral portion of the opercular fold which lags behind is not shown.

The growing edge of right side of the operculum differs from that of the left. On the left side the central portion does not keep pace with the upper and lower portions. Ultimately when the opercular fold fuses with the body wall behind, a funnel shaped opening (P.B.A.) the primary branchial aperture or spiracle leading into the gill-chamber of its side (L.G.C.). The growth of the right side of the operculum is uniform and the free edge fuses completely with the body wall behind. As a result no opening leading into the right gill-chamber is formed. In Fig. 4 the ventral portion of the fold (V.O.F.) has also come up. But this does not now fuse with the body wall. On the left side the operculum (L.O.F.) shows a break in the centre. This is due to the lagging behind of that region of the fold. The right edge of the fold (R.O.F.) is uniform.




Fig. 3.

The opercular fold on the ventral side (V.O.F. Figs. 3, 4) which to begin with lags behind soon grows backwards. In the anterior region it is fused with the body wall of the tadpole so that the right gill-chamber (R.G.C.) is completely separated from the left one (L.G.C.). Posteriorly the ventral region of the fold does not fuse with the body wall for a short distance and in this region the left and right gill-chambers communicate with one another. This passage is the ventral

communicating channel (V.C.C.). Just behind this passage ventral region along with the right and left portion of the opercular fold fuses with the body wall of the tadpole. Figs. 3, 4 shows the ventral communication (V.C.C.). In Figs. 5 and 6 the opercular fold (O.F.)




Fig. 4.




Fig. 5.




Fig. 6.

has once again fused with the body wall (B.W). In Figs. 4 and 5 the primary branchial aperture (P.B.A.) is shown.

At this stage the branchial cavity consists of right and left gill-chambers (R.G.C. & L.G.C.) separated from one another anteriorly and communicating with each other by means of the ventral communicating channel (V.C.C.) posteriorly. The two chambers communicate with the exterior by a single opening—the primary branchial aperture (P.B.A.) on the left side. This condition continues till the hind legs are completely formed and the fore legs become evident.




Fig. 7.

B. Formation of the secondary branchial apertures :—

As the anterior limb buds are formed the primary branchial aperture shows slight narrowing. The anterior limbs are budded off from the dorsal walls of the branchial chambers and remain there till they are completely formed. In this stage the developing limbs fill up the greater portion of the right and left gill-chambers and press against the outer walls of the chambers (Fig. 7 R.A.L. & L.A.L.). By this time the lungs are also formed and the respiration is both by lungs and gills.

When the anterior limbs are completely developed the right limb is liberated by the histolysis of the operculum in that region. After the emergence of the limb the rupture of the operculum does not close up completely, but leaves a crescentic perforation at the base of the limb (Figs. 8 and 9, R.S.B.A. and L.S.B.A.). This is the secondary branchial aperture of the right side.

Now the emergence of the left anterior limb is mainly through the primary branchial aperture and to some extent by the histolysis of the operculum. In this case also an aperture—the left secondary branchial aperture (L.S.B.A.) is formed at the base of the limb. In almost all the tadpoles I have examined the left secondary branchial aperture

is slightly larger than the right (Fig. 8, L.S.B.A. & R.S.B.A.). The right one is formed completely from the histolysis of the operculum while the left one is formed partly from the histolysis of the operculum and partly from the primary branchial aperture.




Fig. 8.

Helft (1926) has stated that these secondary branchial apertures are formed from the histolysis of the operculum in *Rana*. He does not show whether the primary branchial aperture contributes to the formation of the left perforation or not. Further he is silent regarding the manner in which the primary branchial aperture closes and its role in the liberation of the anterior limb of its side. Marshall (1882) and Brock (1929-30) though they have clearly stated that the primary branchial aperture is largely responsible in bringing about the emergence of the left anterior limb, yet they have not pointed out whether it contributes to the formation of the left secondary branchial aperture in *Rana*.

Latter (1923) and Brock (1929-30) have observed that branchial respiration along with respiration by lungs takes place even after the fore limbs have appeared. They have noticed the importance of the secondary branchial apertures which serve as exits for the branchial current. My findings are in complete confirmity with their observations. Helft (1926) however does not subscribe to this view.

C. The fate of the gill-chambers and secondary branchial apertures :—

Just after the formation of the secondary branchial apertures the opercular fold in the region of the ventral communicating channel (V.C.C.) grows upwards in the form of a median ridge and fuses with the body wall of the tadpole. The right and left gill-chambers are now completely separated from one another and each chamber communicates with the exterior independently by means of the secondary branchial aperture of its side (Fig. 9). It has not been pointed out in *Rana* by any previous worker at what stage exactly the ventral communication between the right and left gill-chambers is closed.

The above observation in *Rhacophorus* is of special interest. Huxley (quoted by Balfour; 1881) described the presence of a right and a left spiracle or primary branchial aperture in *Dactylethira*. But whether there exists a ventral communication between the right and left gill-chambers has not been pointed out. Brock (1929-30) correlated the presence of a single primary branchial aperture with the existence of a ventral communication and suggested that in *Dactylethira* a ventral communicating channel between the right and left gill-chambers might not be present. The above condition in *Rhacophorus* with completely separated right and left gill-chambers (Fig. 9) communicating independently with exterior by their secondary branchial apertures strongly supports the suggestion of Brock (1927-30).




Fig. 9.

With the widening of the mouth and the shortening of the tail the secondary branchial apertures begin to disappear. In the majority of tadpoles I have examined the left aperture disappears at a slightly later stage. To start with the thickened lips of each aperture get approximated and ultimately fuse together. In Fig. 10, the thickened lips are seen coming together. In Fig. 11 they are fused. The withdrawal of the branchial cavity (R.G.C.) inwards and the thickening of the integument (I.N.T.) which has formed as a result of fusion of the lips of the secondary branchial aperture, are shown in Fig. 12. The operculum now gradually sinks inwards and the cavities of the branchial chambers get obliterated. The inner surface of the operculum (I.O.F. Figs. 10, 11 and 12) with the outer surface of the original body wall (B.W.) of the tadpole. The outer surface of the operculum (O.O.F.) now forms the outer surface of the permanent body wall of the adult *Rhacophorus maculatus*.




Fig. 10.




Fig. 11.




Fig. 12.

SUMMARY

(1) Certain new points regarding the formation of the secondary branchial apertures and the closing of the ventral communication between the gill-chambers, which were not dealt with in *Rana* by any previous worker are described. The general development and fate of the gill-chambers in *Rhacophorus* is almost similar to that of *Rana*.

(2) The operculum arises as a fold of skin from the sides and ventral surface of the head region just in front of the gill-clefts and grows backwards enclosing the gills in gill-chambers.

(3) The primary branchial aperture is formed on the left side as a result of the unequal growth of the operculum.

(4) There is a ventral communicating channel between right and left gill-chambers. Behind this the operculum fuses completely with the body wall.

(5) The right anterior limb is liberated by the histolysis of the operculum while the liberation of the left anterior limb is effected partly through the primary branchial aperture and partly by the histolysis of the operculum.

(6) The right secondary branchial aperture is formed entirely from the histolysis of the operculum while the left one is formed partly from the histolysis of the operculum and partly from the primary branchial aperture.

(7) The left secondary branchial aperture is slightly bigger than the right.

(8) The secondary branchial apertures subserve branchial respiration which is carried on side by side with respiration by lungs till the complete disappearance of the tail.

(9) With the appearance of the secondary branchial aperture the ventral communicating channel between the right and left gill-chambers is completely closed. Each chamber now communicates with the exterior independently by means of the secondary branchial aperture of its side.

(10) The above condition supports the suggestion of Brock (1929-30) that a ventral communicating channel might not be present in *Dactylethira*.

(11) The right secondary branchial aperture closes at a slightly earlier stage than the left.

(12) The operculum sinks inwards obliterating the branchial cavity. Its inner surface fuses with the outside of the original body wall of the tadpole and its outer surface forms the exterior of the permanent body wall of the adult.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

In conclusion I would like to thank Mr. R. V. Seshaiya, M.A., Annamalai University, who not only suggested this problem but also kindly provided me with most of the material used in this work. My thanks are also due to Prof. S. G. Manavala Ramanujam, M.A., Ph.D., D.I.C., F.Z.S., Presidency College, Madras for his kindness in sending some of the references to me.

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EXPLANATION OF FIGURES.

B.W.	Body wall.
G.	Gills.
I.N.T.	Integument.
I.O.F.	Inner surface of the opercular fold.
L.A.L.	Left anterior limb.
L.G.C.	Left gill chamber.
L.O.F.	Left portion of the opercular fold.
L.S.B.A.	Left Secondary branchial aperture.
O.F.	Opercular fold.
O.O.F.	Outer surface of the opercular fold.
P.B.A.	Primary branchial aperture.
R.A.L.	Right anterior limb.
R.G.C.	Right gill chamber.
R.O.F.	Right portion of the opercular fold.
R.S.B.A.	Right secondary branchial aperture.
V.C.C.	Ventral communicating channel.
V.O.F.	Ventral portion of the opercular fold.

தொல்காப்பிய ஆராய்ச்சி

By

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(Annamalai University)

சூத்திரம் 34.

“ எத்திணை மருங்கினும் மகலே மடன்மேற்
பொற்புடை நெறிமை யின்மை யான ”

இது, மகளிர்க்கு மடலேற விரும்புதலும் முறையன்று என விலக்குதல் நுதலிற்று. இதுவும் பெண்ணியல் கூறும் பெற்றித்தாகலின், மகளிர்க்கு முந்நீர் வழக்கம் மறுக்கும் முன்னேச் சூத்திரத்தை யடுத்து மடன் மேவலை மறுக்கும் இச்சூத்திரம் அமைக்கப்பட்டது.

(இ-ள்.) எத்திணை மருங்கினும் = அகத்திணை ஏழனுள் எதன் கண்ணும்; மகலே மடன் மேல் = தலைவி மடலேற விரும்புதல்; பொற்புடை நெறிமை யின்மையான = அழகிய முறைமை இல்லை.

எத்திணை மருங்கினும் என்றார்; அன்பினைத்திணைப்பகுதியில் ஆடவர் போல் பெண்டிர் மடல் விரும்புதல் அமையாமை மட்டு மன்று; பெருந்திணையினும் ஏறிய மடற்றிறம் ஆடவர்க்கன்றி, புலனெறி வழக்கில் மகளிர்க்குக் கூறுவது வழக்காறில்லை என்பதை வற்புறுத்துதற்கு. மேவல்-மேல், இடைக்குறை; ஐந்தாம் பரிபாட்டிலும், மலைபடு கடாத்திலும் ஆரல்-ஆல் ஆனதுபோல. மேவல், விருப்பப் பொருட்டு. “ நம்பு மேவு நசையாகும்மே ” (தொல்-சொல், உரி, சூத். 33) பேரிசை நவீர மேள யுறையும் ” என்னும் மலைபடு கடாத்தடியுங் காண்க. ‘இல்லை’ என ஒரு சொல்லை வருவித்து, ஆன்’ என்பதைக் காரணக் குறியாக்கி, ‘பெண்பால் மடன் மேவலில்லை; பொலிவுபெறும் நெறிமை இல்லாமையால்’, என இளம்பூரணர் கொண்டாங்குக் கொள்ளலும் தள்ளும் தன்மைத் தன்று. எவ்வாற்றானும், மடலேறுதல் எனப்பொருள் கொள்ளுதல் பொருந்தாது. ஆடவர்க்குமே மடலேறுதல் பொற்புடை நெறிமைக்கு மாறாக ‘நோந்திறத்தின் பாற்பட்ட காதலற்ற கழிகாமப் பழி பிறங்கும் இழிதகவுடைய பெருந்திணையின் பாற்படும் என்பது “ஏறிய மடற்றிறம்...பெருந்திணைக் குறிப்பே”’ என்னும் சூத்திரத்தானும் வலியுறும். மடல் ஏறாமல், மடல் ஊர்வேன் எனக் கூறுதலும் ஆடவர்பால் பொற்புடை நெறியாக்காமல், ஒரோவிடத்துப் புலனெறி வழக்கில் அமைத்துக்கொள்ளப்படுகிறது. “ மடன்மா கூறும் இடனுமாருண்டே ” எனுந் தொல்காப்பியச் சூத்திரத்தால், மடன்மா கூறுவதும் ஆடவரளவிலும் நன்மரபாகாமல், ஓராங்கு மரபு வழுவுமையாக மட்டும் கொள்ளப்படும் தமிழ்வுழக்குத் தெளிக்கப்பட்டது. அதன் காரணமும் எளிதில் அறியப்படும். ஊரறிய ஏறிய மடற்றிறம்’ ஆடவருக்கும் பொருந்தாக்காமலாம் பெருந்திணை எனக் கடியப்படுகிறது. ஏறாமல் தனியிடத்தே மடலூர்வேன் எனமட்டும் தலைமகன் ஒரோவழிக் கூறுதல் அமைத்துக்கொள்ளப்பட்டது; ஏனெனில் தலைவன் தன் காதற் பெருக்கை விளக்குமள விற்கு, தலைவியின் உறுதுணையாம் தோழிக்குத் அவன் தனித்துத் தலைவியின்

இன்றியமையாமையை வலியுறுத்தும் கருத்துடைமை காட்டும் கருவியாக்குதலால், மடன்மா கூறுதல் அகப்பகுதியில் ஆண் மகனுக்கு மரபு வழுவமைதியாக மட்டும் ஆளப்படும். இப்புலனெறி வழக்கு மறுத்தற்கில்லை என்பதைத் தொல்காப்பியர், ‘மடன்மா கூறு மிடனுமாருண்டே’ என்று கூறி, உம்மையாலும் ஏகாரத்தாலும் அதுவும் நன்மரபன் நென்பதை இனிதுபெற வுளக்கினார். ஆதலால் மடலேற அவாவுதல் ஒருவாறு ஆடவர்க்கு மரபு வழுவமைதியாக மட்டும் அமையுமெனக் காட்டும் ஆசிரியர், மகளிர்க்கு யாண்டும் பொற்புடை நெறிமையாகாது என்பதைச் சூத்திரத்தால் விலக்குவாரானார். இதுவே தமிழ் மரபென்பது :—

“கடலன்ன காமம் உழந்தும் மடலேறப்
பெண்ணிற் பெருந்தக்க தில்” என்னும் குறளாலும்,
“அன்ன நடையார் அலரேச ஆடவர்மேல்
மன்னும் மடலூரார் என்பதோர் வாசகமும்
தென்னுரையிற் கேட்டறிவதுண்டு-அதனையாம் தெளியோம்
மன்னும் வடநெறியே வேண்டினோம்”

என்னும் திருமங்கை யாழ்வாரின் பெரிய திருமடலின் அடிகளாலும் தெளியப்படும். “மடலேறப் பெண்ணிற் பெருந்தக்க தில்” என்பதும் தலைவன் கூற்றேயாகலானும், மடல் ஊர்வேனென்று தலைவி கூறுதலாக யாண்டும் ஆன்றோர் செய்யுள் செய்யாமை யானும், மடல் ஏறும் விருப்பமும் மகளிர்க்குப் பொற்புடை நெறியாகாமை தேறப்படும். மேலும்,

“உடம்பும் உயிரும் வாடியக் காலும்
... ..
கிழவோற் சேர்தல் கிழத்திக் கில்லை”

என்னும் பொருளியற் (10) சூத்திரத்தால் மணந்து கணவனுடன் வாழும் மனைவியும் தன் காதலைக் கொண்ட கணவனுக்குமே கரத்தலே பெண்ணியல்பென வலியுறுத்தப் படுகின்றது. தனியிடத்துத் தன் கொண்ட கணவனுக்கும் கரத்தற்குரிய காதலை ஊரரிய மடலேறிப்பறை அறைவேனெனல், நானொடு நிறையைப் பூணாக் கொண்ட பெண்டகை மைக்கு முற்றிலும் இயைபற்றதாகும். இதனாலன்றோ,

“காமத் திணையிற் கண்ணின்னு வருஉம்
நானும் மடனும் பெண்மைய, ஆதலின்
குறிப்பினும் இடத்தினும் அல்லது வேட்கை
நெறிப்பட வாரா அவள்வயி னான”

எனங் களவியற் (17) சூத்திரத்தால் தொல்காப்பியர், களவில் தலைவியரிடம் கடலன்ன காமவேட்கை நெறிப்படுமாற்றையும், அதன் பொற்புடைமையையும் வற்புறுத்தினார்.

இத்தமிழ் மரபுக்கு மாறாக,

“கடலன்ன காமத்த ராயினும் பெண்டிர்
மடலூரார் மைந்தர்மே லென்ப—மடலூர்தல்

காட்டுகேன் வம்மின் கலிவஞ்சி யார்கோமான்
வேட்டமா மேற்கொண்ட போழ்து ”

என நச்சினார்க்கினியர் உரையில் மேற்கோள் காட்டினாராவெனின், பண்டை நன் மரபுக்கு மாறாக, பெண்டிரெல்லாரும் யாண்டும், எந்நிலையிலும், ஆடவரெழிலுக்கு உடையுமுள்ளத்தினர் எனக்கூறும் உலா, மடல் முதலிய பணுவல் எழுந்த தகுதியும் மரபும் தலைதடுமாறிய பிற்கால வழக்கென மறுக்க.

சூத்திரம் 35.

“ தன்னும் அவனும் அவளுஞ் சுட்டி
மன்னு நிமித்தம் மொழிப்பொருள் தெய்வம்
நன்மை தீமை அச்சம் சார்தலென்று
அன்ன பிறவும் அவற்றொடு தொகைஇ
முன்னிய காலம் மூன்றுடன் விளக்கித்
தோழி தேளத்தும் கண்டோர் பாங்கினும்
போகிய திறத்து நற்றாய் புலம்பலும்
ஆகிய கிளவியும் அவ்வழி உரிய ”

இது, தலைவனுடன் போன தலைவியின் பிரிவாற்றாத தாயரின் பரிவு நிலையும், அது பற்றிக் கூற்று நிகழும் பகுதிகளும் கூறுதல் நுதலிற்று.

(இ-ள்.) போகிய திறத்து நற்றாய் புலம்பலும் = தலைமகள், தலைவனுடன் போனவழி, அவளைப் பெற்ற நற்றாயின் துணிதரும் தனிமையில் மகட் பிரிவின் அகப்பரிவாற் கூறு வனவும்; தன்னும் அவனும் அவளுஞ்சுட்டி = தன்னையும், தலைமகளையும் (அவனுடன் சென்ற) தன் மகளையும் குறித்து; மன்னு நிமித்தம் = அடிப்பட்ட புள் என்னும் நிமித்தக் களோடும்; மொழிப்பொருள் = விரிச்சி என்னும் நற்சொல்லோடும்; தெய்வம் = வேலன் வெறியாடல் முதலிய கடவுட் பராவலோடும்; நன்மை தீமை அச்சம் சார்தல் என்று = உடன் போக்கால் உளதாம் நன்மை தீமை அச்சம் சார்தல் என்பவற்றோடும்; அன்ன பிறவும் = அத்தகைய இடங்களுக்கேற்ற பிற கூற்றுக்களையும் அவற்றொடு தொகைஇ = மேற்கூறியவற்றோடு சேர்த்து; முன்னிய காலம் மூன்றுடன் விளக்கி = இறப்பு, நிகழ்வு, எதிர்வு ஆகிய மூன்று காலங்களோடும் இயைய விளக்கி; தோழி தேளத்தும் கண்டோர் பாங்கினும் = தலைவியின் தோழியிடத்தும், தலைமக்களைக்கண்டு மீண்டோரிடத்தும்; ஆகிய கிளவியும் = நிகழும் கூற்றுக்களும்; அவ்வழி உரிய = அந்நிலையில் உரியனவாகும்.

போகிய திறத்து என்பதை முன்னே கூட்டிச் சூத்திரத் துறைகள் அனைத்திற்கும் பொதுவாக்கிப் பொருள் கொள்ளலே பொருந்தும். ஆகிய கிளவி’ என்பதனை, “தன்னும் அவனும் அவளும் சுட்டி” என்பது முதல் ‘மூன்றுடன் விளக்கி’ என்பது வரை ஒவ் வொன்றினோடும், ‘தோழி தேளத்தும், கண்டோர் பாங்கினும், புலம்பலும்’ என்பவற் றோடும் தனித்தனிக் கூட்டிக். ‘அவ்வழி’ என்பது அவ்வாறு உடன் போகிய மகட் பிரிவுக்கு வருந்தும் வழி என்றாகும். ‘புலம்பல்’, தோழி தேளத்தும், கண்டோர் பாங்கினும், வருந்திக் கூறலைச் சுட்டலாகப் பொருள் கோடல், ‘புலம்பே தனிமை’ (உரி-33) என்னும் சூத்திரக்கருத்துக்கு டுளாகும். ஆதலால் நற்றாயின்

தனிப்பட்ட இரக்கத்தையே அச்சொல் உணர்த்து மென்க. 'நிமித்தம்' என்பது காக்கை கரைதல், பல்வி சொல், ஒத்தி நிலை, இடத்தோள் இடக்கண் துடிப்பு முதலியவைகளைக்கொண்டு நன்மை தீமை துணிதல். இதற்குப் புள்ளிதல் என்றே பெயர் வழங்கிற்று. முதலில் பறவைகளைக்கொண்டு குறி பார்க்கும் வழக்கத்தால் பறவையைக் குறிக்கும் புள் என்னும் பெயர் நாளடைவில் எல்லாக் குறிகளையும் குறிக்கும், நிமித்தத்திற்கே வழங்கலாயிற்று. 'மொழிப்பொருள், என்பது நற்சொல்; விரிச்சி, நற்சொல், மொழிப்பொருள்' என்பன ஒரு பொருட் கிளவி விரிச்சியை,

“வேண்டிய பொருளின் விளைவுநன் கறிதற்கு
சுண்டிருண் மாலைச் சொல்லோர்த் தன்று”

என்பர் புறப்பொருள் வெண்பாமாலையார்.

(i) தன்னும் அவனும் அவளும் சுட்டித் தாய் கூறும் கிளவிக்குச் செய்யுள் :—

“இரும்புனிற் நெருமைப் பெருஞ்செவிக் குழவி
பைந்தா தெருவின் வைகுதாயின் மடியுள்
செழுந்தண் மனையோ டெம்மிவ னெழியச்
செல்பெருங் காளை பொய்மருண்டு, சேய்நாட்டுச்
சுவைக்காய் நெல்லிப் போக்கரும் பொங்கர்
வீழ்கடைத் திரள்காய் ஒருங்குடன் தின்று
வீசனைச் சிறுநீர் குடியினள் கழிந்த
சுவளை உண்கண்என் மகளோ ரன்ன
செய்போழ் வெட்டிப் பெய்த லாய
மாலைவிரி நிலவிற் பெயர்ப்புறங் காண்டற்கு
மாயிருந் தாழி கனிப்பத்
தாவின்று கழிகளற் கொள்ளாக் கூற்றே”

(நற்றிணை 271).

இச்செய்யுளில் 'எம் இவண் ஒழிய எனவும்,' 'எற்கொள்ளாக் கூற்றே' எனவும் தாய் தன்னையே சுட்டியும், 'செல்பெருங்காளை பொய் மருண்டு' எனத் தலைவனைச் சுட்டியும், 'வீசனைச் சிறுநீர் குடியினள் கழிந்த சுவளை யுண்கண் என் மகள்' என உடன் போன மகளைச் சுட்டியும் கூறுதல் காண்க.

“என்னும் உள்ளினள் கொல்லோ தன்னை
நெஞ்சணத் தேற்றிய வஞ்சினக் காளையொடு
அழுங்கல் மூதூர் அலரெழுச்
செழும்பல் குன்றம் இறந்தவென் மகளே”

(ஐங். 372)

எனும் செய்யுளுமது.

(ii) நிமித்தத்தொடு சார்த்தி நற்றாய் கூறும் கிளவிக்குச் செய்யுள் :—

“மறுவில் தூவிச் சிறுகருங் காக்கை
அன்புடை மரபினின் கிளையோ டாரப்

பச்சூன் பெய்த பைந்நிண வல்சி
பொலம்புனை கலத்தில் தருகுவென் மாதோ
வெஞ்சின விறல்வேற் காளையொடு
அஞ்சி லோதியை வரக்கரைந் தீமே ” (ஐங். 391).

(iii) மொழிப்பொருள் என்ற நற்சொல்லொடு படுத்து நற்றாய் கூறுதற்குதாரணம் வந்துழிக் காண்க.

(iv) தெய்வத் தொடுபடுத்தி நற்றாய் கூறும்கிளவி :—

‘ அருஞ்சுர மிறந்தஎன் பெருந்தோட் குறுமகள் ’

என்னும் அகம் (195) ஆம் பாட்டில், ‘ அறுவை தோயும் ஒருபெருங்குடமிச் சிறுபைஞ்ஞாற் றிய பஃறலைக் கருங்கோல் ஆகுவ, தறியும் முதுவாய் வேல, கூறுக மாதோ நின்கழங்கின் திப்பம், ஆறுது வருபனி கலுழும் கங்குவின் ஆனாது துயரும் என்கண் இனிது படை இயர், எம்மனை முந்துறத் தருமோ, தம்மனை உய்க்குமோ யாதவன் குறிப்பே ” எனவரும் அடிகள் தெய்வத்தொடு படுத்து நற்றாய் கூறும் கிளவியாகும்.

(v) “ நன்மை சார்தல் :—

மள்ளர் கொட்டின் மஞ்ஞை யாலும்
உயர்நெடுங்குன்றம் படுமழை தலைஇச்
சுரநனி யினிய வாசுக தில்ல’,
அறநெறி இதுவெனத் தெளிந்தஎன்
பிறைநுதற் குறுமகள் போகிய சுரனே’,

எனும் ஐங்குறுநூற்று(371)ச் செய்யுள் மகளின் நன்மை கருதிய தாய்கூற்றும்.

(vi) உடன் போய மகளின் துன்புறு தீமை கருதித் தாய் கூறும் கிளவி:—

“ நிழலான் றவிர்த நீரி லாரிடைக்
கழலோன் காப்பக் கடுகுபு போகி
அறுசுனை மருங்கின் மறுகுபு வெந்த
வெவ்வங் கலுழி தவ்வெனக் குடிக்கிய
யாங்குவல் லுநன்கொல் தானே எர்க்கிய
செம்பொற் புனைகலத் தம்பொரிக் கலந்த
பாலும் பலவென உண்ணாள்
கோலமை குறுந்தொடித் தளிரன் னோனே ” (குறு. 356).

“ நீர்நசைக் கூக்கிய உயவல் யானே
இயம்புணர் தூம்பின் உயிர்க்கும் அத்தம்
சென்றனள் மன்றளன் மகளே
பந்தும் பாவையும் கழங்குமெமக் கொழித்தே ” (ஐங். 377).

என்பதும்அது.

“ நினைத் தொறும் கவிழும் இடும்பை எய்துக
புலிக்கோட் பிழைத்த கவைக்கோட்டு முதுகலை
மான்பிணை அணைதர ஆண்குரல் விளிக்கும்
வெஞ்சுரம் என்மகள் உய்த்த
வம்பமை வல்வில் விடலை தாயே ”

(ஐங். 378).

(vii) அன்ன பிறவும் என்பதற்குத் தலைவன் தாயை நொந்து பழிக்கும்இப்பாவைக் கொள்க.

(viii) முன்னிய காலம் மூன்றுடன் விளக்கும் நற்றாய் கூற்றிற்கு, “ பிரசங்கலந்தசிறுமதுகையளே ” (110) என்னும் நற்றிணைப்பாட்டு உதாரணமாம். கழிந்த மகளின் இளம்பருவச் செய்தியும் உடன் போகிய அவள் நிகழ்காலச் செய்தியும். அவள் எதிர்காலக் கற்பு வாழ்வின் பெருமையும் ஒருங்கே இதிற் போதனால் விளக்கி யுள்ளது காண்க.

(ix) தோழி தேளத்து நற்றாய் கிளவிக்குச் செய்யுள் :—

“ செல்லிய முயலிற் பாஅய சிறகர்
வாவ லுக்கு மாலையாம் புலம்பப்
போகிய அவட்கோ நோவேன் தேமொழித்
துணையிலள் கவிழு நெஞ்சின்
இணையே ருண்கண் இவட்குநோ வதுவே ”

(ஐங். 378).

(x) கண்டோர் பாங்கில் நற்றாய் கூறுதற்கு எடுத்துக்காட்டுச் செய்யுள் :—

“ ஒருமக ஞடையேன் மன்னே அவளும்
செருமிகு மொய்ம்பிற் கூர்வேற் காணையொடு
பெருமலை அருஞ்சுரம் நெருநற் சென்றனள்
இனியே, தாங்குநின் அவல மென்றிர் அதுமற்று
யாங்கனம் ஒல்லுமோ அறிவுடை யீரே '
உள்ளின் உள்ளம் வேமே உண்கண்
மணிவாழ் பாவை நடைகற் றன்னவென்
அணியியற் குறுமகள் ஆடிய
மணியேர் நொச்சியுந் தெற்றியுந் கண்டே ”

(நற்றிணை. 184).

இப்பாவில், ‘ தாங்குநின் அவலமென்றிர், அதுமற்று யாங்கனம் ஒல்லுமோ அறிவுடையீரே ’ என அறிவுடையோராகிய கண்டோர் பாங்கில் நற்றாய் பகர்ந்த கிளவி காண்க.

(xi) நற்றாய் தனிமையிற் கூறல் :—

இதுவென் பாவை பாவை இதுவென்
னலமரு நோக்கி னலம்வரு சடர்நுதற்

பைங்கினி எடுத்த பைங்கினி என்றிவை
காண்டொறுங் காண்டொறுங் கலங்க
நீங்கின னோஎன் பூங்க ணேளே.”

எனும் ஐங்குறு நூற்று(375) ச் செய்யுள், மகட் பிரிந்ததாய் ஆற்றாமையால் வருந்தும் புலம்பு சுட்டிய கிளவி யாகும்.

சூத்திரம் 36.

ஏமப் பேரூர்ச் சேரியுஞ் சுரத்தும்,
தாமே செல்லுந் தாயரு முளரே.”

இது, தலைவி உடன் போகிய வழி அவள் தாய்மார் அவளைத் தேடிச் செல்லுதலும் உண்டென உரைத்தல் நுதலிற்று.

(இ-ள்.) ஏமப் பேரூர்ச் சேரியும் = தீதுறுக்காவலுடைய பேரூரைச்சார்ந்த சேரியிலும்; சுரத்தும் = தலைவி உடன்போகிய அருவழியிலும்; தாமே செல்லும் தாயரு முளரே = தன்னையர் தமர் முதலியோர் துணையின்றிச் சென்ற மகளைத் தேடித் தாமே செல்லும் தாய்மாரும் உளராவர்.

ஏமமற்ற ஊராயின் தாயர்மனையிறந்து புறஞ்செல்லாராதலின் ‘ஏமப் பேரூர்ச்சேரி’ எனப்பட்டது, ஏமப் பேரூர்ச் சேரியில், அதனளவு மகட் பெற்ற நற்றாய் தேடிச் செல்லுதல் அமையும்; நற்றாய் சுரஞ் சென்று தேடுதல் வழக்காறில்லை. செவிலித் தாயர் சுரத்தும் தேடிச் செல்வர். இதுவே பண்டைய ஆன்றோர் செய்யுளிற் கண்ட புலனெறி வழக்கம். சிற்றாராயின் தேடுதல் வேண்டாவாதலின் சேரியுடைய பேரூரே கூறப்பட்டது, ‘தாயரும்’ எனும் உம்மையால், தாமே செல்லும் தாயர் சிலரேயாவ ரென்பதும், பிறரைத் தேடிவர ஏவும் தாய்மாரே பலராவரென்பதும் பெறப்படும்.

இனி, சேரியும் சுரத்தும் என ஒருங்கெண்ணி, ‘செல்லுந் தாயரும் உளர்’ எனப் பன்மையாற் கூறுதலால் நற்றாய்மனையிருந்து இரங்குவதன்றி, இறந்து புறம் பெயர்தல் இன்றெனக் கொண்டு, செவிலித்தாயரே சேரியும் சுரத்தும் செல்வர் எனப் பொருள் கொள்ளினும் தவறுகாது. நற்றாய் பேரூர்ச்சேரி அளவு தேடிச் செல்லுதற்குச் செய்யுள் வருமாறு :— “ஓங்குநிலைத் தாழி மல்கச் சார்த்தி”(275)என்னும் அகப்பாட்டில் “வெம்மலை அருஞ்சுரம்கண்ணுடையீரே” எனவருமடிகள் ஏமப்பேரூர்ச் சேரியில் தேடிச் சென்ற நற்றாய் கூற்றாகும். “கூழை நொச்சிக் கீழது என்மகள் செம்புடைச் சிறுவிரல் வரித்த வண்டலுங் காண்டிரோ” என்பதனால் அப்பேரூர் காவல் மதினுடைய தென்பதும், அந்நகர் மதிப்புறத்தே, தன்மகள் விரல்கொண்டு வரித்த வண்டல்காணக் கிடப்பதாய்க் குறித்ததனால், அது நகர்ப் புறச்சேரி என்பதும் விளக்கமாகும். அன்றியும், ‘நம்மிவனெழிய’ என நற்றாய் தன் முன்னிலையோரையும் உளப்படுத்திக் கூறினதால் அவர் தலைமகள் ஊரவராதலும், தன்னையோல் அவரையும் தலைமகள் விட்டுச்சென்றாள் எனச் சுட்டுந் தாயின் உளக் குறிப்பும் தெளியலாம்.

•இனி, செவிலி தேடிச் சுரஞ் செல்லுதற்குச் செய்யுள் :—

“காலே பரிதப் பினவே கண்ணே
நோக்கி நோக்கி வாளிழந் தனவே

அகலிரு விசம்பின் மீனினும்
பலரே மன்றஇவ் வுலகத்துப் பிறரே

(குறட். 44)

பாலக்கலியில், “ எறித்தரு கதிர்தாங்கி ” எனும்பாட்டில்,

“ வெவ்விடைச் செல்வமலை ஒழுக்கத்தீர் இவ்விடை, என்மகள் ஒருத்தியும், பிறண்மகன் ஒருவனும் ; தம்முளே புணர்ந்த தாமறி புணர்ச்சியர் அன்றார் இருவரைக் காணிரோ பெரும ” எனுமடிகள் சுரஞ்சென்ற செவிலியின் கூற்றும்.

சூத்திரம் 37.

“ அயலோ ராயினும் அகற்சி மேற்றே ”

இது, மேலதற்கோர் புறனடை கூறுதல் நுதலிற்று.

(இ-ள்.) அயலோராயினும் = உடன்போயவரைத் தேடிச்செல்வோர் தாயரன்றி, தமர், எவலர் முதலிய பிறரேயாயினும் ; அகற்சி மேற்றே = அவர்தேடுதல் அண்மையசேரியன்றி அகன்ற சேய்மைய சுரத்தின் கண்ணதேயாகும்.

மேற் சூத்திரத்தில் சொல்லிய இரண்டனுள், அண்மைய சேரியை விலக்கிச் சேய்மைய சுரத்திற்கே, தாயரல்லாப்பிறர் தேடிச்செல்லுதல் மரபு. ஈற்றேகாரம்தேற்றம்.

இதற்குப் பழைய உரைகாரர் வேறுபொருள் புகல்வர். அதுவருமாறு :—அயலோ ராயினும் = முற்கூறிய சேரியினும் சுரத்தினு மன்றித் தம்மனைக்கயலே பிரிந்தாராயினும் ; அகற்சிமேற்றே = அதுவும்பிரிவின் கண்ணதாம் என இளம்பூரணரும், நச்சினார்க்கினியரும் உரைகூறுவர். மேற்கூத்திரம் கூறும் சேரியுஞ் சுரமும் காதலர் பிரியுமிடம் குறியாது, உடன்போன தலைமக்களைத் தாய்மார் தேடிச்செல்லும் இடத்தையே குறிக்கு மாதலால், அங்குப்பிரியாமல் தம்மனை அயலேபிரிதலை இச்சூத்திரம் கூறுவதாகக் கொள்ளும் அவ்விரு உரையும் பொருந்தாது. அன்றியும் மேற் சூத்திரம் பாலையாம் பிரிவைக் குறிப்பதேயன்று ; பிரியாமல் உடன் போன தலைமகளை அவன்தாயர் தேடிச் செல்லுதலை மட்டுமே குறிக்கும். பிரிவையே கருதாத சூத்திரம் பிரியுமிடம் குறிக்கும் எனக்கொள்வது எவ்வாற்றானும் அமைவதன்றும். அதனாலும் அவர்தம் உரை தொல் காப்பியர் கருத்தன்மை அறிக.

இனி, இதற்கு இன்னும் ஒருபொருள் கூறுவாருமுள் :—அதுவருமாறு : அயலோ ராயினும் = உடன் போய தலைமக்கள் சேரி, சுரம் போகாமல் ஊரகத்தே மனை அயலில் தங்குவாராயினும் ; அகற்சிமேற்றே = அதுவும்பிரிவின் கண்ணதேயாம்.

இவ்வுரையும் இச்சூத்திரத்திற்குப்பொருந்தாது.

மனை அயல் உறைதல் உடன்போதலாமாறில்லை உடன்போய தலைமக்கள் மனை அயல் உறைந்ததாகப் புலனெறி வழக்கில் யாண்டும் ஆன்றோர் செய்யுளிலாட்சியு மில்லை ; ‘ தாமே செல்லும் தாயரும் ’ என்னும் முன்கூத்திரத்தொடரொடு அடுத்தியையும் அயலோராயின் எனும் சொற்றொடர் அவ்வாறு செல்லுந் தாயரல்லாப்பிறரையே சுட்டு வது வெளிப்படடை. மேலும், ‘ அகற்சி ’ என்பது பிரிந்த நெடுந்தூரத்தையே குறிக்கு மாதலின், மனை அயலைக்குறியாது. ‘ அகற்சி ’ யை நீங்குதல் எனப்பொருள் கொண்டு,

பிரிவெனும்பாலுத்திணையை இச்சூத்திரம் கூறுவதாக உரையாசிரியர் கொண்டனர்; முன், அவர் கொண்டுதலைக் கழிதலைப்பாலுத் திணையாகக்கொண்டதுபற்றி இச்சூத்திரத்திற்கும் இவ்வாறு உரைகூறுவாராயினர். உடன்போகும் தலைமக்கள் தம்முட் பிரிதலின்மையின், அவரொழுக்கம் பாலையாதலில்லை. அதனால் ஈண்டு 'அகற்சி' என்பது பிரிதலை உணர்த்தாது சேனையே உணர்த்துமென்க. தலைவி தமர் தேடிச்சுரஞ்செல்லுதற்குச் செய்யுள் வருமாறு:— 'அன்றையினையவாகி' என்னும் நற்றிணை (48)-ஆம் செய்யுளில், "நீர்எமரிடைஉறுதர ஒளித்தகாடே என்பதும்," 'வினையமைபாவையின்' என்னும் நற்றிணை (362)-ஆம் செய்யுளில், 'தும்ர்வரின் மறைகுவென் மா அயோளே' என்பதும் சேன சென்று தமர் தேடுதலைக்குறிக்கும்.

சூத்திரம் 38.

“தலைவரும் விழும நிலையெடுத் துரைப்பினும்
போக்கற் கண்ணும் விடுத்தற் கண்ணும்
நீக்கலின் வந்த தம்முறு விழுமமும்
வாய்மையும் பொய்மையும் கண்டோர்ச் சுட்டித்
தாய்நிலை நோக்கித் தலைப்பெயர்த்துக் கொளினும்
நோய்மிகப் பெருகித்தன் நெஞ்சுகலுழந் தோனே
அழிந்தது களையென மொழிந்தது கூறி
வன்புறை நெருங்கி வந்ததன் திறத்தோ
டென்றிவை பெல்லாம் இயல்புற நாடின
ஒன்றித் தோன்றும் தோழி மேன”.

இச்சூத்திரம் தோழிக்குக் கூற்று நிகழுமிடம் உணர்த்துகின்றது. தலைவரும் விழும நிலையெடுத்துரைப்பினும் = தலைவனுக்கும், தலைவிக்கும் பிரிவால்வரும் ஏதப்பாடுகளை எடுத்துக் கூறுதற்கண்ணும்; போக்கற்கண்ணும் = தலைமகனுடன் தலைவியை அனுப்பு மிடத்தும்; விடுத்தற்கண்ணும் = உடன்கொண்டு செல்லாமல், தலைவன் தலைவியை விட்டு நீங்கு மிடத்தும்; நீக்கலின் வந்த தம்முறு விழுமமும் = தலைவிதன்னையும், தமரையும். நீத்துச் செல்லுதலால் தனக்கும், தாயர்முதலிய தமருக்குமுற்ற துன்பத்தையும்; வாய்மையும் பொய்மையும் கண்டோர்ச் சுட்டித் தாய் நிலைநோக்கித் தலைப்பெயர்த்துக் கொளினும் = மெய்யையும், பொய்யையும் புணந்துகூறியும் கண்டோரைக்காட்டியும் நற்றாயின் பருவரலைக்கருதி மறுத்தரத் தலைவியை வரவேற்றுக்கொள்ளுதலினும்; நோய் மிகப் பெருகித்தன் நெஞ்சு கலுழந்தோனே = தலைவன்விடுத்தகல ஆற்றமையால் மிக நொந்து மனங்கலங்கும் தலைவியை; அழிந்தது களையென = வருந்துதலை ஒழி யென; மொழிந்தது கூறி = தலைவன் கூறியதை எடுத்துக் கூறி; வன்புறை நெருங்கிவந்ததன் திறத்தொடு = வற்புறுத்தி ஆற்றுவிக்கும் கூற்றுக்கள் நிகழ்த்தும் திறத்தொடு; என்றிவை பெல்லாம் = இவை போல்வனபிற பொருந்து மிடங்களி லெல்லாம்; இயல்புறநாடின ஒன்றித்தோன்றும் தோழிமேன = அகத்துறை இலக் கணத்தை ஆராயின் தோழிக்குரியனவாய்ப் பொருந்தித் தோன்றும்.

விடுத்தற் கண்ணும் என்பதற்குப் பண்டை உரையாளராய இளம்பூரணரும், தலைவியைத் தோழி தலைவனுடன் கூட்டிவிடுத்தற்கண்ணும் எனப்பொருள் கூறுவர்.

‘போக்கற் கண்ணும்’ என்பதும் இதனையே குறிக்குமாதலின், இவர்பொருள் ஆசிரியர்க்குக் கூறியது கூறல் என்னும் குற்றம்தரும். அன்றியும் பின் தலைவன் கூற்றுக்களைக் கூறும், ‘ஒன்றாத் தமரினும்’ எனும் சூத்திரத்தில் தலைவன் தலைவியை “ஒன்றிய தோழி யொடு வலிப்பினும், விடுப்பினும்” என்றுதொல்காப்பியர்கூறுதலான், தலைவியைத் தலைவன் உடன் கொண்டு செல்லுதலும், விடுத்துச்செல்லுதலும், உண்டெனத் தெளியக்கிடத்தலின், ஈண்டு விடுத்தல் என்பதும் தலைவியைத் தலைவன் விட்டுச் செல்லலையே குறிக்கு மென்பது ஒருதலை. இச்சூத்திரத்தில் தலைவன் மொழிந்தது கூறித் தலைவியைத் தோழி ஆற்றுவித்தலைக் கூறுதலானும், தலைவி வருந்தத் தலைவன் அவளைவிட்டுச் செல்லுதலுண்டென்பது போதரும்.

‘தலைப்பெயர்த்துக் கொளினும்’ என்பதற்கு நச்சினார்க்கினியர் உடன்போய தலைவியைத் தேடிச்செல்லாமல் தாயை மீட்டுக்கொள்ளுதல் எனப்பொருள் கொள்ளுவர். இதற்கு ஆன்றோர் செய்யுள் ஆட்சியின்மையின் இவ்வுரை சிறவாது. இதற்கு நச்சினார்க்கினியர் காட்டும், ‘அவளே, உடனமர் ஆயமொடு ஓரைவேண்டாது’ “எனும்பாட்டில் சுரஞ்செல்லும்தாயை மீட்டருறிப்பொன்றுமில்லை மகட் பிரிவுக்கு வருந்தும் தாயைத் தோழிஆற்றுவித்ததையே இச்செய்யுள் குறிக்கிறது.

“பால்பாற் படுப்பச் சென்றனள் ; அதனால்

நீஎவ னிரங்குதி அன்னை

விழுவயர்ந் திருப்பின் அல்லதை இனியே”.

என்பதே ஈண்டுத் தோழி கூற்றுதல் காண்க. ‘ஒழிந்தது கூறி’ என நச்சினார்க்கினியர் கொண்ட பாடத்தினும், காலத்தால் முற்பட்ட இளம்பூரணர் கொண்ட ‘மொழிந்தது கூறி’ எனும் பாடமே, மரபுநிலை வழாச்சிறப்பும் செவ்விய முடைத்து. வன்புற நெருங்குதலாவது, வற்புறுத்திக் கூறலாகும்.

இனி “நோய்மிகப் பெருகித் தன் நெஞ்சுகலுழந்தோளை, அழிந்தது களை இய ஒழிந்தது கூறி வன்புற நெருங்கி வந்ததன் திறத்தோடு” எனப் பாடங்கொண்டு, மகட் பிரிவாற்றாது அரற்றும் தாயை அவள் வருத்தம் தீர்த்தல் கருதி, தலைவியும் தலைவனும் கூறியனவும், செய்தனவும் எடுத்துச்சொல்லி விரைவில் மீள்வாரென வற்புறுத்தித் தேற்றுவ கூற்றோடே, எனப் பொருள் கொள்ளுவதும் பொருந்துவதாகும். அதற்குச் செய்யுள்:— அன்னை வாழியோ அன்னை சின்மகள்” எனும் கீழ்வருஞ் செய்யுளாம்.

தலைவரும் விழுமநிலை எடுத்துரைத்தற்குச் செய்யுள்:—

“பொலம்பசும் பாண்டிற் காசுநிரை அல்குல்
இலங்குவனோ மென்றோள் இழைநிலை நெகிழப்
பிரிதல் வல்லுவை யாயின்
அரிதே விடலையிவள் ஆயுறுதற் கவினே”

(ஐங். 310).

தோழி தலைவி விழுமம் தலைவற்குக் கூறியது.

‘பாஅல் அஞ்செவி’ எனும் பாலைக்கலியில்,
“பொய்நல்கல் புரிந்தனை புறந்தரல் கைவிட்

டெந்நாளோ நெடுந்தகாய் நீசெல்வ
தந்நாள்கொண் டிறக்குமிவ ளரும்பெற லுயிரே ”

என வரும் போக்கியலுமதுவே.

இனி, தோழி தலைவிக்குத் தலைவன் விழுமம் உரைத்தற்குதாரணம் வருமாறு :—

“ திணைகிளி கழிகெனிற் பகலும் ஒல்லும் ;
இரவுநீ வருதலின் ஊறும் அஞ்சுவல் ;
யாங்குச்செய் வாமென் னிடும்பை நோய்க்கென
ஆங்குயான் கூறிய அணைத்திற்கும் பிறிதுசெத்
தோங்குமலை நாடன் உயிர்த்தோன் மன்ற
ஐதே காமம் யானே
கழிமுதுக் குறைமையின் பழியுமென் றிசினே.” (குறு. 217).

போக்கற்கண் தோழி தலைவற்குக் கூறியதற்குச் செய்யுள் வருமாறு :—

“ பெருநன் றுற்றிற் பேணுரு முளரே
ஒருநன் றுடைய ளாயினும் புரிமாண்டு
புலவி தீர வளிமதி இலைகவரப்
பாடமை யொழுகிய தண்ணறுஞ் சாரன்
மென்னடை மரையா துஞ்சு
நன்மலை நாட நின்னல திலளே ” (குறு. 115).

“ அண்ணந்தேந்திய ” எனும் நற்றிணை (10)-ஆம் செய்யுளில் ‘நன்னெடுங் கூந்தல்
நரையொடு முடிப்பினும் நீத்தல் ஓம்புமதி பூக்கேழூர் ’ என்பதும் போக்கற்கண் தோழி
தலைவனுக்குக் கூறியதாகும்.

“ இவளே நின்னல திலளே யாயும்
சுவளே யுண்கண் இவளல திலளே
யானு மாயிடை யேனே
மாமலை நாட மறவா தீமே.”

எனவரும் செய்யுளுமது.

தலைவனுடன் போக்கற்கண் தோழி தலைவிக்குக் கூறியதற்குச் செய்யுள் :—

“ ஊஉர் அலரொழச் சேரி கல்லென,
ஆளு தலைக்கும் அறனில் அன்னை
தானே யிருக்க தன்மகள் யானே
நெல்லி தின்ற முள்ளொயிறு தயங்க
உணலாய்ந் திசினு லவரொடு சேய்நாட்டு
விண்டொட நிவந்த விலங்குமலைக் கவாஅற்
கரும்புநடு பாத்தி யன்ன
பெருங்களிற் றடிவழி நிலைஇய நீரே ” (குறு. 262).

தலைவியைத் தலைவன் விடுத்தற்கண் தோழி தலைவற்குக் கூறிய கிளவி:—

“ உமணர்ச்,

சேர்ந்து கழிந்த மருங்கின் அகன்றலை
ஊர்பாழ்த் தன்ன ஓமையம் பெருங்காடு
இன்னு வென்றீ ராயின்
இனியவோ பெரும் தமிழேற்கு மனையே ”

(குறு. 124).

“ மரையா மரல்கவர மாரி வறப்ப
வரையோங் கருஞ்சுரத் தாரிடைச் செல்வோர்
சுரையம்பு மூழ்கச் சுருங்கிப் புரையோர்தம்
உண்ணீர் வறப்பப் புலர்வாடு நாவிற்குத்
தண்ணீர் பெறுஅத் தடுமாற் றருந்துயரம்
கண்ணீர் நனைக்குங் கடுமைய காடென்றால்
என்னீர் அறியாதிர்போல இவைகூறின்
நின்னீர் வல்ல நெடுத்தகா யெம்மையும்
அன்பறச் சூழாதே ஆற்றிடை தும்மொடு
துன்பந் துணையாக நாடி னதுவல்லது
இன்பமு முண்டோ எமக்கு ”

(கவி-6) எனும் பாலைக் கலியுமது.

“ ஒன்றில்காலை அன்றில் போலப்
புலம்புகொண் டிறையும் புன்கண் வாழ்க்கை
யானுமாற் றேன்அது தானும்வந் தன்று
நீங்கல் வாழி யரைய....”

எனும் நற்றிணைப் பாட்டுமதுவே.

“ மால்வெள் ளோத்திரத்து மையில் வாலிணர்
அருஞ்சுரம் செல்வோர் சென்னிக் கூட்டும்
அவ்வரை இறக்குவை யாயின்
மைவரை நாட வருந்துவள் பெரிதே ”

எனவரும் ஐங்குறுநூற்றுச் (301) செய்யுளுமது.

விடுத்தற்கண் தோழி தலைவிக்குக் கூறியதற்குச் செய்யுள் வருமாறு :—

“ நிலந்தொட்டுப் புகாஅர் வான மேறார்
விலங்கிரு முந்நீர் காலிற் செல்லார்
நாட்டின் நாட்டின் ஊரின் ஊரின்
சூடிமுறை சூடிமுறை தேரிற்
கெடுநரு முளரோடும் காத லோரே ”

(குறு. 130).

“பொன்செய் பாண்டிற் பொலங்கல நந்தத்
தேரக லல்குல் அவ்வரி வாட
இறந்தோர் மன்ற தாமே பிறங்குமலைப்
புல்லரை யோமை ரீடிய
புலிவழங் கதர கானத் தானே”.

எனும் ஐங்குறுநூற்று (316)ப்பாவுமதுவே.

நீக்கலின் வந்த தம்முறு விழுமம் தோழி கூறுதற்கு உதாரணம் :—

“அன்னை வாழியோ அன்னை நின்மகள்
என்னினும் யாயினும் நின்னினும் சிறந்த
தன்னமர் இளந்துணை மருட்டலின் முனாஅது
வென்வேற் புல்லி வேங்கட நெடுவரை
மழையொடு மிடைந்த வயக்களிற் றருஞ்சுரம்
விழவுடை உள்ளமொடு உழைவயிற் பிரியாது
வன்கண் செய்து சென்றனள்
புன்கண் செய்தல் புரைவதோ அன்றே”.

தாய்நிலை நோக்கித் தலைப்பெயர்த்துக் கொளற்குச் செய்யுள் :—

“புள்ளு மறியாப் பல்பழம் பழுநி
மடமான் அறியாத் தடரீர் நிலைஇச்
சுரநனி இனிய வாசுக வென்று
நினைத்தொறுங் கலிழு மென்னினும்
மிகப்பெரிது புலம்பின்று தோழிநம் மூரே”.

(ஐங். 398).

அழிந்தது களையென மொழிந்தது கூறி வன்புறை நெருங்கித் தோழி கூறுதற்குச் செய்யுள் :—

‘அரிதாய அறனெய்தி’ என்னும் பாலை (10)க்கலியில்,

“கடியவே கனங்குழாய் காடென்றார் அக்காட்டுள்
... ..
பிடியூட்டிப் பின் னுண்ணும் களிநெனவும் உரைத்தனரே”

என்பதுபோன்ற தலைவன் மொழிந்தவற்றை எடுத்துக் காட்டி,

“இணைநல முடைய கானஞ் சென்றோர்,
புணைநலம் வாட்டுந ரல்லர் மனைவயின்
பல்லியும் பாங்கொத் திசைத்தன
நல்லெழி லுண்கணும் ஆடுமா லிடனே”

எனக்கூறி அழியும் தலைவியை ஆற்றுவித்தாள்.

“தன்கயத்தமன்றவண்டுபடு துணைமலர்” எனும் மருதனிளநாகஞர் அகப்பாட்டில் (அகம். 59),

“வருந்தினை வாழியர் நீயே

...

...

...

தாம்பா ராட்டிய காலையு முள்ளார்

பிரிந்து சேணுறைநர் சென்ற வாரே,”

“புன்தலை மடப்பிடி உணீஇயர் அங்குழை

நெடுநிலை யாஅ மொற்றி நனைகவுள்

படிஞ்ரிமிறு கடியும் களிநே”

என்று எடுத்துக்காட்டி அழியும்தலைவியைத் தோழி ஆற்றுவித்தலும் காண்க.

‘என்றிவை எல்லாம்’ எனப் பொதுப்படக்கூறுதலான் ‘தோழி இது பருவமன்று’ என்பது போன்ற கூற்றுக்கள் நிகழ்த்தி ஆற்றுவித்தலையுங் கொள்க. அதற்குச் செய்யுள் வருமாறு:—

“மடவ மன்ற தடவுநிலைக் கொன்றை

கல்பிறங் கத்தஞ் சென்றோர் கூறிய

பருவம் வாரா வளவை, நெரிதரக்

கொம்புசேர் கொடியிணை ஞழ்த்த

வம்ப மாரியைக் காரென மதித்தே”

(குறள். 66).

சூத்திரம் 39.

“பொழுதும் ஆறும் உட்குவரத் தோன்றி

வழுவி னாகிய குற்றங் காட்டலும்

ஊரது சார்வும் செல்லுந் தேயமும்

ஆர்வ நெஞ்சமொடு செப்பிய வழியினும்

புணர்ந்தோர் பாங்கிற் புணர்ந்த நெஞ்சமொடு

அழிந்தெதிர் கூறி விடுப்பினும் ஆங்கத்

தாய்நிலை கண்டு தடுப்பினும் விடுப்பினும்

சேய்நிலைக் ககன்றோர் செலவினும் வரவினும்

கண்டோர் மொழிதல் கண்டதென்ப.”

இது, தலைமக்கள் உடன்போக்கின்கண் கண்டோர் கூற்று நிகழியிடம் கூறுகின்றது.

(இ-ள்) பொழுதும் ஆறும் உட்குவரத் தோன்றி வழுவினாகிய குற்றங் காட்டலும் = அவர் போகும்பொழுதும், வழியும் அச்சந்தரத்தக்கவாகத் தோன்ற, அதற்கஞ்சாது மேற்செல்லுந்தவற்றால், வினையும் ஏதப்பாட்டை எடுத்துக் காட்டுதலும்; ஊரது சார்வும் = உடன் போவார்க்கு வழித்தக்க அண்மையில் ஊருண்மையையும்; செல்லும் தேயமும் = அவர்கள் செல்லுமிடத்தின் சேய்மையையும்; ஆர்வ நெஞ்சமொடு செப்பிய வழியினும் =

அன்பு நிறைந்த உள்ளத்தோடு தலைமக்கட்கு நலம் பேணிப்பரிந்து கூறுமிடத்தும் ; புணர்ந்தோர் பாங்கிற் புணர்ந்த நெஞ்சமொடு அழிந்தெதிர் கூறி விடுப்பினும் = காதலால் கூடின தலைமக்கள்பால் அன்புற்ற உள்ளத்தோடு அவர் நிலைமைக் கழிந்து எதிரெடுத்த துரைத்து அவரை விடுக்குமிடத்தும் ; ஆங்கத்தாய் நிலைகண்டு தடுப்பினும் = தலைமக்களைத் தாங்கண்ட சுரத்திடையே தேடிவரும் செவிலித்தாய் நிலைமைகண்டு அவளை மேற்செல்லாது தடுத்துரைக்கு மிடத்தும் ; விடுப்பினும் = நீ மேற்செல்லின் தலைமக்களைக் காண்பை எனக்கூறி அவளை விடுக்குமிடத்தும் ; சேய்நிலைக் ககன்றோர் செலவினும் வரவினும் = தொலை செல்லும் தலைமக்களின் உடன்போக்கிலும், அவர் மறுதரவிலும் ; கண்டோர் மொழிதல் கண்டதென்ப = உடன்போம் தலைமக்களைக்கண்டவர்கள் கூற்று நிகழ்த்தல், வழக்கின்கண் காணப்பட்டதென்பர் இலக்கண நூலார்.

பொழுதும் ஆறும் உட்குவரத் தோன்றி வருவினகிய குற்றம் காட்டற்குச் செய்யுள் :—

“ எல்லு மெல்லின்று பாடுங் கேளாய்
செல்லா தீமோ சிறுபிடி துணையே
வேற்றுமுனை வெம்மையிற் சாத்துவர் திறுத்தென
வளையணி நெடுவே லேந்தி
மிளைவந்து பெயருந் தண்ணுமைக் குரலே ”. (குறு. 390).

ஊரது சார்வு கண்டோர் கூறும் கிளவி வருமாறு :—

“ நல்லோன் மெல்லடி நடையு மாற்றாள்,
பல்கதிர்ச் செல்வன் கதிரும் ஊழ்த்தனன்,
அணித்தாற் றேன்றுவது எம்மூர்,
மணித்தார் மார்பு, சேர்ந்தனை சென்மோ ” (பொருளியல்).

ஆர்வ நெஞ்சமொடு கண்டோர் கூறியதற்குக் கூற்று :—

“ வில்லோன் காலன கழலே தொடியோன்
மெல்லடி மேலவுஞ் சிலம்பே நல்லோர்
யார்கொல் அனியர், தாமே ஆரியர்
கயிறுடு பறையிற் கால்பொரக் கலங்கி
வாகை வெண்ணெற் றொலிக்கும்
வேப்பயில் அழுவம் முன்னிப்போரே ”. (குறு. 7).

பைங்காய் நெல்லி பலவுடன் மிசைந்து
செங்கால் மராஅத்த வரிநிழல் இருந்தோர்
யார்கொல் அனியர் தாமே வார்சிறைக்
குறுங்கால் மகன்றில் அன்ன
உடன்புணர் கொள்கைக் காத லோரே *

எனும் ஐக்குறு நூறு (381) மது.

அழிந்தெதிர் கூறிவிடுத்தற்குச் செய்யுள் :—

“ இது நும் மூரே யாவருங் கேளிர் ;
பொதுவறு சிறப்பின் வதுவையுங் காண்டும் ;
சுன்றோர் எய்தாச் செய்தவம்
யாம்பெற் றனமால் மீண்டனை சென்மோ ”

(பொருள்—40ஆ—உதாரணம்) .

தாய் நிலை கண்டு கண்டோர் தடுத்தற்குச் செய்யுள் :—

“ பெயர்ந்து போகுதி பெருமூ தாட்டி
சிலம்புகெழு சிறடி சிவப்ப
இலங்குவேற் காளையொடு இறந்தனள் சுரனே .

தாய் நிலை கண்டு விடுத்தற்கு மேற்கோள் :—

“ நெருப்பவிர் கனலி உருப்புச்சினந் தணியக்
கருங்கால் யாத்து வரிநிழ லிரீஇச்
சிறுவரை இறப்பிற் காண்குவை செறிதொடிப்
பொன்னேர் மேனி மடந்தையொடு
வென்வேல் விடலை முன்னிய சுரனே ”

(ஐங். 388) .

சேய் நிலைக்கன்றோர் செலவிற் கண்டோர் கூறும் கூற்று :—

“ செய்வினைப் பொலிந்த செறிதழல் நோன்தாள்
மையணற் காளையொடு பைய வியலிப்
பாவை யன்னஎன் ஆய்தொடி மடந்தை
சென்றனள் என்றிர் ஐய ;
ஒன்றின வோஅவள் அஞ்சிலம் படியே .

(ஐங். 389) .

இதில் கண்டோர் கூற்றைச் செவிலி கொண்டு கூறுதல் அறிக .

வரவிற்கட் கண்டோர் கூறியதற்குச் செய்யுள் :—

“ இவன்இவள் ஐம்பால் பற்றவு மிவளிவன்
புன்றலை யோரி வாங்குநள் பரியவும்
காதற் செவிலியர் தவிர்ப்பவுந் தவிராது
ஏதில் சிறுசெரு வறுப மன்றே ;
நல்லைமன் றம்ம பாலை மெல்லியற்
துணைமலர்ப் பிணையலன்ன இவர்
மணமகிழ் இயற்கை காட்டி யோயே ”

(குறு. 229) .

குத்திரம் 40.

“ ஒன்றாக் தமரினும் பருவத்துஞ் சுரத்தும்,
ஒன்றிய மொழியொடு வலிப்பினும் விடுப்பினும்,

இடைச்சுர மருங்கின் அவள்தம் ரெய்திக்
கடைக்கொண்டு பெயர்தலிற் கலங்களு ரெய்திக்
கற்பொடு புணர்ந்த கௌவை யுளப்பட
அப்பாற் பட்ட வொருதிறத் தானும் ;
நாளது சின்மையும், இளமைய தருமையும்,
தாளான் பக்கமும் தகுதிய தமைதியும்
இன்மைய திளிவும் உடைமைய துயர்ச்சியும்
அன்பின தகலமும் அகற்சிய தருமையும் ;
ஒன்றாப் பொருள்வயின் ஊக்கிய பாவினும் ;
வாயினுங் கையினும் வகுத்த பக்கமோடு
ஊதியங் கருதிய ஒருதிறத் தானும்
புகழும் மானமும் எடுத்துவற் புறுத்தலும்
தூதிடை யிட்ட வகையி னானும்
ஆகித் தோன்றும் பாங்கோர் பாங்கினும்
மூன்றன் பகுதியும் மண்டிலத் தருமையும்
தோன்றல் சான்ற மாற்றோர் மேன்மையும்
பாசறைப் புலம்பலும் முடிந்த காலத்துப்
பாகனொடு விரும்பிய வினைத்திற வகையினும் ;
காவற் பாங்கின் ஆங்கோர் பக்கமும் ;
பரத்தையின் அகற்சியிற் பரிந்தோட் குறுகி
இரத்தலும் தெளித்தலும் எனஇரு வகையோடு
உரைத்திற நாட்டங் கிழவோன் மேன.”

இது, உடன்போக்கும், பிரிவின் வகையும், காரணங்களும் பற்றித் தலைவனுக்குக் கூற்று நிகழும் இடன் கூறுகின்றது.

(இ-ள்.) ஒன்றாத்தமரினும் பருவத்தும், சுரத்தும் ஒன்றிய மொழியொடு வலிப்
பினும் = வரைவுடன்படாத சுற்றத்தோடும், பருவத்தின் கண்ணும், சுரத்திலும் ஏற்புடைச்
சொல்லொடு தலைவியை உடன்கொண்டு செல்லத் துணியுமிடத்தும் ; விடுப்பினும் =
கொண்டு தலைக்கழியாமல் தலைவியைத் தான் விடுத்துப் பிரியுமிடத்தும் ; இடைச்சுர
மருங்கில் அவள் தமர் எய்தி = உடன்போக்கில் அரும் வழியினிடையே தலைவியின்
தன்னையர் முதலிய சுற்றத்தாருற்று ; கடைக்கொண்டு பெயர்தலிற் = தலைவியைக்
கொண்டு திரும்புமிடத்து ; கலங்களுரெய்திக் கற்பொடு புணர்ந்த கௌவை உளப்பட =
தலைவியங்கித் துன்பமெய்திக் கற்பால் தலைவன்பால் சேரலாலுளவாம் பூசலுட்பட ;
அப்பாற்பட்ட ஒரு திறத்தானும் = அத்தகைய (பல) பகுதிப்பட்ட ஒரு முறையானும் ;
நாளது சின்மையும் = வாழ்நாளின் சின்மையால் பொருள் வலித்தலும் ; இளமைய
தருமையும் = இன்ப நுகர்ச்சிக்குரிய இளமையின் அரிய தன்மை (பொருட் பிணியை)
நலித்தலும் ; தாளான் பக்கமும் = முயற்சியின் பெருமை கருதிப் பொருள் வலித்தலும் ;
தகுதிய தமைதியும் = தலைவியைப் பேணும் தகுதியின் அமைதி பொருட் பிணியை
மெலித்தலும் ; இன்மையதிளிவும் = இலம் பாட்டின் இழிவு கருதிப் பொருள் வலித்தலும்.

உடைமைய துயர்ச்சியும்=கிடைத்திருக்கும் தலைவியின் காதலாகிய புத்துடைமையின் பெருமை பொருட் பிணியை மெலித்தலும்; அன்பின் தகலமும்=தலைவிபால் அன்பின் பெருக்கால் அவள் பொருட்டுப் பொருள் வலித்தலும்; அகற்சிய தருமையும்=அவளைப் பிரிந்திருக்க ஒல்லாமை, பொருட்பிணியை மெலித்தலும்; ஒன்றாப் பொருள் வயின் ஊக்கிய பாலினும்=ஆக இவ்வாறு (ஒன்றுக்கொன்று மாறுபட்டுப்) பொருந்தாத பொருள் பற்றி வலிக்கும் பிரிவின் பகுதிகளிலும்; வாயினும் கையினும் வகுத்த பக்கமொடு ஊதியங் கருதிய ஒருதிறத்தானும்=தூல் முதலியன கற்கும் கல்வியும், படை ஓவியம் முதலிய பயிலும் கலையும் என வகுக்கப்பட்ட கல்விப் பகுதிகளின் பயனை எண்ணிப் பிரியும் ஒரு பகுதித் கண்ணும்; புகழும் மானமும் எடுத்து வற்புறுத்தலும்=(இவ்விரண்டிலும்) புகழையும் மானத்தையும் பேணற்பொருட்டுப் பிரிவு வற்புறுத்துமிடத்தும்; தூதிடையிட்ட வகையினனும்=பகை வேந்தரிடைச் சந்து செய்யும் பிரிவு வகைகளிலும்; ஆகித் தோன்றும் பாங்கோர் பாங்கினும்=தனக்கு உரிமையாகத் தோன்றும் பாங்கரிடத்தும்; மூன்றன் பகுதியும்=மேலே கூறியாங்கு, பொருள், ஓதல், தூது என்ற பிரிவின் பகுதி மூன்றிலும்; மண்டிலத் தருமையும்=பகைப் புலத்தின் அருமையும்; தோன்றல் சான்ற மாற்றோர் மேன்மையும்=புகழாற் சிறந்த பகைவரின் பெருமையும்; பாசறைப் புலம்பலும்=போர்க்கட்டிரிற் செருமுடிந்தபின் தலைவியை உள்ளும் தலைவன் தனிமையும்; முடிந்த காலத்துப் பாகனொடு விரும்பிய வீணத்திறவகையினும்=வந்த வீணை முடிந்தபொழுது தேர்ப்பாகனொடு தலைவன் தான் செய்ய விரும்புவனவும் கூறும் வகையினும்; காவற்பாங்கின் ஆங்கோர் பக்கமும்=பிறர் நாடு காக்குமிடத்தானும் ஓர் பிரிவின் கண்ணும்; பரத்தையின கற்சியிற் பரிந்தோட்குறுகி=பரத்தையின் பிரிவால் பரியும் தலைவியை அணுகி; இரத்தலும்=தன் தவறு பொறுக்கு மாறு தலைவன் வேண்டதலும்; தெளித்தலும்=தன் தவறினமை கூறித் தலைவியைத் தேற்றலும்; என இருவகையொடு=என இவ்விரண்டு வகையொடுகூட; உரைத்திற நாட்டம்=மேற்கூறிய இடங்களிலெல்லாம் கூற்றுவகை நாடுதல்; கிழவோன் மேன=தலைவன்கண் நிகழும்.

இச்சூத்திரம், ஒன்றாத் தமரினும் என்பது முதல் ஒருதிறத்தானும் என்றதுவரை உடன்போக்கில் தலைவன் கூற்று நிகழுமிடங்களைச் சுட்டும் பகுதியும், எஞ்சியவெல்லாம் பிரிவின் கண் கூற்று நிகழு மிடங்களைச் சுட்டும் பகுதியுமாக அமைந்துள்ளது. பிறறைய பிரிவுப்பகுதியில் ஆறுவகைப்பிரிவும் கூறப்படுகிறது. நாளது சின்மையும் என்பதுமுதல், பொருள்வயின் ஊக்கிய பாலினும் என்பதீராகப் பொருட் பிரிவும் (1), வாயினும் கையினும் என்பது முதல் எடுத்து வற்புறுத்தலும் என்றதுவரை ஓதற் பிரிவும் (2), தூதிடையிட்ட வகையினனும் என்பதால் தூதிற் பிரிவும் (3), மண்டிலத்தருமை முதல், வீணத்திற வகையினும் என்றதுவரை பகைப் பிரிவுவகையும் (4), காவற்பாங்கின் ஆங்கோர் பக்கமும் என்பதால் காவற் பிரிவும் (5), பரத்தையினகற்சி என்பதால் பரத்தையிற் பிரிவும் (6), ஆகப் பிரிவு வகை ஆறும் முறையே வகைப்படுத்திக் கூறப்பட்டன. பாசறைப் புலம்பல், பாகனொடு கூறல் முதலிய பகைவயிற் பிரிவின்பாற் பட்டடங்கும், ஆகித் தோன்றும் பாங்கோர் பாங்கினும், மூன்றன் பகுதியும் என்பது,—அதற்குமுன் வகைப் படுத்திக் கூறப்பட்ட “பொருள், ஓதல், தூது என்ற மூன்றன் பகுதிகளிலும் உரிய பாங்கன், பாங்கியரிடத்துத் தலைவன் கூறும்”—எனத் தொகுத்து உணர்த்தும் தொடராயமையும், ‘மூன்றன் பகுதி’—என்பதற்கு, “இப்பகுதியில் தொல்காப்பியரால் சுட்டி விளக்கப் பெறாத பிற தூல்களிற்கண்ட நால்வகைவலியுள் மூன்றென” இளம் பூரணரும், “அறம், பொருள், இன்பமென”—நச்சினர்க்கினியரும் தம்முள் மாறு

பட்டு இருவேறு பொருள் கூறுகின்றனர். இவை உரையன்மை வெளிப்படை, தூலில் கூறும் தொகையால் குறிக்கும் வகைகளை, ஆங்கே விளக்காது சூத்திரிப்பது தூன்மீரபாகாமையானும், ஈண்டுப்பிரிவுவகை மூன்றும் விளக்கப்பட்டு, அவற்றை அடுத்து 'மூன்றன்பகுதி' எனத்தொகை கூறப்படுதலானும், இத்தொடர் இச்சூத்திரத்தில் தெளிக்கப்பட்ட பிரிவு வகைமூன்றையே குறிப்பது விளக்கமாகும். இவ்வாறே புறத் திணையியல் (24) "மாற்றும் கூற்றும்" என்னும் சூத்திரத்திடையில், 'ஈரைந்தாகும்' எனத்தொகுத்துப் பிரித்ததும் காண்க.

பொருட் பிரிவுப் பகுதிக்கண், பொருட்பிணியால் ஒருபுறம் பிரிய விரும்புதலும், காதலால், பிரிவொல்லாது செலவழுங்குதலுமாகத் தம்முள் முரண்படும் உணர்ச்சிகள் தலைவன்பால் நிகழுமியல்பை, விளக்கிய பகுதிபாராட்டற்பாலது. நாளது சின்மையால் பொருளீட்டும் விருப்பம் (காதல்) உடைமை உயர்ச்சியால் தகைக்கப்படுவதும், அன்பு பற்றித் தலைவி, தமர் முதலியோர்க்குப் பொருளீட்டும் விருப்பமும், அவ்வன்பிற்குரிய தலைவியின் அகந்சியருமையால் தகைக்கப்படுதலும், இயல்பாதலின் ஒன்றப் பொருள் வயின் ஊக்கியபாலெனப் பொருட் பிரிவில் தலைவன் உள்ளத்தில் நிகழும் உணர்ச்சி முரண்பாடு வலியுறுத்தப்பட்டது.

'உரைத்திற நாட்டம் கிழவோன்மேன' என்பதை, அப்பாற்பட்ட ஒருதிறத்தானும், ஒன்றப் பொருள்வயின் ஊக்கியபாலினும், ஊதியங்கருதிய ஒருதிறத்தானும், தூதிடையிட்டவகையினனும், மூன்றன்பகுதியும், வினைத்திறவகையினும், ஆங்கோர்பக்கமும், இரத்தலும், தெளித்தலும் என வரும் ஒவ்வொன்றோடும் தனித்தனி கூட்டுக.

பொருள், ஒதல், தூது, பகை, காவல், பரத்தை என அறுவகைப் பிரிவும் வகை பெறக்கூறும் இச்சூத்திரத்தில் முதல் மூன்றையும், 'மூன்றன்பகுதியு' மெனப் பிரித்தார்; பகை, காவலாகிய இரண்டும் தன்னளவிலும், பரத்தை தலைவி அளவிலும் பகைமை சுட்டுதலால், அம்மூன்றையும் வேறாக்கி, எண்ணும்மைகளை எல்லாம் இறுதியில் ஒடுக்கொடுத்துக் கூட்டிப்பிரிவு வகை ஆறும் விளக்கப்பட்டுள்ளது.

ஒன்றத்தமரினும், பருவத்தும், சுரத்தும் என்பவற்றுள் ஒவ்வொன்றின்கண்ணும் தலைவன் வலித்தலும், விடுத்தலும் இயல்பாகும். அவைவருமாறு:—ஒன்றத்தமர், உடன்படுமாறு தலைமகன் சான்றோரை விடுத்தது கேட்ட தோழி கூற்றாகவரும்,

"எக்கர் ஞாழல் சிறியிலைப் பெருஞ்சினை

ஒதம் வாங்குந் துறைவன்

மாயோள் பசலை நீக்கின னினியே"

என்னும் ஐங்குறுநூற்று(145)ச் செய்யுளால், தமர் ஒன்றவழித் தலைவன் துணிதலுண்மை விளங்கும்.

"பெருநன் ருற்றிற் பேணுரு முளரே

ஒருநன்றுடைய ளாயினும் புரிமாண்டு

புலவி தீர வளிமதி இலை கவரப்

பாடமை யொழுதிய தண்ணறுஞ் சாரன்

மென்னடை மரையா துஞ்சு

நன்மலை நாட நின்னல திலனே"

(குறுந். 115).

இக்குறந் தொகைச் செய்யுளில், 'நன்மலை நாட நின்னலதிலனே' எனத் தோழி தலைவற்குக் கூறுதலால், தலைவனுக்குத் தலைவியைத்தரத் தமர் ஒன்றுமையும் அதனால் தலைவன் கொண்டு தலைக்கழிய வலித்தலும் கூறப்பட்டது.

இனி மணமறுத்த ஒன்றுத்தமரை உடன்படுத்தத் பொருட்டுப் பொருளீட்டக் கருதித் தலைவியை விடுத்தற்குச் செய்யுள் வந்துழிக் கண்டு கொள்க.

உடன் போக்கு வலித்துக்கொண்டு செல்லும் தலைவன் தலைவிக்குச் சூரத்திடைக் கூறுதற்குச் செய்யுள் :—

“ அழிவில முயலும் ஆர்வ மாக்கள்
வழிபடு தெய்வம் கட்கண் டாஅங்
கலமரல் வருத்தந் தீர யாழநின்
நலமென் பணைத்தோள் எய்தின மாகலிற்
பொரிப்பூம் புன்கின் எழிற்றகை யொண்முறி
சுணங்கணி வனமுலை அணங்குகொளத் திமிரி
நிழல்காண் டோறும் நெடிய வைகி
மணல்காண் டோறும் வண்டல் தைஇ,
வருந்தா தேகுமதி, வாலெயிற் றோயே
“ மாநனை கொழுதி மகிழ்குயி லாலும்
நறுந்தண் பொழில் கானம்,
குறும்ப லூரயாம் செல்லு மாநே ”.

(நற்றிணை. 9)

“ வருமழை காரந்த வானிற விசும்பின்
துண்டுளி மாறிய உலவை யாங்கட்
டால நீழல் அசைவு நீக்கி
அஞ்சவழி அஞ்சா தசைவழி யசைஇ,
வருந்தா தேகுமதி, வாலிழைக் குறுமகள்
இம்மென் பேரலர் தும்புர்ப் புன்னை
வீமல ருதிரந்த தேனாறு புலவிற்
கான லார்மணன் மரீஇக்
கல்லுறச் சிவந்தரின் மெல்லடி யுயற்கே ”.

(நற்றிணை. 76)

எனவரும் நற்றிணைச் செய்யுளுமது.

“ புலிபொரச் சிவந்த புலாவஞ் செங்கோட்
டொலிபன் முத்த மார்ப்ப வலிசிறந்து
வன்சுவற் பராரை முருக்கிக் கன்றொடு
மடப்பிடி தழீஇய தடக்கை வேழந்
தேன்செய் பெருங்கிளை யிரிய, வேங்கைப்
பொன்புரை கவழம் புறந்தரு பூட்டு

மாமலை விடரகங் கவைஇக் காண்வரக்
கண்டிசின் வாழியோ குறுமகள் நுந்தை
அறுமீன் பயந்த அறஞ்செய் திங்கட்
செல்சுடர் நெடுங்கொடி போலப்
பல்பூங் கோங்கம் அணிந்த காடே ”.

என்னும் நற்றிணைப் (202) பாலைச் செய்யுளுமது.

இனி, சுரத்தினதருமை கருதித் தலைவியை விடுத்தற்குச் செய்யுள் :—

“ உமணர், சேர்ந்து கழிந்த மருங்கி னகன்றலை
பூர்பாழ்த் தன்ன, வோமையம் பெருங்காடு
இன்றா வென்றி ராயின்,
இனியவோ பெரும தமியோர்க்கு மனையே ” (குறு. 124).

இதில் “ என்றிராயின் ” என்பதால் தலைவன் கூறியதைத் தோழி கொண்டு கூறினாள் என்றிக. இனி, விட்டுச் சென்ற தலைவன் இடைச்சுரத்துத் தலைவியை நினைந்து கூறற்குச் செய்யுள் :—

எரிகவர்ந் துண்ட வென்றாழ் நீரிடைச்
சிறிதுகண் படுப்பினுங் காண்குவென் மன்ற
நள்ளென் கங்குல் நளிமனை நெடுநகர்
வேங்கை வென்ற சுணங்கிற்
தேம்பாய் கூந்தன் மாஅ யோளே, (ஐங். 324)

“ வேட்டச் செந்நாய் கிளைத் தூண் மிச்சில்
குளவி மொய்த்த அழுகற் சின்னீர்
வளையுடைக் கையள் எம்மொ ணணீஇய
வருகதில் லம்ம தானே
அளியளோ அளியளென் நெஞ்சமர்ந் தோளே ”. (குறு. 56)

இடைச்சுர மருங்கில் தமர்வர தலைவன் அருளால் மறைதற்குச் செய்யுள் :—

“ அன்றை யனைய வாகி யின்றுமெங்
கண்ணுள் போலச் சூழலு மாதோ
புல்லிதழ்க் கோங்கின் மெல்லிதழ்க் குடைப்பூ
வைகுறு மீனின் இனையத் தோன்றிப்
புறவணி கோண்ட பூநாறு கடத்திடைக்
கிடினென விடிக்குங் கோற்றொடி மறவர்
வடிநவில் அம்பின் வினையர் அஞ்சா
தமரிடை யுறுதர நீக்கிரீர்
எமரிடை யுறுதர வெளித்த காடே ” (நற். 48)

இதில், தலைவன் முன்கூறியதைத் தோழி கொண்டு கூறியதாகக் காண்கின்றோம்.

“ வினையமை பாவையினியலி துந்தை
மனைவரை யிறந்து வந்தனை, யாயிற்
தலைநாட் கெதிரிய தண்பெய லெழிலி
அணிம்கு கானத் தகன்புறம் பரந்த
கடுஞ்செம் மூதாய் கண்டுங் கொண்டு
நீவினே யாடுக சிறிதே யானே
மழகனி றுரிஞ்சிய பராரை வேங்கை
மணலிடு மருங்கின் இரும்புறம் பொருந்தி
அமர்வரின் அஞ்சேன், பெயர்க்குவென் ;
துமர்வரின் மறைகுவென், மாஅ யோனே ”

எனும் நற்றிணை (362)ச் செய்யுளுமது. இதில், தேடிவந்த தலைவி தமர்க்கு ஊறு செய்யாது அருளான் ஒளிக்கும் தலைவன் தானே கூறியதும் அறிக. கற்பொடு புணர்ந்த கௌவைக் குத் தலைவன் கூற்றாகச் செய்யுள் வரின் கண்டுகொள்க.

நாளது சின்மையால் பொருள்தேட வலித்தல் :—பொருட்பிணியும் இன்பம் நுகரும் இளமையும் தம்முள் ஒன்றமைக்குச் செய்யுள் :—

“ புணரிற் புணராது பொருளே ; பொருள்வயிற்
பிரியிற் புணராது புணர்வே ; ஆயிடைச்
சேர்பினும் செல்லா யாயினும் நல்லதற்
குரியை, வாழியென் னெஞ்சே ; பொருளே
வாடாப் பூவின் பொய்கை நாப்பண்
ஒடுமீன் வழியிற் கெடுவ ; யானே
விழுநீர் வியலகந் தூணி யாக,
எழுமா ணளக்கும் விழுநிதி பெறினும்,
கனங்குழைக் கமர்த்த சேயரி மழைக்கண்
அமர்ந்தினிது நோக்கமொடு செகுத்தனன்
எனைய வாசுக வாழிய பொருளே ”.

(நற்றிணை, 16)

“ வங்காக் கடந்த செங்காற் பேடை
எழாலுற வீழ்ந்தெனக் கணவற் காணுது
குழலிசைக் குரல குறும்பல அகவும்
குன்றறு சிறுநெறி அரியவென் னாது,
மறப்பருங் காதலி யொழிய
இறப்பல் என்பதூண டின்மைக்கு முடிவே ”.

எனும் குறுந்தொகைச் செய்யுளுமது.

பொருள் வலிக்கும் நெஞ்சுக்கு அதனொடு பொருந்தா இளமையதருமை தலைவன் கூறற்குச் செய்யுள் :—

‘பைங்காய் நல்லிட மொரீஇ’ என்னும் நற்றிணைச் செய்யுளில்,

“.....பாழ்நாட் டத்தம்
இறந்துசெய் பொருளும் இன்பம் தருமெனில்,
இளமையிற் சிறந்த வளமையு மில்லை,
இளமை கழிந்த பின்றை வளமை
காமந் தருதலு மின்றே அதனால்
நில்லாப் பொருட்பிணிச் சேறி,
வல்லே நெஞ்சம் வாய்க்கநின் வினையே ”

(நற். 126).

எனத் தலைவன் கூறுதல் காண்க. இன்னும்,

அருவியார்க்கும், எனும் நற்றிணைச்(205) செய்யுளில்

“ துன்னருங் கானம் என்னாய் நீயே
சுவளை யுண்கண் இவளீண் டொழிய
ஆள்வினைக் ககறி யாயின், இன்றொடு
போயின்று கொல்லோ தானே.....
ஆய்நிறம் புரையுமிவள் மாமைக் கவினே ”

என வருவதுமது.

“ முதிர்ந்தோ ரிளமை ஒழிந்தும் எய்தார்
வாழ்நாள் வகையளவு அறிஞரு மில்லை ;
... ..
கருங்கண் வெம்முலை நெழுங்கப் புல்லிக்
கழிவதாக கங்குல் ”

என்று தலைவன் கூறியதைத் தலைவிஎடுத்துக்கூறும் நற்றிணைச் (314) செய்யுளில், இளமையதருமையும், நாளின் சின்மையும் தம்முள் ஒன்றாது முரணுதலைக் காண்க.

தாளாண்மையால் பொருள் வலிக்கும் நெஞ்சிற்குத் தலைவி தகுதி நோக்கித் தலைவன் பிரிவருமை கருதற்குச் செய்யுள் :

“ வினையே ஆடவர்க் குயிரே வாணுதல்
மனையுறை மகளிர்க் காடவ ருயிரென
நமக்குரைத் தோரும் தாமே :
அழா அல் தோழி அழுங்குவர் செலவே”

இக் குறுந்தொகை(135)ச் செய்யுளில் தோழி கொண்டு கூறிய தலைவன் கூற்றால், ஆடவர்க்குத் தாளாண் பக்கம் இன்றியமையா தென்பதும், மனையுறை மகளிரின் தகுதி

பேணுதலும் அவ்வாடவர் கடனென்பதும், இவ்வாறு இருவேறுணர்ச்சி தம்முள் ஒன்றர்ப் பொருட் பிணியின்கண் தலைவர்க்குக் கூற்று நிகழு மென்பதும் காண்க, இன்னும்,

ஆறுசெல் வருத்தத்துச் சீறடி சிவப்பவும்
சீணீங்கு தளிரின் வண்ணம் வாடவுந்
தான்வரல் துணிந்த இவளினும் இவளுடன்
வேப்பயில் அழுவம் உவக்கும்
பேதை நெஞ்சம் பெருந்தக வுடைத்தே”

(பொருள்—பக்—133)

என்னும் பொருளதிகார உதாரணச் செய்யுளாலும், இவ்வொன்றர்ப் பொருட்பிணியில், தலைவியின் பிரிவருமை தலைவன் கூறியதறிக.

இன்மையதிகளிலும் உடைமைய துயர்ச்சியும் கருதித்தலைவன் கூறுதற்குச் செய்யுள்:—

“ஈதலும் துய்த்தலும் இல்லோர்க் கில்லெனச்
செய்வினை கைம்மிக எண்ணுதி ; அவ்வினைக்
கம்மா அரிவையும் வருமோ !
எம்மை யுய்த்தியோ ! உரைத்திசு நெஞ்சே”.

(குறு. 613).

இச் செய்யுளில், ‘இல்லோர்க்கில்லெனச் செய்வினை கைம்மிக எண்ணுதி’ என்பதால் இன்மையதிகளிலும், ‘அம்மா அரிவையும் வருமோ’ என்றதால் உடைமையாம் காதலின் உயர்வும், தம்முள் ஒன்றருமை தன் நெஞ்சிற்குத் தலைவன் கூறிச் செலவு தவிர்த்தது காண்க.

இனி, இவ்வாறு செலவழங்காமல் தலைவன் பிரிதலும் உண்டு ; அதற்குச் செய்யுள்:—

“இசையும் இன்பமும் ஈதலும் மூன்றும்
அசையுட னிருந்தோர்க் கரும்புணர் வின்மென
வினைவயிற் பிரிந்த வேறுபடு கொள்கை,
அரும்பவி ழலரிச் சுரும்புண் பல்போ
தணிய வருதுநின் மணியிருங் கதுப்பென
எஞ்சா வஞ்சினம் நெஞ்சணக் கூறி
மைசூழ் வெற்பின் மலைபல இறந்து
செய்பொருட் ககன்ற செயிர்தீர் காதலர்
கேளார் கொல்லோ தோழி

... ..

.....கார்ப் பெயற் குரலே”

எனவரும் நற்றிணைச் (214) செய்யுளில் இவ்வாறு ஒன்றர்ப் பொருள்வயின் மாறு பட்டலேக்கும் உணர்ச்சி கூறித் தலைவன் ஒன்றர்ப் பொருள்வயின் பிரிந்தமையும் காண்க. “அரிதாய அறனெய்தி அருளியோர்க்களித்தலும்” எனும்பாலைக்கவி (11) யுமதுவே.

அன்புடைமையால் மனை மாட்சிக்குப் பொருள் வலித்தலும், தலைவியின் பிரிவரு
மையால், செல்லத்துணியாமைபு மாகிய ஒன்றர்ப்பொருட் பிணிக்குச் செய்யுள்:—

“மாரிப் பித்திகத்து நீர்வார் கொழுமுகை
இரும்பனம் பசங்குடை பலவுடன் பொதிந்து
பெரும் பெயல் விடியல் விரித்துவிட் டன்ன
நறுந்தண்ணியளே ; நன்மாமேனி,
புனற்புணை யன்ன சாயிறைப் பனைத்தோள்
மணத்தலும், தணத்தலு மிலமே
பிரியின் வாழ்தல் அதனினு மிலமே”

(குறு. 168)

“மல்குசனை புலர்ந்த நல்கூர் சரமுதல்
குமரி வாகைக் கோலுடை நறுவீ
மடமாத் தோகைக் குடுமியிற் றேன்றும்
கான நீளிடைத் தானும் நம்மொ
டொன்றுமணம் செய்தன ளிவளெனில்
நன்றே நெஞ்சம் நயந்தநின் துணிவே”

என்ற குறுந்தொகை (347)-ப் பாட்டிலும், அன்பினதகலமும், அகற்சியதருமையும்,
ஒன்றர்ப்பொருள்வயின் ஊக்குதல் உணர்க.

இனி, ஒதற் பிரிவில் கூற்று நிகழ்த்தற்குச் செய்யுள்:—

“பொய்யற்ற கேள்வியாற் புரையோரைப் படர்ந்துநீ
மையற்ற படிவத்தான் மறுத்தரல் ஒல்வதோ
தீங்கதிர் மதியேய்க்கும் திருமுகம், அம்முகம்
பாம்புசேர் மதிபோலப் பசப்பூர்ந்து தொலைந்தக்கால்”

என்னும் பாலைக்கலித் (14) தாழிசையில் வாயின்வகுத்த கல்விப்பகுதியின் ஊதியங்கருதிய
தலைவன் பிரிவு உணர்த்தப்படும்.

“பின்னிய தொடர்நீனிப் பிறர்நாட்டுப் படர்ந்துநீ
மன்னிய புணர்ச்சியான் மறுத்தரல் ஒல்வதோ
புரியவிழ் நறுநீலம் புரையுண்கண் கலுழ்பாணத்
திரியுமிழ் நெய்யேபோற் நெண்பனி யுறைக்குங்கால்”

என்பதால், கையின் வகுத்த கல்விப்பகுதியின் ஊதியங் கருதித் தலைவன் பிரிந்தமை
அறிக. இப்பிரிவுகளில் தலைவன் கூற்று வந்தவழிக் கண்டுகொள்க. புகழும் மானமும்
எடுத்து வற்புறுத்தும் தலைவன் கூற்றுக்குச் செய்யுள்:—

நாளும் நாளும் ஆள்வினை யழுங்க
இல்லிருந்து மகிழ்வோர்க் கில்லையாற் புகழென
ஒண்பொருட் ககல்வார்நம் காதலர் ;
கண்பனி துடையினித் தோழி! நீயே.”

(சிற்றெட்டகம்)

“ இசையும் இன்பமும் ஈதலும் மூன்றும்
அசை யுடனிருந்தோர்க் கரும்புணர் வின்மென
வினைவயிற் பிரிந்த வேறுபடு கொள்கை

... ...

மைசூழ் வெற்பின் மலைபல இறந்து
செய்பொருட் ககன்றநம் செயிர்தீர் காதலர் ”

எனும் நற்றிணைச் (124) செய்யுளடிகளுமது. இச்செய்யுள் தலைவி கூற்றாயினும், இதில், ‘ இன்மென ’ என்பதனால் தலைவன் கூறியதைத் தலைவி கொண்டு கூறியது என விளங்குதலால், புகழும், மானமும் தலைவன் எடுத்துவற்புறுத்தியதறிக.

“ மிகைதணித் தற்கரி தாமிரு வேந்தர்வெம் போர்மிடைந்த
பகைதணித் தற்குப் படர்தலுற் றார்நமர்...”

என்னும் மணிவாசகர் செய்யுளில், தோழி கூறுதலால், தலைவன் தூதியையிட்டிப் பிரிதல் கூறப்படுகின்றது. தூதுபற்றிய பிரிவில் தலைவன் கூற்றுக்குச் செய்யுள் வந்துழிக் காண்க. ‘ கொடியிடலும் ’ எனும் (36-ஆம்) கலியில், தூதொடு மறந்தார் கொல்லோன்ற தனால், தூதின் பொருட்டுப் பிரிதற்கரிய தலைவியையும், தலைவன் பிரித்ததறியப்படும்.

மூல்லைப்பாட்டு, பட்டினப்பாலை, மதுரைக் காஞ்சி முதலியவற்றில் மண்டிலத் தருமையும், தோன்றல் சான்ற மாற்றோர் மேன்மையும் பலவிடத்தும் வருதல் காண்க. தன் வேந்தன் பகைவராய தோன்றல் சான்ற மாற்றாரைப் பெருது வெல்லப் பிரியும் தலைவன் கூற்று வருமாறு :—

“ பல்லிருங் கூந்தல் பசப்பு நீவிடின்
செல்வேந் தில்ல யாமே செற்றார்
வெல்கொடி அரண முருக்கிய
கல்லா யானே வேந்துபகை வெலற்கே ”

(ஐங். 429).

பாசறைப் புலம்பல் :—

“ புகழ்சால் சிறப்பிற் காதலி புலம்பத்
தூற்றுவந் தனையே அருந்தொழிற் கட்டேர்
நல்லேறு தழீஇ நாகுபெயர் காலை
உள்ளுதொறுங் கலிழு நெஞ்சம்
வல்லே எம்மையும் வரவிழைத் தனையே ”

(ஐங். 445).

வினை முற்றிய தலைமகன் பாகனொடு விரும்பிக் கூறுதற்குச் செய்யுள் :—

“ விருந்தின் மன்னர் அருங்கலம் தெறுப்ப
வேந்தனும் வெம்பகை தணிந்தன் ன் தீம்பெயல்
காரு மார்கலி தலையின் று ; தேரும்
ஒவத் தன்ன கோபச் செந்நிலம்

வள்வா யாழி உள்ளூறு புருளக்
கடவுக காண்குவம் பாக !..... ”

(அகம். 54).

காவலுக்குப் பிரிந்த தலைவன் தான் வருவதாய்த் தலைவிக்குத் தூதனுப்பியது :—
“ ஒருகுழை ஒருவன்போல ” என்னும் பாலைக்கலியில்,

“ ஒல்குபு நிழல்சேர்ந்தார்க் குலையாது காத்தோம்பி
வெல்புகழ் உலகேத்த விருந்துநாட் நிறைபவர்

... ...
... ...
... ...

வருமென வந்தன்றவர் வாய்மொழித் தூதே ” (கலி. 25).

பரத்தையினகற்சியில் பரிந்த தலைமகளிடத்துத் தலைவன் இரத்தலும், தெளித்தலும்
என இருவகையினும் கூற்று நிகழ்த்தற்குச் செய்யுள் :—

‘ ஒருஉ, கொடியியல் நல்லார்க்கு ’ என்னும் மருதக்கலி (88)யில்,

“ ஆயிழாய், நின்கண் பெறினல்லால் இன்னுயிர் வாழ்கல்லா
என்கண் எவனோ தவறு ” எனவும்,

“ அதுதக்கது, வேற்றுமை என் கண்ணோ ஓராதி தீதின்மை
தேற்றக்கண் டயாய் தெளிக்கு ”

எனவும் தலைவன் தலைவியிடம், இரத்தலும், தெளித்தலும் கூறுதலும்,

“ இனித் தேற்றேம்பாம்
தேர்மயங்கி வந்த தெரிகோதை அந்நல்லார்
தார்மயங்கி வந்த தவறஞ்சிப் போர்மயங்கி
நீகூறும் பொய்ச்சூழ் அணங்காயின்
வேற்றினி யார்மேல் விளியுமோ கூறு ”

எனக் கூறித் தலைவி ஊடல் தணிதலும் வந்தமை காண்க.

“ நில்லாங்கு நில்லாங்கு ” என்னும் மருதக்கலி (45)யுள்

“ ஆயும் ஆயிழாய் அன்னவையான் ஆங்கறியாமை
போற்றிய நின்னைத் தொடுகு ”

எனத் தன் பரத்தமைக்குப் புலந்த தலைவியைத் தெளிக்கு முகத்தானும்,

“ நல்லாய் பொய்யெல்லாம் ஏற்றித்தவறுதலைப் பெய்து
கையொடு கண்டாய் பிழைத்தேனருளின் ”

என இரக்கு முகத்தானும் தலைவன் கூற்று நிகழ்த்தியது காண்க.

(தொடரும்)

Some Facts and Fables about Karikalan the Great

By

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King Karikalan was one of the greatest monarchs that adorned the Chola throne in times of yore. The ancient Tamil classics afford abundant testimony to his many and rare kingly virtues and martial valour, to his great attainments in the arts of peace as well as to his glorious achievements in many a field of war. Almost all the great anthologies of the old classical literature have poems in praise of this Chola king great alike both as man and king. *Puṛaṇānūṟu*, *Ahaṇānūṟu*, *Naṟṟiṇai*, *Pattup-ṭāṭṭu* and *Chilappadikaram* are full of anecdotes of this monarch and of his eventful reign. It is not however proposed here to expatiate on all those admiring eulogiums and loving homages paid to his memory by the galaxy of illustrious poets and poetesses of yore. In this thesis I shall essay to examine only some of the suspect legends and traditions that are in vogue in the world of Tamil scholarship, and are still credited and cherished even by the tallest and most erudite savants like Mahamahopadyaya Dr. V. Swaminatha Aiyar.

I

One of these legends about Karikalan the Great is that in his youth he strayed into and sojourned in the Chera capital of Karuvur as a vagrant; and the Chola crown came to him unexpectedly as a windfall by a miraculous event. It is given out that the then Chola monarch passed away without leaving any heir of his own house, and as per *māmūl* the royal elephant was set at large to find and fetch a suitable candidate to occupy the vacant throne. That sagacious animal is said to have stalked all the way to the Chera metropolis of Karuvur, seized this forlorn remote scion of the Chola family there, and bringing him on his back to have put him on the throne at Uraiyur, the then capital of the Cholas. This fable is fondly believed and persistently circulated in the pandit-world universally and with such unanimity as to doubt it would at once expose the sceptic to obloquy and anathema. And yet this story seems to be not only incredible and lacking warrant in literature; but it is also obvious that it runs counter to the positive testimony afforded by the biographical sketch of his childhood and of his rightful succession to the Chola throne portrayed in one of the Ten Idylls known as *Porunarāṟṟuppaḍai*. If the above fable were to receive any credit, Kari-

kalan must be taken to be an impecunious and hopeless vagrant without any vested right and prospects, or expectations whatever to succeed to the Chola crown. On the other hand the poet Muḍattāmakkaṇṇiār asseverates in Porunarāṇṇuppaḍai that he was born in purple as royal heir to the Chola throne, and in virtue of legitimate rights vested in him even when he was in his mother's womb he succeeded to the crown and was anointed king while he was yet a baby. Even as a crawling infant he is said to have borne the royal sceptre he was born to wield, and in his very boyhood to have warred with and vanquished the other two powerful potentates of the Tamil country. The unmistakably significant and relevant passages that bear out these facts run as follow :

“ வென் வேல்
உருவப் பஹேரினே யோன் சிறுவன்
முருகம் சீற்றத்துருகெ முருகிசில்,
தாய்வயிற் றிருந்து தாய் மெய்தி,
எய்யாத் தெவ்வர் ஏவல் கேட்பச்
செய்யார் தேளம் தெருமரல் கலிப்ப,
பவ்வ மீமிசைப் பகற்கதிர் பரப்பி
வெவ்வெஞ் செல்வன் விசம்பு படர்ந் தாங்குப்
பிறந்து தவழ்கற்றதற்றெட்டுச் சிறந்தான்
ஊடு செகிற்கொண்டு நாடொறும் வளர்ப்ப,—
ஆளிரன் மான் அணங்குடைக் குருளை
மீளிமொய்ம்பின் மிகுவலி செருக்கி
முலைக்கோள் விடாஅ மாத்திரை ஞெரேரெனத்
தலைக்கோள் வேட்டங் களிற் ட் டாங்கு,—
இரும்பனம் போந்தைத் தோடும் கருஞ்சினை
அரவாய் வேம்பின் அங்குழைத் தெரியலும்
ஓங்கிருஞ் சென்னி மேம்பட மிலைந்த
இருபெரும் வேந்தரும் ஒருகளத் தனிய
வெண்ணித் தாக்கிய வெருவரு நோன்றாள்
கண்ணார் கண்ணிக் கரிகால் வளவன்.”

(ll. 130-148 Porunarāṇṇuppaḍai).

There is no possible escape from the positive statement in this poem that to Karikalan descended the kingly rights and royal crown as his birth-right even antenatally, and he reigned as an anointed king continuously from the date of his nativity as baby, child, boy and man till he died full of honours and years. (Vide)

“தாய்வயிற்றிருந்து தாயம் எய்தி.”

he succeeded to his royal state even when he was in his mother's womb ; and again

“பவ்வமீமிசைப் பகற்கதிர் பரப்பி
வெவ்வெஞ்செல்வன் விசம்பு படர்ந்தாங்குப்
பிறந்துதவழ் கற்றதற் றெட்டு கிறந்தநன்
னாடு செகிற்கொண்டு நாடொறும் வளர்ப்ப”

Notwithstanding this categorical and definite statement of fact in what is a direct narration of the biography of Karikalan by a contemporary poet, pedants still persist in giving currency to the legend which attributes his accession to the throne to a mere accident of an elephant's whimsical choice. And they cite the following verse from Pazhamozhi as the sole authority for this story :—

கழுமலத்தி யாத்த களிறும் கருவூர்
விழுமியோன் மேற்சென் றதனால்—விழுமிய
வேண்டினும் வேண்டா விடினும் உறற்பால
தீண்டா விடுத லரிது.

In the first place there is nothing in this *venba* to relate it anywise to Karikalan at all. It only states that “an elephant tied or accoutered in Kaḷumalam strided into Karuvur, marching upon a person in distress.” Even if ‘vizhumyon’ (விழுமியோன்) were taken to mean a great man, and not a man in distress, there is nothing to justify that this word in the verse has any reference to Karikalan. It would be another instance of arguing in a circle. They posit that this verse relates to the incident of the elephant's choice of Karikalan for the Chola throne on the footing that that incident is an accepted fact; and in turn they cite this verse itself as if it were proof enough for this fictitious story. One unproved assumption is offered as proof of another, when neither is proved and none is provable otherwise.

Again this verse offers even more insuperable objections to the pedant's efforts to read a legend about Karikalan into its lines. If the citizens of the Chola kingdom desired to resort to an elephant's aid to choose their king, the wizard elephant should have started its auspicious march from the royal Chola capital of Uraiyur, and not from Kazhumalam. For, Kazhumalam was a town in the malainad of the Cheranad and belonged to the Chera kings. (Vide)

“நற்றேர்க் குட்டுவன் கழுமலத் தன்ன”

(I. 9. Aham 270)

That Kazhumalam was not a Chola possession, but a Chera city to be attacked by the Chola invaders is again evidenced by another reference in Ahanānūru.

“ ... பழையன் பட்டெனக்
கண்டது நோனா னாகித் திண்டேர்க்
கணைய நகப்படக் கழுமலந் தந்த
பிணையலங் கண்ணிப் பெரும்பூட் சென்னி”

(Il 11-14 Aham, 44).

This makes it clear that Perumpūrchenni, a Chola king, attacked and subdued Kazhumalam in his invasion of the Chera kingdom.

It is also inexplicable as to why Karikalan of the Chola family had to be found by the elephant in Karuvur of all places. Karuvur was the capital of the rival kingdom of the Cheras. It is not suggested that Karikalan was there seeking the help of the Chera monarch in his capital city, and the Chola citizens sent the Chola's royal elephant for fetching Karikalan to avoid a Chera invasion to succour Karikalan as a rightful claimant to the Chola throne. On the contrary the schoolmen's emphasis on the Pazhamozhi venba cited above is to show that Karikalan had no anticipations or expectations of any kind regarding the Chola crown, which with the sceptre came to him entirely as a god send and as decreed by the inscrutable destiny in his uneventful vagrant life. Thus the whole story stands self-condemned both as an incredible miracle, and as a fiction betraying its mendacious fabrication in the face of the positive facts found in Karikalan's biography in Porunarāruppadai written by a contemporary poet.

II

Let us now turn to another common story about Karikalan which has had a great vogue among Tamil scholars although forsooth it has no legs to stand on. It is persistently asserted that Karikalan was a state-prisoner in his youth detained in duress by some uncle or dāyādi who usurped the Chola throne legitimately belonging to the former, and having effected his escape he recovered his Chola kingdom with the aid of his uncle named Irumpiḍarthalaiyār. In support of this story another Pazhamozhi venba is relied upon.

“சுடப்பட்ட டுயி ருய்ந்த சோழன் மகனும்
பிடர்த்தலைப் பேராணைப் பெற்றுக்—கடைக்கால்
செயிரறு செங்கோல் செலீஇனான்; இல்லை
உயிருடையார் எய்தா வினை.”

The common interpretation put upon this verse is as follows:—“Karikalan, who in youth met with but escaped an accident of fire which however scalded and burnt his feet, recovered or secured his kingdom, with the aid of his maternal uncle Irumpiḍarthalaiyār, which he later ruled

over. Therefore, if one lives long enough there is nothing one cannot achieve." The verse does not mention Karikalan by name, but merely refers to a son of a Chola, who in some fire-accident got off with burnt or scalded feet. The fact that Karikalan had his feet scalded in some fire accident is spoken of in a venba-verse which is appended to Porunar-āṟruppāḍai.

“முச்சக் கரமு மளப்பதற்கு நீட்டியகால்
இச்சக் கரமே யளந்ததால்—செய்ச்செய்
அரிகான்மேல் தேன்தொடுக்கும் ஆய்புனனர் நாடன்
கரிகாலன் காணெருப் புற்று.”

Tacking this incident in Karikalan's life to the Pazhamozhi Venba, the commentators presumed that the latter venba refers to Karikalan not only as the person who burnt his feet in some accident of fire, but also as one who broke loose from his enemy's prison and recovered his kingdom from his usurpers with the aid of his uncle as mentioned in that venba. In this connection the incidents mentioned in Pattinappalai in reference to the hero of that poem are gratuitously and lavishly banked upon to support the thesis of Karikalan's incarceration by his usurping rival to the Chola throne.

It is of course true that the hero of Pattinappalai is said to have been in prison in his youth :

“கொடுவரிக் குருளை கூட்டுள் வளர்ந்தாங்குப்
பிறப்பிணி யகத்திலிருந்து பீடுகாழ் முற்றி,
அருங்கரை குவியக் குத்திக் குழிகொன்று
பெருங்கை யானை பிடிபுக்காங்கு,
துண்ணிதி னுணரநாடி நண்ணார்
செறிவுடைத் திண்காப் பேறி, வாள்கழித்து
உருகெழு தாயம் ஊழி நெய்தி
பெற்றவை மகிழ்தல் செய்யான்.”

Translated into English, this would read as follows :—“Even as a captive tiger-cub grows vindictive in its cage, he bided his time in incarceration in his enemy's dungeon. On attaining maturity and strength he designed resolutely and discreetly his plans for escape, and boldly broke through the strong guard of his enemies that kept him in duress, just as the captive elephant trapped into a pit escapes to rejoin his mate by butting its bank with his huge tusks and by thus filling the pit with falling earth. Having thus secured his freedom he duly vindicated his birthright with drawn sword, and wrested from the usurper his royal heritage of the Chola kingdom.” We are not told how or why the hero of Paṭṭinappālai is identified with Karikalan. The sole basis for the story seems to be an

unwarranted and untrue assumption that Karikalan is the hero alike of the two poems, *Porunarāṟruppaḍai* by Muḍattāmakkaṇṇiār and *Paṭṭiṇappālai* by Rudrankaṇṇanār. Many a castle has since been built in the air on this fantastic assumption. There is nothing in *Paṭṭiṇappālai* even as a remotest hint to suggest that Karikalan was the hero it refers to. Neither his name nor any of the many great incidents and episodes of his eventful life is anywhere mentioned in *Paṭṭiṇappālai*. *Porunarāṟruppaḍai* expressly mentions Karikalan by name, speaks of his royal father also by name, and narrates the essential events of one of the most memorable battles in the classic age. *Paṭṭiṇappālai* on the other hand names its hero as Tirumāvalavan instead of as Karikalan, omits altogether both the two great victories of Karikalan in the fields of Veṇṇi (வெண்ணி) and Vākai (வாகை) which are emblazoned by the ancient poets in all the eulogiums and poetic biographies of Karikalan. These discrepancies were noticed by Mahavidvan R. Raghava Iyengar, the Tamil Research Lecturer of this university. And when he drew my attention to them, I not only confirmed his conclusion that Karikalan the hero of *Porunarāṟruppaḍai*, and Tirumāvalavan the hero of *Paṭṭiṇappālai*, were two different persons; but I also in my turn suggested to the Mahavidvan that they stood related to each other as father and son. I shall presently elucidate this relationship between Karikalan and Tirumavalavan. But in the meanwhile it is passing strange that even great scholars should ignore these irreconcilable discrepancies which conflict with the assumed identity of the heroes of these two poems and of the other legend woven out of a Pazhamozhi venba attributing Karikalan's accession to the throne to an accidental choice of a wizard elephant. The story of the elephant's choice makes our Karikalan to be a cheerless, impecunious vagrant sojourning as a voluntary exile in Karuvur, the capital of the rival Chera kings when the whimsical elephant's offer of the Chola crown came to him quite as a windfall without any expectations or claims on his part. Again, whereas *Paṭṭiṇappālai* definitely describes the early captivity and long incarceration of its hero in a hostile dungeon, kept out of his heritage by an usurping kinsman in the Chola capital of Kaviripūmpaṭṭinam until this captive hero emancipated himself by a clever stratagem and a bold coup-d'etat; *Porunarāṟruppaḍai* on the contrary distinctly speaks of Karikalan's rare good fortune in his being called to the Chola throne from the very date of his birth, and in having continuously reigned and ruled since as undisputed master and monarch of the Chola territories. It is impossible in the circumstances to confuse or identify the heroes of all these three poems, Pazhamozhi No. 105, *Porunarāṟruppaḍai*, and *Paṭṭiṇappālai*, which describe three diverse situations and different characters.

It is obvious that the adjectival phrase (சுடப்பட்டிருந்த) referring to the burnt-foot precedes and qualifies the word 'Cholan'. Therefore the next word (மகன்) 'Mahan' (son) must refer only to the son of the Chola with a burnt-foot, and as such to a person different from that burnt-footed Chola. If Karikalan were the sole and only person intended to be indicated in this verse, the word mahan (மகன்) in the first line of this verse is an unmeaning superfluity calculated only to cause confusion. The purpose would have been best served by dropping the word 'mahan,' and stopping with the word 'Cholan' after the qualifying phrase relating to the incident of the burnt-foot. Pazhamozhi-venba No. 21 which speaks of Karikalan refers to him only as 'Cholan', and not as Cholan mahan. (Vide).

“ நரைமுடித்துச்
சொல்லால் முறைசெய்தான் சோழன்—குலவிச்சை
கல்லாமல் பாகம் படும்.”

Cholan is the dynastic title for all kings of the Chola-house. And in conjunction with identifying attributes like the adjectival phrase in the verse under discussion, it would and should suffice by itself to indicate Cholan-Karikalan in the context. The addition of the word 'mahan', therefore, unmistakably suggests the intention of the poet to refer to a son of this 'Chola with a burnt foot as the person to whom the incidents mentioned in the subsequent lines relate or are attributed.' And we know definitely from Paṭṭinappālai that these latter incidents relate only to Tirumāvalavan.

The very Pazhamozhi venba relied on for the assumed identity of Karikalan and Tirumavalavan, and cited above in another connection, thus reveals not only that they are two different persons, but also that the latter was the son of the former. It is thus clear that the burnt footed 'Cholan' in the first line was and must be Karikalan, and the word 'mahan' obviously means, as it must, the son of that Cholan, Karikala the Great. This natural and correct meaning accords not only with the rules of grammar and the canons of interpretation, but it also appositely explains the natural relationship between Karikal Cholan of the burnt-foot and the 'mahan' who escaping from a hostile imprisonment vindicated his legitimate claims to his father's throne with his lusty sword and the loyal aid of his uncle, as mentioned in Paṭṭinappālai.

This son of Karikalan is obviously Tirumavalavan, the Paṭṭinappālai-hero. For, the incident that he secured and wielded his royal sceptre with the help of his uncle later in his life, which is referred to in this venba, exactly squares and is in all fours with the biographical description in the poem of Paṭṭinappālai. Tirumavalavan the only name

mentioned in Pattinappalai was the proper name of that hero-king. We have in the Sangam anthologies some references to more than one Chola king with the name of Tirumavalavan. e.g. (குராப்பள்ளித் துஞ்சிய திருமாவளவன்) “Kurāppalli-Tūnjiya-Tirumavalavan” referred to in Puram 58, 60, & 197, and another ‘Tirumavalavan’ mentioned in Puram 43. All these references from the old Tamil classics thus establish that Tirumavalavan, the hero of Paṭṭinappālai, was the son of Karikalan the great; and that after Karikalan’s death, his infant son Tirumavalavan was taken and kept in durance in his boyhood by some ambitious and hostile kinsman who usurped Karikalan’s kingdom; but he regained his father’s crown and his own freedom when he came of age by a clever stratagem and bold coup-de-etat with the help of ‘Pidar-thalaiyar who was perhaps his uncle, father-in-law, or both.

It is also relevant in this connection to remember that Karikalan ruled over the eastern Chola empire from his maritime capital of Kāviriṇṇipattinam. Although Porunarāruppaḍai does not refer to Kāviriṇṇipattinam by name, the entire description of Karikalan’s capital city in that poem makes it out to be a maritime city in the rich and fertile alluvial region near the estuary of the Kāviri. Moreover Silappadikaram leaves no doubt whatever that Karikalan’s capital was ‘Pukar’ otherwise known as Kāviriṇṇipattinam. (Vide) Vanchinamalai (ll. 11-15 and 35), Kaḍalāḍukathai-ll. 159-60; and Indiravizhavor eḍutta kathai. It is probable that after Karikalan’s death some ambitious agnate of his usurped his throne in Pukār or Kāviriṇṇipattinam when his son Tirumāvalavan was too young to fight him, and kept the rightful young heir of Karikalan in a dungeon to ensure his own safety against any revolt on behalf of that heir. It is only natural that the young prince Tirumāvalavan, who was pining in his captivity, took the earliest occasion to effect his escape as soon as he felt confident of his strength and success against the usurper.

I think it is even possible to hazard the suggestion that this Tirumāvalattan may be the very prince referred to in Puram 43. It is obvious that the other Tirumāvalattan mentioned in Puram 58 and 60 cannot be the Pattinappalai hero; for Puram 58 itself says that the Tirumavalattan it speaks of is an Uranthai-Chola, whereas the Pattinappalai hero was Pukar-Chola. But the Chola prince referred to in Puram 43 by the poet Thāmappalkaṇṇanār may well be the Pattinappālai-hero. And there are a number of other circumstances which seem to confirm this identity. The colophon under the verse No. 43 in Puram definitely says that the Chola prince Tirumavalavan it refers to W as the brother of the great warrior Chola king ‘Nalamkiḷli.’ We know from the various eulogiums of this Nalamkiḷli in Puram that he was incessantly at war with his Chola royal cousin Nedumkiḷli on the Uranthai throne, and

that Nalamkilli's own capital was Pukar. (Vide) Kovur Kizhar's eulogium of this king Nalamkilli in Puram 30. It is probable that this Nalamkilli died issueless, and his young brother Tirumavalavan was taken captive by the hostile Uranthai rivals of Nalamkilli, and that all his youth was spent in prison as a state-prisoner. On attaining age he effected his escape and avenged himself by striking down his enemies. The facts are set forth in Pattinappalai itself in all details. If this thesis were confirmed by further investigation, it would establish that Karikalan the great, who ruled over the Chola empire from his capital Pukar, left two sons—Nalamkilli and Tirumavalavan as his sons and heirs. The senior son Nalamkilli naturally succeeded his father on the Pukar throne; and on the former's death Tirumavalavan, who was then very young suffered incarceration at the hands of his rivals on account of the feuds between his deceased brother Nalamkilli and his rival Uranthai Cholas, as evidenced by the many verses of different poets collected in Puram. It is also probable that the Brahmin author of Puram 43, Thamappalkannanār was the son of the great poet Mudattamakkan- niār, who was the panegyrist of Tirumavalavan's father, the great Kari- kala, whom he eulogised in his poem Porunāraṇṇuppaḍai. Instances are not wanting that in the ancient times sons used to have prefixed part or whole of their fathers' names to their own. As the word 'Muḍam' prob- ably referred only to some lameness of his father, his proper name was only Thamakkannanar.

Pattinappalai definitely mentions that Uranthai also suffered and shared the desolation and devastation which dogged the heels of the in- vading and victorious armies of Tirumavalavan along with the other cities and rich rural areas of his enemies, and that Uranthai was subse- quently renovated and restored by Tirumavalavan to be worthy of its traditions as the ancient ancestral Chola capital.

“ அருங்கடி வரைப்பின் ஊர்க்கி னழியப்
பெரும்பாழ் செய்தும் அமையான்

... ..

காடுகொன்று நாடாக்கிக்

குளந்தொட்டு வளம் பெருக்கிப்

பிறங்கு நிலைமாடத் துறந்தை போக்கிக்

கோயிலொடு குடிநிறீஇ

வாயிலொடு புழையமைத்து

ஞாயிரெறும்புதைநிறீஇ

திருநிலைய பெருமன் னெயில்.”

This sack and restoration of Uranthai by Thirumavalavan would only square with this thesis that the enemies be avenged near rival cousins of the Uranthai Chola house.

There is yet another legend which fathers an ordinary street-dancer, Adimandi by name, on king Karikalan as his royal daughter. It is too absurd and preposterous an anamoly to deserve any credibility. Nevertheless it found favour with some scholars. I marshalled the literary evidences which emphatically refute it. But I do not propose to discuss them here any further, as I have since found that Vidwan V. Venkata-rajulu Reddiar has dealt with this anamolous and unwarranted fable and animadverted upon it in his research thesis on Paranar published by the Madras University.

The Passive Voice in Tamil*

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We know that by 'Voice' a kind of aspect of the verbal action in relation to the subject is meant.¹ When the subject is active, that is to say, when the action of the subject produces a certain effect on its surroundings, there is a verb in the active voice. And when the subject is receptive, that is to say, when the subject is acted upon or when the subject experiences a modification of its emotional sentiments, there appears a verb in the passive voice. We do not regard "I sleep", "I die", "I suffer", as passive and "I give" "I strike", as active. The distinction between the active and the passive has reached a stage, when to regard them from the point of view of their root-meaning is not always necessary. Yet the difference between the active and passive verbs does not exist merely in the grammatical relations of the subject and object. If 'Rāma struck Rāvaṇa', one gave the blow and the other received it. Rāma acted and Rāvaṇa was receptive. This receptivity or being affected is expressed by putting the object as the subject. Then we employ a verb in the passive voice. The word 'passive' itself takes its origin from the Latin word 'passus' the past participle of "pati" meaning to suffer.²

The passive is considered by certain writers³ as one of the two necessary forms of the verb. The passive is necessary when one wishes to express an action without telling the acting subject. It is necessary also when there is a desire to bring out the object which suffers the action rather than the subject which performs it. But it appears that to the early intelligence every action perhaps required an object.⁴ And to turn an object into a subject, it seems, needed considerable powers of abstraction.

* A Paper read at the Ninth All-India Oriental Conference.

1. Vendryes "*Language*" p. 102.

2. Skeats: *Etymological Dictionary* p. 432.

3. E.g. Sylvestre de Sacy.

4. Sayce: *The Science of Language*, Vol. II, p. 158,

No wonder then that in the Primitive Indo-European there was no passive voice of the verb. "The passive is a form acquired gradually by the diverse Indo-European Languages long after the system of their conjugation was completed in its principal lines" says Mr. Breal.⁵ "The Primitive Aryan verb possessed no passive voice; in fact, the passive is a comparatively late creation" says Prof. Sayce.⁶ That the primitive Indo-European did not have a passive conjugation is the view expressed by Mr. Brugmann⁷ and by Dr. S. K. Chatterji⁸ also. And that in Sanskrit the passive was a new base formed by the suffix 'Ya' is the opinion of Dr. Peile.⁹

Over against all these there is the view of Dr. Caldwell that each of the primitive Indo-European Languages has a regular passive voice, regularly conjugated.¹⁰ That by the primitive Indo-European he did not mean the *ursprache*—the assumed parent stock—is clear from his use of the expression "Primitive Indo-European Languages". His idea seems to be that in the languages born of the Primitive Indo-European there is to-day a regular passive conjugation. And it is by means of annexing the particle 'Ya' to the verbal theme that the Sanskrit passive is formed. And this 'Ya' which is now recognised as a particle might have once had the meaning of "to go" according to Dr. Caldwell¹¹ and Dr. S. K. Chatterji,¹² although this explanation does not greatly commend itself to Dr. Peile.¹³ Mr. Vendryes, who also holds that the Primitive Indo-European did not know the passive, has clearly stated that the Indo-European inflexion also might have been the result of the *agglutination* to the stem of elements originally independent.¹⁴ And this 'Ya' was perhaps extended from an old autonomous word that had some meaning which has now receded into the background. In other words, it has been reduced to the role of a grammatical device.

Now coming to the Dravidian languages we find that Dr. Caldwell, "the founder of Dravidian Philology,"¹⁵ has stated that "the Dravidian

5. "Semantics" p. 85.

6. "The Science of Language" Vol. II, p. 158.

7. "A Comparative Grammar of the Indo-Germanic Languages". Vol. IV. §. 972.

8. "Origin and Development of the Bengali Language" Vol. II. §. 653.

9. "Philology" chapter V. §. 26.

10. A Comparative Grammar of the Drn. Langs. (3rd. edn.), p. 463.

11. Comp. gram. p. 463.

12. Bengali Lang. Vol. II. p. 912.

13. "A Primer of Philology", p. 97.

14. "Language—A Linguistic Introduction" p. 104 and p. 170.

15. Grierson: Linguistic Survey of India, Vol. IV, p. 277.

verb is entirely destitute of a passive voice, properly so called, nor is there any reason to suppose that it ever had a passive".^{15a} Mr. A. H. Arden,¹⁶ Thomas Hodson,¹⁷ and Captain R. A. Cole,¹⁸ seem to have a similar view.

Straightway it must be conceded that there is no inflected passive in the Dravidian such as the old English¹⁹ "hight" (= was called) from *hātan* (= to call) or the Danish²⁰ "de slās" (with a long vowel, meaning they are beaten) from "de slas" (with a short vowel, meaning they fight one another) or the Western Panjabi²¹ "Mārindā" (= being struck) from *Māranda* (= striking). So one can whole-heartedly support Dr. Caldwell when he says "None of the Dravidian dialects possesses any means of expressing passivity by direct inflexional changes."²²

But when he says that there is a constructive passive in the Tamil Language formed by means of the preterite verbal participle of any neuter or active verb followed by the preterite of the verb 'to become' or 'to go' and when he cites "*Muḍintāyirru*" and "*Uḍaidupōyirru*" as instances in point,²³ one wonders whether this usage is not after all modern and whether the idea of completion of an act rather than that of passivity is not conveyed. It is hard to find instances of this kind with a passive import in ancient Tamil Literature. And modern expressions like "*Nī Cāppiṭṭāyirra?*"^{23a} are found only to convey the idea of completion of particular acts. In fact this example only means "Have you finished eating?" and not "Have you been eaten?"

A mode of expressing the passive in Tamil, mentioned by Dr. Caldwell, is by means of neuter or intransitive form of the verb. "*Adu Uḍaindadu*" is an instance cited by him.²⁴ A wrong translation of it

15-a. Comp. Gram. p. 463.

16. "A Grammar of the Telugu Lang." (1873) p. 101.

17. "Kanarese Grammar" (1859) p. 39.

18. "Coorg Grammar" (1867) p. 43.

19. Dr. O. F. Emerson's "The History of the English Language" (1919) p. 33.

20. Otto Jespersen's "Language—Its Nature and Development" (1928) p. 377.

21. Dr. S. K. Chatterji's Bengali Lang. Vol. II, p. 910.

22. Comp. Gram. p. 463.

23. *Ibid.*, p. 464.

23a.	n — ன	t — த	l — ல
	ṇ — ண	ṭ — ட	ḷ — ள
	ṇ — ண	r — ர	ḷ — ள
	ñ — ன	r — ர	
	ñ — ன		

24. Comp. Gram. p. 464.

purporting to be literal has been given. This expression does not mean literally "It has come into a broken condition". On the other hand it literally means "It broke". This is just like saying "Two and two make four" when really two and two *are made* four. Perhaps here the Tamil Language only framed this phrase to represent the action in a somewhat dramatic way wherein the subject is active. "It broke" or "adu Uḍaindadu" then is only a statement where an act has been attributed to the subject. This active form with a passive significance may be said to be somewhat similar to the Japanese form. Caldwell regards this mode of expressing the passive as the most idiomatic and characteristic mode in the Dravidian languages.²⁵ Probably, before learning other methods of forming the passive the Tamils used this to a considerable extent.

Occasionally Tamil active or transitive verbs are themselves used with a passive signification. For instance, "Eḷudiya tāḷ Uṇḍu" which means "there is the paper which (You or he or she or they) wrote" conveys the passive significance of "there is the written paper". And Dr. Caldwell has carefully said that this was a mode adopted only occasionally. That this method alternated with a regular use of "paḍu" for passive import is evident from the earliest extant piece of Tamil literature, namely Tolkāppiyam.^{26a} The use of the preterite active participle "Colliya" (= that which . . . said) from the root col (= to say) and of the preterite passive participle "Collappaṭṭa" (= that which was said) from the same root is found side by side in this treatise.

The preterite neuter relative participial noun is very often used with a passive import, according to Dr. Caldwell. When Rāma commanded Bharata to do as he dictated, he is reported in Tamil to have said "connadu ceydi". The context permits either an active or a passive meaning here. It can mean either "Do that which (I) said" or "Do as was said". The point is that the real active agent is not expressed here. Expressions such as these then were probably considered adequate for sometime for conveying the significance of the passive.

But when Dr. Caldwell next proceeds to say that "the use of the more formal *modern* passive "collappaṭṭadu" (pōdum) would sound awkward and foreign,²⁶ he makes a highly disputable statement. Forms such as 'collappaṭṭa' or 'Collappaṭṭadu' are as old as Tamil literature.

25. *Ibid.*, p. 463-464.

26a. Vide § 246 and § 112 of Thol. Col.

26. *Ibid.*, p. 465-6.

The very expressions 'Collappaṭṭa' and 'Collappaṭṭana'²⁷ are found in the ancient Tamil Grammar Tolkāppiyam composed in about the 4th century B.C.²⁸ I have collected materials from all the works that are generally classified as "the Third Sangam Works in Tamil" which enable me to say without any fear of contradiction that the employment of "paḍu" for purposes of conveying a passive significance is as old as the works themselves. The collections of the Third Sangam known as Eṭṭutogai, Pattupāṭṭu and Padinenkil-kaṇakku may be taken to belong to a period ranging between the 3rd century B.C. and the 7th century A.D. In Kalittogai (a book earlier than the 1st century A.D.) where there are 150 verses, we have no less than 25 places where 'paḍu' is found in a passive sense. In Tirukkuraḷ (of about the same age) where there are 1330 couplets we have as many as 48 occasions where 'paḍu' appears with a passive import. In Paḷamoli and Nālaḍiyār—compositions made somewhere between the 2nd and 7th centuries A.D.—where there are four hundred verses in each, there are at least 20 instances in each of 'paḍu' with a passive significance. In the earliest extant treatise, Tolkappiyam too, there are more than fifteen places in one of its three parts alone (namely Poruḷadikāram) where we notice the employment of 'paḍu' for this purpose. In the face of these facts it is inconceivable how anyone could persist in holding that expressions having 'paḍu' are modern passives. To hold that view appears to me to shut one's eyes to truth.

Nor is the use of 'paḍu' for this purpose "awkward" or "foreign" as taken by Dr. Caldwell. A mode that existed in the days of the third Tamil Sangam, a mode that flourished in the Age of the Epics (2nd century A.D. to 10th), a form that was sanctified by the use of the great religious devotees and saints commonly called "the Saiva Samaya Āchāryās" and "the Vaishnavaita Āḷwārs" in their hymns, a form that continually occurs in almost every grammatical treatise in Tamil (Kārigai, Yāpparuṅkalam, Naṇṇūḷ, Daṇṭialaṅkāram, Iraiyanārkaḷavīyal etc.), a form found in almost every purāṇa (e.g. Periapurāṇa, Mērumandarapurāṇa, Sīkālāthipurāṇa, Taṇigaipurāṇa, Tiruviḷaiyāḍal-purāṇa, etc.) can scarcely be considered awkward, clumsy or ungraceful. And to treat this form as a foreign one is completely to overlook all evidence from ancient Tamil Literature and to be unjust to old writers.

It is true that the employment of 'paḍu' was not the only method of conveying the idea of passive in Tamil. Alongside of other methods

27. Marapiyal §.9 and 105.

28. M. Srinivasa Ayyaṅgar: 'Tamil Studies' (1914) p. 117 and Prof. S. S. Bharatiar in A. U. Journal, Vol. VI, p. 329.

it also existed from a time as far back as we could see. Contemporaneous with the use of active forms themselves in a passive sense, the method of affixing 'paḍu' for conveying the passive significance was co-existent with the use in ancient and medieval times of "uṇ" (meaning "to eat") for the same purpose.²⁹ "Uṇ" which means "to eat" sustained a transference in meaning and was used in a metaphorical way indicating 'to enjoy' or 'to suffer'. In this sense we find it used in Chilappadikāram (of about the 2nd century A.D.). "Vinaiappayan uṇṇunkālai" which occurs there³⁰ means metaphorically "at the time of enjoying the fruits of (one's) deeds." This metaphorical extension in meaning of the word "uṇ" seems to have influenced the Tamil mind to seize upon it as capable of expressing, as much as is done by 'paḍu,' the idea of the passive. It was not "uṇ" alone that shared the honour of expressing the passive with 'paḍu.' 'Peru' also meaning "to get" or "to obtain" had a share in the affair. We see 'peru' employed to indicate the idea of the passive in Tolkāppiyam,³¹ Periapurāṇam³² (of about the 12th century) and certain Tamil inscriptions.³³ If obtaining is succeeded by enjoying or suffering, if enjoying or suffering presupposes obtaining something, the ideas of 'uṇ' (= to enjoy) and 'peru' (= to obtain) appear not far removed from each other. Hence it is that these were perhaps considered equivalent to 'paḍu' which itself had the meaning of "to get" as could be seen from ancient Tamil Literature.³⁴ But in certain connexions 'paḍu' seems to have been preferred to 'uṇ.' It seems to be uncouth or awkward now to say "colluṇḍa". "Collapaṭṭa" has however gained favour. From among the three materials that could be used for the same purpose, the Tamil mind seems to have adopted in recent times one of the equivalents 'paḍu' and dismissed the two others. Any employment of 'uṇ' in this connexion by a person of to-day will appear pedantic or antiquated. We do not meet it in ordinary conversation but we may probably find it in poetical compositions of the present day too. If poets like Mahavidwan R. Raghava Aiyengar use it now, it is perhaps

29. Vide :—

(a) Chilappadikāram V, l. 122.

(b) Periya Tirumoli, 11th Ten, 5th stanza.

(c) Kambarāmāyaṇam—Sundarakāṇḍam—Pāsappaḍalam, st. 29.

(d) Periyapurāṇam—Eripattar purāṇam st. 26.

30. Vide Kāthai XIV l. 33.

31. Poruḷadikāram § 445.

32. Periyapurāṇam—Kāraikkāl Ammaiyaṛpurāṇm st. 62; *ibid.*—Tirunāna Sambandar purāṇam st. 1221.

33. South Indian Inscriptions, Vol. II, part 5. Vēlurpālaiyam Plate IV-b, l. 58-60 and Dr. P. S. S. Sastriar's "History of Grammatical Theories" p. 175.

34. Vide Puṇanānūru, st. 93, l. 93,

because they, being learned in the classics and medieval literature, adopt a form which they have very often met with and which has not perhaps gone out of their memory. And "peru" is rarely used by certain scholars like Mahamahōpādya Dr. V. Swaminatha Aiyar and Mr. T. V. Kalyanasundara Mudaliar (Editor of "Navasakti") due largely to the influence of Periyapurāṇam of which they are masters. Otherwise it may be said to have proved abortive.

Thus we have seen that ancient Tamil literature bears testimony to the fact that the passive was often-times expressed by means of the active forms themselves and that "paḍu" which alternated with "uṇ" and "peru" gained the widest use in course of time. Naturally the Tamil active forms should have preceded the passive. Since the distinction between the active and passive categories generally rests on a very slight basis as remarked by the famous French Philologist Mr. Vendryes³⁵ and since language is sometimes alogical as held by the famous Danish philologist Dr. Jespersen,³⁶ it is no surprise to see sometimes the active forms themselves standing for the passive in Tamil also. When the need for a particular element for expressing the passive significance however arose, the Tamil people employed one or another of the words which had the meaning of "to get" or "to enjoy" or "to suffer." This indeed is the way in which morphology may be expected to supply its wants or to repair its losses. One of these words "paḍu" has survived and gained preference. What then is the history of this word?

Originally it appears to have started with the meaning of "to appear." "Paṭ" was perhaps the root from which "paṭupu"^{36a} (=an appearance or rising) and "paṭam" (=an appearance or a picture) arose. And in "paḍu" also we find the same root with an euphonic addition of a vowel.³⁷ Abundant instances can be cited for the use of "paḍu" in this sense from early literature. For example, there occurs in a line of Puraṇānūru (Stanza 166.1.27) "Poṇpaḍu Kāviri". The transition from this sense to that of 'Stopping' or 'Staying' is easy, for what appears would sometimes stop or stand. In this transitional sense there is the use of "paḍu" in a line of another verse of Puraṇānūru (Stanza 134.1.4)³⁸ where the context permits of both the meanings. Next

35. Vide "Language" p. 105.

36. "Logic and Grammar" (S.P.E. Tract No. 16) and "Philosophy of Grammar" (1925) p. 345.

36a. Vide "Paḍupu ariyalanē pal kadirc chelvan" (Puram), verse 34, 1. 18.

37. cf. Caldwell's Comp. Gram. p. 580.

38. "Āṅkup paṭṭaṇru avaṇ kai vaṇmai,"

there is a transference from "to stop" to "to get" on one side and from "to stay" to "to perish" on the other.

The latter transference does not concern us here. It only shows how a word which once meant "to appear" came to mean just the opposite of it. To stay in the sea for a dumb, blind man for instance would involve perishing. (Cf. *Purananānūru* 238. 1. 16 "Kaṇṇil ūman kaḍal paṭṭāṅku"). The former transference is also possible because the idea of stopping at a place is easily associated with getting at it. And "Chōla Naṇṇaṭṭup paḍiṇ" which occurs in another *Purananānūru* verse (No. 67.1.8) meaning "if (you) reach or stop at chōla country," is thus found capable of yielding both the significations. There are instances however of "paḍu" where the context does not permit of both these ideas but only the idea of getting. For instance, *Purananānūru*³⁹ verse 93 contains such a statement (1. 93). And this word expressing the idea of getting or enjoying or suffering was just the thing wanted to convey the significance of the passive and therefore the Tamils probably caught hold of it at this stage.

This probable history of the word "paḍu" throws a flood of light on another aspect of the passive formation in Tamil. If in Greek, Latin,⁴⁰ Sanskrit⁴¹ and Bengali,⁴² it is from the middle voice or "the Karma-Kartru Vākya" that the passive developed, the same may be said to be true of Tamil also in a way. "Avai Kāṇappaḍukinraṇa," for example, may be taken to have meant "they appear visible," for "paḍu" meant also "to appear." This phrase which in the "old Greek Sense"⁴³ stands midway between the active and passive may be treated as one in the middle voice. Similarly "Kuḍam Niraipaḍukiraḍu" (=the pot becomes full or more literally "the pot obtains fulness") and Kai Kuṛaipaḍukiraḍu" (= "the hand becomes short or more literally—"the hand obtains shortage") may be regarded as phrases in the middle voice.⁴⁴ These very same phrases are used in the passive significance respectively of "they are seen," "the pot is filled" and "the hand is cut." And in fact it is in this latter sense alone they are remembered to-day. Thus a possible development of passive formations from the middle in Tamil also is hereby suggested. And this suggestion owes much to the probable history of the word "paḍu" which I have

39. "Peruntakai Viḷuppuṇ paṭṭa mārē."

40. Peile: Philology p. 95.

41. Brugmann: Comp. Gram. of I.G. Langs. Vol. IV, p. 515.

42. Chatterji's Bengali Lang. p. 919.

43. Peile: Chap. V §25.

44. Bengali Lang. Vol. II, p. 919: "bās bhāṅgē" (= the bamboo breaks); "kālāsi bhārē" (= the Jar becomes full).

tried to construct in the preceding paragraph. The meanings "to appear" and "to obtain" of the word "paḍu" which we have seen before have rendered the matter of finding out a possible link between the passive voice and middle voice in Tamil easy.

And since the other two words employed for converting active forms into passive, namely 'uṇ' and 'peru,' had not these advantages, since they had not both the meanings of "to appear" and "to obtain" so that they could appear in several places and in an indifferent sense, "paḍu" which had these advantages has slowly reached a position denied to them. This explains how "paḍu" which existed from far-off times side by side with the other two intellectual tools has now become the solitary implement whereby the passive significance is effected in the Tamil language.⁴⁵ The old meanings of this word "to appear" or "to obtain" are no more remembered when used in passive connexions, although they may exist in a small measure elsewhere. This word appearing in passive connexions does not to-day invoke any idea of the original meanings in the mind but represents only a quality of abstractness and is therefore a specific passive symbol. By gradually and imperceptibly losing its meaning it has become a passive particle or suffix⁴⁶ and may therefore be regarded as an "empty word" in the Chinese grammatical sense.⁴⁷ It is, in fact, on its march to become a regular morpheme. It is just like the German word "mann" found in such words as "kaufmann" (=a merchant) which has not yet become a suffix but is said to be on the road to become one in that language.⁴⁸ One may be excused if one ventures to suggest after these considerations that it has already become a morpheme in the Tamil language, despite the fact that it has not suffered any phonetic change so as to obscure its identity with the old independent word. If it has not undergone any alteration in its shape, it is not because it has not lost its semantic value but because in the nature of things in the agglutinating languages of which Tamil is one it would retain its shape unaltered. As Dr. Taraporewala⁴⁹ says "each

45. The fact that in *Telugu Bhāratam—Āraṇyakāṇḍam—IV Canto, Verse 191* (Vide Dr. C. Narayana Rao's *History of Telugu Language* Vol. II, p. 1250) and in the *Kannāḍa* inscriptions of the 7th Century A.D. (Vide *Epigraphia Carnatica—Vol. VI, p. 323*—as kindly pointed out by Dr. A. N. Narasimha in a private communication to me) "paḍu" with a passive significance appears suggests that most of the Dravidian languages might have originally borrowed it from the Primitive Dravidian.

46. cf. Sivañānaswami: *Tolkāppiya Pāyira Virutti*, p. 40: "Seyappaḍu poruṇmai uṇarttum paḍu ennum vikuti."

47. cf. Vendryes p. 164 and 83.

48. *Ibid.* p. 167.

49. "Elements of the Science of Language" (1922) p. 62.

one of the elements of the word, though glued on, is felt to be a separate word and is capable of being used as such " in the agglutinating tongues. It may be easier for languages of the inflectional class⁵⁰ to alter their full words when they come to be used as grammatical devices. So a criterion,⁵¹ which insists upon change in the form of a particular word for its eligibility to be treated as a morpheme, howsoever sound so far as it relates to the inflexional languages, does not appear to be applicable to the Tamil language whose circumstances are quite different. It may not therefore be wrong to say that "paḍu" has now reached the stage of a morpheme in Tamil and that it is by means of this particle that the morphological category of passive voice is expressed in Tamil.

By retracing the road over which the Tamil language appears to have travelled and by trying to recognise the probable turnings, we have seen that in Tamil as in several other languages of the world there was a time when the passive signification was conveyed by the active forms themselves, that subsequent to, and contemporaneous with, this usage there was the method of forming the passive by means of the word "paḍu," that "paḍu" alternated in this respect with "uṇ" and "peru" for sometime and that it ultimately gained the widest use. We have seen also how from one meaning to another "paḍu" probably had a march and how because of its certain inherent advantages it came to be the most characteristic instrument for converting active forms into passive and how by constant use, by losing its original meaning and by invoking only the abstract idea of passivity it has slowly assumed the character of a morpheme. We have seen also how because of the conditions prevailing in Tamil, an agglutinating language, it would be futile to expect words that have become morphemes to have lost their original shapes. With these considerations we have now reached the stage when we may boldly say that by means of the particle "paḍu" the passive voice is formed to-day in Tamil and that the Tamil language is not therefore "destitute of a passive voice properly so-called."

50. cf. Dr. Tucker's "Natural History of Language" (1908) p. 76.

51. Whitney: *Life and Growth of Language* (1885), p. 52.

Vijayīndra Tīrtha

By

B. N. KRISHNAMURTI ŚARMA

CHAPTER III.

25. *Vijayīndra Tīrtha* (C. 1514-95)

i

Tradition affirms that Vijayīndra was originally a disciple of Vyāsarāya and read under him. This is confirmed by Vij. himself who, in some of his works,¹ acknowledges Vyāsarāya as his teacher, and by a statement in the *Śrīpādarājāṣṭakam*, counting both Vij. and Vādirāja among the disciples of Vyāsarāya,² as well as by the references in the songs of Purandara Dāsa, Vijaya Dāsa and Śrīda Viṭṭhala.³ Vij.'s former name is said to have been Viṭṭhalācārya.⁴ He was presumably a Karnāṭaka Brahmin. He seems to have been a great favourite with Vyāsatīrtha and would, in all probability, have succeeded him, had not Surendra Tīrtha, the then Pontiff of the Vibudhendra Tīrtha Mutt, asked Vyāsarāya for a competent disciple to succeed him. Vyāsarāya is, on that occasion, said to have gifted Viṭṭhalācārya. Thus it was that Vij. came over to the Mutt of Surendra Tīrtha whom he eventually succeeded on the Pīṭha. This tradition is supported by the following "sulādi" of Purandara Dāsa.⁵

1. See the introductory verses in his *Madhvādhvakaṇṭhakoddhāra* (Nos. 4, 8) and

गुरुपादोक्तिभिर्न्यायैरुपक्रमपराक्रमम् ।

निराकृत्योपसंहारविजयोऽयं प्रकाश्यते ॥ (*Upasamhāravijaya*)

as well as the introd. verse to his *Candrikodāhṛta-Nyāya-vivaraṇa*

(Tanjore Ms).

2. iii, 6. (S.M. p. 317).

3. These have been cited by me in my paper on the Date of Vādirāja in the Annals of the B.O.R.I., xviii, 2, p. 191 and 197.

4. There is a tradition that soon after he became a monk, Vij. was once humorously taunted by Vyāsarāya that "Vikāra" (i.e., the sound "Vi") had not left him! There is no basis for the statement on p. 316 of the Vijayanagar Sex. Com. Vol. that "Viṣṇu Tīrtha" was another surname of Vij.

5. For which I am indebted to H. H. Śrī Vidyāvāridhī Tīrtha of the Vyāsarāya Mutt. *

श्रीसुरेन्द्रनु पुत्रभिक्षव बेडे विजयोन्द्रन्न करुणिसि
मैठवन्नुद्वरिसिदकारण गुरुव्यासरायरे परमगुरुगळ्ळ पुरन्दरविठलने परदैव काणिरो ॥

ii

There is no reliable biography of Vij. such as we have for Vyāsarāya. There are a few sketches of his life in the form of stotras in Sanskrit by later-day devotees ; but they are of negligible historical value. A good many floating-traditions have gathered round the name and personality of Vij. These have for the most part been kept alive—with the help of the memory of relics in the Mutt and privileges enjoyed by the successors of Vij.—by the Pandits connected with the Mutt of Vij. at Kumbakonam which was the scene of his labors. Such works of Vij. as are yet available, a couple of inscriptions, the *Rāghavendra-Vijaya* of Nārayaṇa and the *Gurugūṇa-stava* of Vāḍindra, seventh in succession from Vij., supply more solid information. The account of tradition is more than substantiated by these sources.

DATE

According to the Mutt Lists, Vij. succeeded his Sannyāsa Guru, Surendra Tīrtha in or about 1539 A.D. and remained on the Pīṭha till 1595 (*Manmatha*). The fact that he was a student of the advanced classics of the Dvaita System under Vyāsarāya,⁶ would indicate at least a few years' stay with the latter. We can therefore assume that Vij. was not less than 20 years old when he first came under the care of Vyāsarāya and not less than 25 at the time of his teacher's demise in 1539. This would give 1514 or thereabout as the probable date of Vij's birth. Nothing is however known about his family history.

iii

Vij. was a very active exponent and powerful defender of the faith of Madhva and the disciple and student of practically the greatest authority on Dvaita Vedānta since the days of Jaya Tīrtha—viz., Vyāsarāya, and the most prolific writer of his school having a *hundred and four works* to his credit. With all that, he is not so intimately known to the followers of Madhva as his successor and grand-disciple Rāgha-

6. षड्वारं व्यासराजेन्दुमुखाच्छ्रुत्वा विशेषतः ।
मध्वशास्त्रार्थसारं तु व्याचक्षाणं निजान्प्रति ॥
नवकृत्वो न्यायसुधां व्यासतीर्थपयोनिधेः ।
उद्धृत्य पीतवन्तं च नाकीन्द्रमिव सञ्जुतम् ॥ ४ ॥

(*Vijayindra Stotra* of Setumādhava Sūri, *Stotra Mahodadhī*, p. 292).

vendra Svāmin, or even his contemporary Vādirāja. It is difficult to account for this especially when we remember the great part played by Vij. in defending the citadel of the Dvaita Vedānta against attacks from three sides : the Advaitins headed by the formidable Appayya Dikṣita, the Viśiṣṭādvaitins, and the Śaivas and Lingāyats. Of the hundred and four works traditionally ascribed to him, *on sound authority*, even the names of half the number have been lost. Of the remaining fifty not more than thirty are attested either by Mss. or by cross-references in other works. Having served the original purpose for which they were intended, very well, his controversial works have now lost their fascination and his commentaries have long ago been superseded and completely put into the shade by the simpler and more attractively written ones of Rāghavendra Svāmin. The works of Vij. consequently are not "living" in any sense, in Dvaita Literature to-day. But upon the attention of the student of the history of Dvaita Vedānta and its Literature, Vijayindra Tīrtha has great claim as a doughty champion of the reign of Realism in Indian Philosophy in the Post-Vyāsarāya Period.

CAREER

Mādhva tradition has been persistently maintaining that Vij. was a close contemporary and critic of the sixteenth century polymath Appayya Dikṣita who was besides, a redoubtable champion of the Advaita and the Śaivite revivals in the 16th Century, in S. India. Vij. is said to have tried conclusions with Appayya Dikṣita, on many occasions and written many works repelling the attacks of the latter on the system of Madhva. The criticisms of Appayya were obviously the reactions from the monistic side to the challenges thrown out by Vyāsarāya in his great controversial classics—the *Nyāyāmṛta* and *Candrikā*.

Vij. seems to have spent most of his time at Kumbakonam where he had good following. There are extensive properties even to this day, belonging to the Maṭha of Vij. at Kumbakonam. There is also a Mutt in excellent state of preservation and therein rest his mortal remains. The *Rāghavendra Vijaya* says that Vij. was honored with a रत्नाभिषेक by Rāmarāya of Vijayanagar (1542-65). Vij. was moreover a protégé of Śevvappa Nāyaka of Tanjore, from whom he obtained the village of Arivilimangalam in 1577 A.D. It is clear from the terms of this grant⁷ that Vij.'s reputation as a scholar and a defender of the faith of Madhva against the attacks of the Māyāvādins, was already made by 1577 :—

7. The Arivilimangalam Plates of Śevvappa Nāyaka, edited by T. A. Gopinatha Rau, *Epigraphia Indica* XII,

पदवाक्यप्रमाणज्ञशेषीजितवादिने ।

मध्वाचार्यमतोद्यानसञ्चरत्तरबर्हिणे ॥

मायावादिमतोच्छेदकोलाहलभरोक्तये ॥

This must indeed have been so, for Vij. was a student of Vyāsarāya who died as early as 1539. *The Mysore Archaeological Report* for 1917 mentions another grant to Vij. by Śevvappa Nāyaka in 1580 A.D. In the course of this record, it is stated that "like the three sacred fires, (a) the Lord of the Ascetics : Vijayīndra Tīrtha ; (b) the leader of the Vaiṣṇavas, proficient in all the Śāstras : Tātācārya and (c) the sole Emperor of Śaivādvaita : Appayya Dīkṣita, used to meet together at his (Śevvappa) court and establish the doctrines of their respective schools of philosophy:

“ त्रेतामय इव स्पष्टं विजयीन्द्रयतीश्वरः ।

ताताचार्यो वैष्णवाग्रयो सर्वशास्त्रविशारदः ॥

शैवाद्वैतकसाम्राज्यः श्रीमानप्पय्यदीक्षितः ।

यत्सभायां मतं स्वं स्वं स्थापयन्तः स्थितास्त्रयः ॥ ”

This epigraph furnishes indisputable proof that Vij. was a very close contemporary indeed of the celebrated Appayya Dīkṣita whose stone-inscription dated Śaka 1504 (1582 A.D.) on one of the walls of the temple of Kāḷakaṇṭheśvara, built by himself in his native village at Aḍayap-pālayam (near Vellore)⁹ gives clear indication of the fact that the Dīkṣita too had more or less completed his life-work by 1582 A.D.¹⁰

Vij. was an all-round scholar, a prolific writer and a great Yogi. He is credited by Vādindra Tīrtha with proficiency in all the sixty-four kalās (arts) and the epithet सर्वतन्त्रस्वतन्त्र is found applied to him in many of his works.¹¹ That this was no empty boast is clear from a few of his works bearing upon the Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā, the Nyāya and Kāvya literature.¹² The *Gurugunastava* distinctly says that he wrote 104 works

8. Text by the kind courtesy of the Assistant Director of Archaeology, Mysore.

9. No. 395 of 1911. For remarks see also Y. Mahalinga Sastri's paper on the Date of Appayya Dīkṣita, J.O.R., Madras, 1929, p. 140-160.

10. MM. Anantakṛṣṇa Sastri makes a desperate attempt in his *Introd.* to his edn. of the *Nyāyāmṛta-Advaita Siddhi*, etc., (Calcutta Ori. Ser. 9, p. 64) to show that "Appayya was already old when Vij. began to flourish and that Vij. criticised the Dīkṣita only after the latter's demise". These contentions of Sjt. Sastri have been dealt with by me in my paper entitled "The Truth about Vijayīndra Tīrtha and Rāmācārya," in the MM. Kuppaswami Sastri Com. Vol. II, Madras (in print).

11. Vide his *न्यायमौक्तिकमाला* (*Introd. verses*).

12. Yet the author of the *Madras Uni. His. Ser. No. XI*, deprecates that it is "nowhere stated what these works of Vij. are." (p. 425) !

(presumably to rival the one hundred of Appayya—and that he was a tireless champion of the creed of Madhva and a relentless critic of Advaita and Śaivism :—

चातुर्यैकाकृत्यैश्चतुरधिकशतग्रन्थरत्नप्रणेता

धातारातिप्रबन्धस्फुटविदितचतुःषष्टिविद्याविशेषः ।

सोऽयं नः श्रीसुरेन्द्रव्रतिवरतनयाद्वैतशैवासहिष्णुः

पुष्पातु श्रीजयीन्द्रः त्रिभुवनविदितः सर्वतन्त्रस्वतन्त्रः ॥

Tradition has it that Vij. had once a disputation with the Vīra-Śaiva Guru residing at Kumbakonam. The condition under which the debate was held was that "if the Śaiva Guru won, Vij. should join his Maṭha, but if the latter triumphed, the former should make over all his belongings to his victor. The discussion lasted for 11 days at the end of which the Śaiva Guru declared himself vanquished. Consequently, Vij. entered into possession of the Śaiva Maṭha at Kumbakonam" (P. 552, Heras, *Āravīḍu Dynasty of Vijayanagar* and P. 346, of Ep. Ind. XIII).¹³

In the same manner, the Maṭha of Vij. to this day, enjoys the special privilege of taking out and entertaining in its own premises, the presiding deity of the Viṣṇu temple of Śārṅgapāṇi at Kumbakonam, on a certain day in the year. The origin of this right which is being exercised to this day, by the representatives of the Mutt, is evidently to be sought in certain timely services rendered by Vij. to the cause of Vaiṣṇavism is general and of the interests of the Śrī-Vaiṣṇavas of the Temple, in particular.¹⁴

THE WORKS OF VIJAYĪNDRA

(1-10) Commentaries on the Daśa-Prakaraṇas

Glosses on all the ten Prakaraṇas have been ascribed to Vij. But so far Mss. have been brought to light of only two of them : the ṭippanis on the TS and TD. The former is preserved at the Pejavar Mutt of Udipi

13. It may be pointed out here, that the Śaiva Maṭha referred to is the one facing the southern gate of the Kumbheśvara Temple at Kumbakonam, and which is now the property of the Pontifical successors of Vij. Vij.'s own Maṭha is situated at a distance of a mile north on the southern bank of the Cauvery river. In commemoration of the victory, the street in which the Śaiva Maṭha was, was named after Vijayīndra as "Vijayīndra Svāmi Mutt Street"—which name still survives in the Municipal records of the town. The Śaiva Maṭha is now in a dilapidated state and contains a few lithic images of Śaivite gods. It behoves the Svāmi of the Rāghavendra Mutt, to restore the building and preserve it to posterity as a historical monument.

14. It would appear that the powers-that-be at the Śrīvaiṣṇava temple, have in recent years, tried to put obstacles in the way of the Mādhvas exercising their time-honoured right and privilege.

(Palm leaf Tuḷu) and the latter at Mysore O.L. (C. 1888) as well as at Madraṣ (R. No. 3412). A gloss on the *Pramāṇalakṣaṇa* is ascribed to Vij. in the M. M. Sangha List.

Tattvodyota—Ṭippani^(m)

The name of this com. is given in one of the introductory verses as गूढभावप्रकाशिका. The Mysore Ms. contains 1950 granthas. The author refers in the course of his gloss to his com. on the *Nyāyāmṛta* : प्रपञ्चितं चैतन्यायामृते अस्मत्कृतटीकायां च । (P. 48b).

(11-15) *Sūtra Prasthāna*.

Vij's works under this head include glosses on the B.S.B. of Madhva, the *Anuvyākhyāna* and the *Nyāyavivaraṇa*, the *Aṇubhāṣya* and the TP of Jayatīrtha.¹⁵ The glosses on the AV and the *Aṇubhāṣya* are not attested by Mss.

B.S.B. Ṭippani (*Tattvamaṇi-māṇikyā-peṭikā*)^{16(m)}

This is evidently the short commentary referred to by Rāghavendra in the beginning of his *Tantradīpikā* :—

गुरुपादकृतोऽप्यस्ति संग्रहो हृदयंगमः ।

प्रस्थानभेदप्रोक्तार्थसंग्रहो वाप्ययं मम ॥ २ ॥

Tattvapraśāsikā—Ṭippani^(m)

A fragment of this is preserved in the Madras O.L. (R. No. 1432). The author says that his work is more in the nature of a summary of the views set forth in the earlier comm. on the TP. He has summarised the story of गौतमशाप as given in the *Tattvapradīpa* and clarifies the term “अन्य” at the beginning of the TP. as a reference to the twenty-one “falsche commentare,” after the manner of Vadirāja (*Gurvarthadīpikā*).

(16) *Madhva-Tantra—Navamañjarī*—^(m)¹⁷

We have a much-damaged Nagari Ms. of this work in the Madras O.L. (D.C. No. 4834 Vol. X). It is a short argumentative work dealing with

15. There is no com. on the *Nyāyasudhā* of Jayatīrtha, by Vij. as reported by Glasenapp (*Madhva's Philosophie Des Viṣṇu-Glaubens, Leipzig, 1923, p. 60*).

16. Dr. R. Nagaraja Sarma, is one of his anniversary contributions on Vij. in the *Hindu*, Madras, speaks of a fragment of this work having reached him. It is also said to be referred to in the author's *Nym-Āmoda*.

17. Presumably the same as the *Nayamañjarī* referred to on p. 317 of the *Vij. Sex. Com. Vol.*

the Sūtra Prasthāna, and written in defence of the interpretations of Madhva. The अधिकरणशरीर of the *Bhāmatī* and the *Vivaraṇa* are quoted and criticised. The work is confined to the first five adhikaraṇas of the B.S.

(17-26) Commentaries on the Daśopaniṣad Bhāṣyas

No Ms. of any of the glosses on the Upaniṣad-Bhāṣyas, traditionally ascribed to Vij. has been brought to light. (27-28). The same is the case with glosses on the *Prameya-dīpikā* and *Nyāyadīpikā* (on the *Gitā Prasthāna*) ascribed to him.¹⁸

(29-31) Glosses on the "Vyāsa-traya."

Nyāyāmṛta-[*Laghu*] *Āmoda*.

This is represented both in the Mysore and the Tanjore O.L. The Tanjore Ms. (No. 8108) containing 2650 granthas, is incomplete and covers only Paricchedas II and III of the original. It is by nature a running com. on the *Nym.* free from digressions and quotations from the *Advaita-siddhi*. According to Dr. R. Nagaraja Śarma, reference is made in the course of this gloss to a bigger com. on the *Nym.* (*Gurvāmōda*). I have not come across any such reference. The com. called (*Nym*-) *Kaṇṭakoddhāra* published by Sjt. Anantakṛṣṇa Śāstri, in C.O.S. IX, is not by Vij., as has been wrongly assumed.^{18a}

Nyāya-Mauktikamālā ^(m)19

This is reported to be a com. on the *Candrikā* (of Vyāsarāya) explaining some of the stiff passages in the original and criticising the views embodied in the bhāṣyas of Śamkara, and Śrīkaṇṭha and in the *Sivārkamaṇidīpikā* and *Nyāyarakṣāmaṇi* of Appayya Dīkṣita. The scope of this work is thus both constructive and destructive :—

सर्वतन्त्रस्वतन्त्रेण विजयीन्द्राख्यभिक्षुणा ।
तन्यते ब्रह्ममीमांसान्यायमौक्तिकमालिका ॥
परोक्ते दूष्य एवांशो मितैः शब्दैरनूद्यते ।
दूष्यते च स एवांशः सिद्धान्तश्च समर्थ्यते ॥

18. Pejawar 291, mentions a com. on the *Nyāyadīpikā* by name *Bhāvadīpa*, evidently the c. of Rāghavendra.

18a. For reasons see my paper on Rāmācārya and Vijayīndra Tīrtha in the Kuppaswami Sastri Com. Vol. II (in print).

19. Dr. R. Nagaraja Śarma (*Reign of Realism in I. Phil.*, p. 19) seems to be aware of the existence of a Ms. My information is based upon his. There is another *Nyāyamauktika-mālā* (Mys. O. L. A. 44) in 630 granthas which is a

Vij.'s attempt here may be looked upon as the forerunner of the *Śeṣa-candrikā* which was in itself a complement to the *Candrikā*. For, the author of the *Candrikā* had confined his attention to the leading comm. of the Advaita and Viśiṣṭādvaita schools alone, with stray references to the writings of Bhāskara and the Vṛttikāra. He had not noticed the Śaivite interpretations of the Sūtras attempted by Śrīkaṇṭha, which were merely a Śaivite *rechauffé* of the *Śrībhāṣya*. But the *Śrīkaṇṭha-Bhāṣya* was suddenly pushed into philosophical prominence by the talented *Appayya Dīkṣita* who headed the Śaivādvaita (or more properly Śaiva-Viśiṣṭādvaita) revival in the 16th Century and wrote his *Śivārkaṃaṇi-dīpikā* and other works in support of it. And Vijayindra wrote his *Nyāyamauktikamālā* so as to bring the Dvaitins' criticism of the Sūtra interpretations of rival schools, up to date, by bringing the *bhāṣya* of Śrīkaṇṭha together with its com. under his purview. He thus represents a logical advance in the line of critical and comparative study of the literature on the B.S., attempted by the Dvaitins. Similar work was done in the next century by Raghunātha Tīrtha. We learn from Rāghavendra Tīrtha²⁰ that Vij. has, in this work, dealt with the objection of some contemporary critics that the syllable *Om* does not form part of the first sūtra of Bādarāyaṇa, as asserted by Madhva.

Yukti-Ratnākara ^(m)

This is the name of Vij.'s c. on the *Tarkatāṇḍava* of Vyāsarāya and a Ms. is to be found of a fragment of it in the Mysore O. L. (A-286). It is referred to by Rāghavendra Tīrtha, in his c. on the *Tarkatāṇḍava*²¹ as well as in one of the introductory verses therein :—

गुरुपादकृताप्यस्ति टीका सात्यन्तविस्तरा ।

व्याख्येयं मन्दबोधाय क्रियतेऽशेषगोचरा ॥

The Mys. Ms. runs to 3400 granthas and covers 1-11 of the original upto the discussion on "Prāmāṇya." It has been suggested that Vij. wrote only up to the end of स्वतः प्रामाण्यज्ञप्तिवाद. The com. is full of

tract establishing the supremacy of Viṣṇu as against that of Śiva and refuting the Śaivite interpretation of such sources as the *Puruṣasūkta*. It is also attributed to Vij.

20. यदत्र केनचित् प्रलपितम्—"ओंकारस्यादित्वे, सूत्रावयवत्वे, गुणपूर्त्यर्थत्वे, 'स्वत्यनौकृतं.....' इत्यत्र ब्रह्मपदेन सूत्रग्रहणे च मानं ने" त्यादि, तत्सर्वस्य खण्डनं गुरुपादकृतन्यायमौक्तिकमालायां द्रष्टव्यम् । (*Candrikā-prakāśa*, Mysore, p. 110).

21. अत्र स्वतः प्रामाण्यज्ञप्तिवादपर्यन्तं विस्तरस्तु गुरुपादकृतयुक्तिरत्ताकरे द्रष्टव्यः । (Mysore G.O.L.S. 74, Vol. I, p. 4.)

technicalities and besides the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, the Bhāṭṭas, Prābhākaras and the Logician Narahari (p. 14) are criticised.

(32) *Pramāṇapaddhati-Vyākhyā* (p)^D

This com. on the *Pramāṇapaddhati* of Jayatīrtha (granthas 800), is a tough and short one. The author comments only on those passages of the original which are not quite clear. It was perhaps for this reason that Vij.'s successor Rāghavendra wrote a more extensive com. (granthas 946) on the same text. Vij.'s comments have in some places been severely criticised by Vedeśa Bhikṣu (in his com. on the *Pramāṇapaddhati*). No attempt has however been made by Rāghavendra to meet these criticisms of Vedeśa.

Original Works

We know nearly eighteen works of Vij. of a more or less polemical character, dealing with doctrinal and interpretational issues. Most of these are available in Mss.

(33) *Adhikaraṇa-Mālā***

This is supposed to be a work explaining the Mīmāṃsā rules of interpretation utilized in the Nym. of Vyāsarāya.

(34) *Candrikodāhṛta-Nyāya-Vivaraṇam*^(m)

This is an exposition of the principles and Adhikaraṇas of the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā, made use of by Vyāsarāya, in the course of his *Tātparyacandrikā*, in support of the Sūtra-interpretation of Madhva. The necessity for writing such a work lay in the loud complaints made by Appayya Dikṣita and other hostile critics of Dvaitism, that Madhva and his followers had treated the principles of interpretation evolved by the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā, with scant respect and had in many cases openly violated them. Such complaints had already been met by Vyāsarāya, in his *Candrikā* and *Nym.*, wherein he had shown that the charge against Madhva was wholly unfounded. But the complaints, taunts and sarcastic denunciations of the Advaitins continued with unabated vigor. The leader of the Advaitins in the latter part of the 16th century in S. India was Appayya Dikṣita. Even Khaṇḍadeva, the celebrated Mīmāṃsaka from the North came to have great respect for him whom he styled a veteran Mīmāṃsaka : **मीमांसकमूर्धन्यः** ! The prestige of Madhva and his followers was thus at stake and it was Vij. who saved it in time by a series of tracts replying to the criticisms of the Dikṣita, then and there. The *Candrikodāhṛtanyāyavivaraṇa* (T.P.L. 7854) is one such work in which Vij. expounds for the benefit of the critics of Madhva, the body-politic of the Adhikaraṇa-nyāyas of the Mīmāṃsā pressed into service in the

Candrikā,²² exhibiting in detail the subject-matter, the *pūrvapakṣa*, *siddhānta*, etc., in each case. The exposition is in another sense, a very good commentary on the *Adhikaraṇas* in question. The work comes to a stop with B. S. i. 1. 4, after explaining the sentence :— “सम्मते चैतन् मीमांसकानामपि.....” of the *Candrikā* thereunder. Among the *Mīmāṃsānyāyas* dealt with are (1) the रथकार; (2) अपच्छेद and (3) वेदोपक्रमधिकरण ।

(35) *Appayya-Kapola-Capeṭikā* ^(m)

As the somewhat offensive title indicates, this is a general rejoinder to the multifarious charges against Madhva and his works, brought by Appayya Dīkṣita. Aufrecht mentions a Ms. of it on p. 23 of his *Cat. Cat.* and Fr. Heras refers to the work in his *Āraṇyaka Dynasty* (p. 522). I have seen a Ms. in a private library at Kumbakonam.

(36) *Madhvādhva-Kaṇṭhakoddhāra*²³ (v)

This work, known also by its other title of *Madhva-tantra-Mukha-bhūṣaṇam*,²⁴ is a reply to the *Madhva-(tantra) mukhabhaṅga (mardana)* of Appayya Dīkṣita and his own com. thereon called *Madhvamata-vidhvamsana*. The Dīkṣita has, in his work, criticised Madhva's interpretation of the first five *adhikaraṇas* of the B. S., for a sample. His point is that on the dualistic interpretation, the arguments lack cogency, the *Adhikaraṇa-Śarīras* are anything but satisfactory. The critic also levels a number of minor allegations against Madhva such as that (1) he is given to systematic and wholesale fabrication of Śruti and Smṛti texts in support of his far-fetched ideas; (2) that his *Bhāṣya* has nothing in common with others in the field, but stands severely alone and by itself; (3) that the *Bhāṣyakāra* has nowhere been anxious to keep abreast of the *Mīmāṃsā* rules of interpretation; (4) that he and his commentators have very often flagrantly disobeyed and at times utterly failed to

22. ये न्यायाः पूर्वतन्त्रीयाः चन्द्रिकायामुदाहृताः ।

गुरुपादैः क्रमात्तेषां विषयाद्यङ्गपूर्वकम् ।

शरीरं विजयीन्द्राख्यभिस्तुणेह प्रदर्शयते ॥

23. A portion of the work ending with the जिज्ञासाधिकरण alone, was printed and published from Dharwar, by Mr G. R. Savanur, under a mistaken belief that it was the full work. I have the Ms. with me for the other four *adhikaraṇas* also.

24. Mr S. Śrīkanṭha Sastri (p. 317, *Vijayanagar Sex. Com. Vol.*) is therefore wrong in treating the *Kaṇṭhakoddhāra* and the *Madhva-tantra(mukha)-bhūṣaṇam* as two different works of Vij.

(38) *Bhedavidyā-Vilāsa*^(m)

This is a controversial manual devoted to the establishment of the reality of Difference in its five-fold aspect on the lines of Vyāsarāya's *Bhedojjīvana*. A few pages of this work are reported to be available.²⁷

(39) *Nyāya Mukura*^(m)

The *Mysore Archaeological Report* for 1917 (p. 17), reports that a Ms. of this work is preserved at the Rāghavendra Svāmi Maṭha at Nanjangud. It is the same work as is wrongly entered under the name of "Nayamukurā" in the G. V. Catal. (Kumbakonam), in the S. K. (1896, p. 43) and on p. 317 of the Vijayanagar Sex. Com. Vol. I have not had access to this Ms.

(40) *Paratattva-Prakāśikā*^(m)

This (Mysore O.L.C-939, Dev. 49 ff) is a criticism of the *Śivatattva-viveka* of Appayya Dīkṣita²⁸ which (latter) seeks to establish Śiva as the Supreme Brahman of the Śāstras. Appayya's thesis is directed against the beliefs and teaching of the followers of Rāmānuja and Madhva. As a counterblast to it, Vij. wrote his *Paratattva-prakāśikā*, upholding the view that in the hierarchy of Vedic and Vedāntic gods, the highest place is to be given to Viṣṇu. The parties to the controversy are agreed that there are different gods possessing different names and powers and want to find out and identify the chief amongst them. The issue cannot therefore be cheaply dismissed from an "Advaitic point of view." On any theistic programme, the true identity of the one God is bound to loom large and give no end of trouble to earnest inquirers. Vij. patiently wades through the bulk of the theological literature available in his days and after a prolonged discussion of the texts, declares ultimately in favour of the supremacy of Viṣṇu. The work consists of two parts, the Pūrvapakṣa and the Siddhānta.

27. R. Nagaraja Sarma, *Reign of Realism* . . ., 1931, p. 24. It is not unlikely that the work contains also a refutation of the *Bheda-dhikkāra* of Nrsimhāśrama. There are no Mss. however in the Madras, Mysore and Tanjore Ms. Libraries. According to the description given of it by Dr. Nagaraja Sarma, it is "a complete vindication of the thesis that Difference is fundamental of the cosmos. Authorities are cited in support and syllogisms intended to maintain identity are refuted. The scheme of five-fold difference is argumentatively maintained." (pp. 24-25).

28. Sri Vidya Press, Kumbakonam, 1895.

(41) *Nyāya-Samgraha*^(m)

[Brahmasūtra] Nyāyasamgraha²⁹ (Mysore O. L. C-2274) is a short metrical tract of Vij. giving the gist of the adhikaraṇas of the B.S. as interpreted by Madhva, after the manner of the *Aṇubhāṣya*. The following would serve as a sample :—

जीवान्यद्ब्रह्म जिज्ञास्यं सृष्ट्या^यष्टविधायि यत् ।
शास्त्रैकगम्यं तद्ब्रह्मोपक्रमादिसमन्वयात् ॥

(42) *Siddhānta Sārāsāraviveka I*^(m)

Two Mss. of this work exist, one at Mysore O. L. (A. 88) and the other at Madras O. L. (R. No. 1293). The fragment preserved at Madras, contains only ten chapters, containing a refutation of the Rāmānuja Siddhānta. The author dismisses the classification of categories into six adopted by the Viśiṣṭādvaitin, as defective and argues a case for the recognition of **अन्धकार** as a separate category (p. 5, Madras). He denies to **नित्यविभूति** the status of a Dravya and criticises the doctrines of **प्रपत्ति** (p. 32) and **ब्रह्मोपादान**. The *Vijayīndra-parāṇaya* (Madras X, 4994) of Kumbakonam Tātācārya is a direct refutation of the above work of Vij.³⁰

(43) [*Siddhānta*] *Sārāsāraviveka II*^(m)

A work similar to the above and directed against the Śivādvaita of Śrīkaṇṭha, is reported from Mysore (C-2331) according to a handlist of 'uncatalogued' books in the Mysore O. Library, sent to the office of the *New Catalogus Catalogorum*, Madras.³¹

(44) *Ānandatāratamya-Vādārtha*^(m)

This (Catalogus 570 and Oppert II, 9806) is another short controversial tract of Vij. directed against the school of Rāmānuja. The subject of discourse is the gradation of bliss in Mokṣa among released souls. Since even the Rāmānujīyas are agreed that the released souls *are* debarred from participating in the cosmic functions of the Brahman

29. Presumably the same as the "Brahmasūtrārthasamgraha" mentioned on p. 317 of the *Vijayanagar Sex. Com. Vol.*

30. यतिना परकालेन विजयीन्द्रः पराजितः ।

रामानुजमतेऽप्येतमसारत्वोक्तिगदितः ॥ (end).

31. I am indebted to my friend Dr. V. Raghavan of the office of the *New Catalogus Catalogorum*, Madras, for this information. But an examination of Mss. has shown that C-2331 of Mysore, is, in reality, a different work.

(B. S. IV, 4, 17) and are still subject to the Lord and to such limitations as are irrevocable, Vij. finds it easy to argue that the bliss of the Infinite ever-free Lord cannot be the same as that of the human soul which has gone through Samsāra and earned its deliverance by His Grace !

In his *Nyāyāmṛta* and *Candrikā*, Vyāsarāya had passed severe strictures on some of the pet-theories, doctrines and sūtra-interpretations of the Viśiṣṭādvaitins. The thesis of Parama-sāmya was refuted by him in the closing section of the Nym. These criticisms were naturally resented by the Rāmānujīyas. The evidence of Mss. shows that close on the heels of Vyāsarāya came a number of Viśiṣṭādvaitins, who strove to repudiate the attacks made by Vyāsarāya on their system. The names of (1) Kumbakonam Tātācārya ; (2) Śrīnivāsa Ācārya of the Śaṭhamarṣaṇakula, and (3) Mahācārya of Sholinghur, require special mention in this connection. The *Tattva-mārtāṇḍa* of the second (Madras O. L. X, 4894) is a refutation of those portions of the *Candrikā* which are specially directed against the *Śrībhāṣya* and its commentary :

Vāsudevakathāyām hi Pauṇḍrakasya kathā yathā |
 Vyāsācāryakathāyām tu Vyāsarāyakathā tathā ||
 Iti svapnopadeśena deśikānugraheṇa ca |
 Candrikodīritā doṣā na lagnā iti sādhyate ||
 Sādhyate Brahmasūtrāṇām saṅgatāsaṅgatārthatā |
 Rāddhāntayoḥ svaparayoḥ Śrīnivāsakṛpāvaśāt ||
 Duruktibhir doṣagaveṣaṇāśayā gurūktiṣu bhrāntimupeyusā ruṣā |
 Mahāviśāśīviṣapeṭikābhir dodūṣakān hanta vidanti mūṣakān ||

(D. C. Madras X, No. 4894, end).

The same writer also wrote a *Praṇavadarpaṇa* or *Oṃkāravādārtha* (Madras X, 4871), dismissing the belief of the Mādhvas that the sacred syllable Om should be read as part of the opening sūtra of Bādarāyaṇa : Iha kecit atisāhasino prathamam "Athāto brahmajijñāsā" iti brahmanimāmsā-sūtre sakalaiḥ paṭhyamānam omkāram tadāvayavam abhidadhāti. Tadetat pramāṇapathānuvartino nānumanyante. Tathāhi . . ." ³² In like manner, the *Pārāśarya-Vijaya* of Mahācārya also has attempted to criticise the Sūtra-interpretations of Madhva.

A scrutiny of the controversial tracts of Vijayīndra against the doctrines of the Viśiṣṭādvaitins would at once show that they were themselves reactions from his side to the attempted criticism of the *Candrikā* by the Viśiṣṭādvaitins. It would thus be plain that Vijayīndra had to carry on a *triangular fight* with (1) the Advaitins, (2) the Vira-Śaiva

32. The Viśiṣṭādvaitins must have greatly resented the attacks from Vyāsarāya—all the more so because the great Vedānta Deśika had called the Mādhvas his nearest friends : "Tatsannikṛṣṭamapi vā matam āśrayadhvam" || (*Śatadūṣaṇī*).

schoolmen including the followers of Śrīkaṇṭha and (3) the Vira-Vaiṣṇavas (Rāmānujīyas). His *Praṇavadarpaṇakhaṇḍanam* is a direct refutation of the *Praṇavadarpaṇa* of Śrīnivāsācārya. Of this we shall speak anon.

Some idea of the fury with which the Viśiṣṭādvaitins came to defend their system against the attacks of Vyāsarāya and Vijayindra can be gathered from the title of one of the works of this period ; the *Vijayindra Parājaya*³³ of Kumbakonam Tātācārya and the invective rhetoric employed by them³⁴ which is conspicuous by its absence in the replies of Vijayindra.³⁵ This Tātācārya describes himself as a native of Kumbakonam. He was presumably a younger contemporary of Vijayindra. From certain remarks let fall by him towards the close of his work, it appears that Vijayindra was yet alive then tho' probably too old. It was probably the same Tātācārya, that figures in Sevappa Nāyaka's grant to Vijayindra in 1580. We cannot say if Vijayindra again replied to the criticisms of Tātācārya most of which however, have been anticipated by him in his *Siddhāntasārāsāraviveka* I. And the thesis of ānandatāratamya has been sufficiently well established by Vijayindra in his *Ānandatāratamyavādārtha* under notice.

(45) *Nyāyādhva-Dīpikā*.^(m)

This is a manual of the general principles of the Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā system, written from the point of view of Madhva's system, and presumably for the benefit of students approaching the subject thro' the door of the Dvaita system :—

Nyāyādhvagāminām Madhva darśanāt gatisiddhaye/
Tanyate Vijayindreṇa tanvī Nyāyādhvavādīpikā//

Besides giving a fair and clear exposition of the orthodox Mīmāṃsaka doctrines as presented by the leading commentators of that school, the work aims at harmonising them with those of Madhva and his followers. The author says that tho' there are works like the *Śāstradīpikā* lucidly explaining the views of the Mīmāṃsakas, his work would be welcomed by all—especially those who are not equal to the stiff treatment of the former. It is understood that the work will shortly be taken up for publication by the authorities of the Mysore O.L.

33. This work deals with nearly 22 subjects of topical interest in the Dvaita-vedānta and criticises them all. These include (1) Guṇaguṇabheda ; (2) Ānandatāratamya ; (3) Viśeṣa ; (4) Avyākrtākāśa ; (5) denial of Brahman's material causality ; (5) and the inefficacy of Prapatti.

34. "Vṛatānīcchrīnivāso nayamaṇimālikām dhvāntadaurgatyahantrīm |

Tasmāt aprāmāṇikam Dhvāntamatānuvartinām avayavatvakathanam iti." |

35. See his introduction to the *Prāṇavadarpaṇakhaṇḍanam*.

(46) *Śrutitātparya Kaumudī**

This is mentioned by name in Rāghavendra Tīrtha's com. on the *Candrikā* (i, 3, vol. 4, Mysore edn.) as well as in his *Bhāvadīpa* on the *Tattvaparakāśikā* (p. 101, line 12):—Atra vistarastu Gurupādakṛta Śrutitātparyakaumudyām jñeyaḥ | No further information is available regarding this work or the nature of its contents. No Ms. also is forthcoming.

(47) *Upasamhāra-Vijaya* ^(m)

This is another of Vijayīndra's works bearing upon the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā system. It is in the nature of a reply to the *Upakrama-Parākrama* of Appayya Dīkṣita, who in his work (Benares, 1904) pleads for the superiority of the upakrama (initial statement in a textual totality) over the concluding part thereof, in the settlement of the import of the whole, in case of any difficulty. Vijayīndra's work is just a plea for the soundness of the reverse procedure advocated by Madhva, and which has been ridiculed by Appayya.³⁶

The attempt to defend the position taken up by Madhva was first made by Vyāsarāya, in his *Candrikā* and other works in the light of some of the admissions and implications in the *Mīmāṃsā Sūtras* and their commentaries. It was carried still further by his eminent disciple Vijayīndra in such of his works as the *Candrikodāhrtanyāyavivaraṇam*, etc., and specially in the present one:—

Gurupādoktibhir nyāyair Upakramaparākramam/
Nirākṛtyopasamhāra-vijayoyam prakāśyate//

A complete Telugu Ms. of it is preserved in the T. P. L. (8086) in 1270 granthas. Two other Mss. are available at the Mysore O. L. Vijayīndra quotes passages *in extenso* from the work of Appayya and replies to them at length. He has discussed such adhikaraṇas as the Vedopakrama, Aśvapratiagraheṣṭi and Apaccheda. He quotes from the *Candrikā*, AV, etc.

(48) *Naya-Pañcaka-Mālā*.³⁷ ^(m)

A Ms. of this work is preserved in the Rāghavendra Svāmi Mutt at Nanjangud. Its ascription in the *Mysore Arch. Report* for 1917 (p. 17)

36. "Yavanagurūpadiṣṭaśaucapraṁśālanapaurvāparyavyatyāsavat upekṣaṇīyaḥ | "

37. Not नयचम्पकमाला as it has been called on p. 317 of the Viṅ. Sex. Com. Vol,

to Sujanendra Tīrtha, twelfth in succession from Vijayīndra, is a mistake. The *Satkathā* (1896, p. 43) ascribes it to Vijayīndra.

(49) *Vāgvaikharī*^(m)

This is a short tract in 1900 granthas, of a miscellaneous character dealing among other things with the validity of the Veda, the scope and purpose of Bheda-śrutis. The author seeks to establish God as a Person full of auspicious attributes and combats the doctrines of Nirguṇatva and Avācya of the Brahman, which render the majesty of God meaningless. A Dev. Ms. of this work is to be found in the Mysore O.L. (2397C).

(50) *Nārāyaṇa-Śabdārthanirvacanam*

This (Mysore O. L. 4025) is one of the tracts dealing with the etymology of the word “Nārāyaṇa” as applied to Viṣṇu, and refuting the contention of Śaivite writers like Appayya Dīkṣita who have endeavoured to correlate it to Śiva. The renowned Appayya Dīkṣita is said to have given up the attempt with the significant remark that the cerebral nasal ‘ṇ’ presents an insuperable difficulty to the Śaivite attunement.

(51) *Praṇavadarpaṇa-Khaṇḍanam*^(m)

A complete Ms. of this tract is preserved in the Madras O. L. (D. C. X, 4798). The work is a reply to the contention of Śrīnivāsācārya (Śaṭhamarṣaṇa) in his *Praṇavadarpaṇa*, that the syllable Om has no right to be read as part of the opening sūtra of Bādārāyaṇa. Vijayīndra quotes passages from Śrīnivāsācārya and replies to them in a more dignified fashion than his adversary has chosen to present the case of the Dvaitins: Athāto brahmajijñāseti nyāyagrathanātmakabrahmamīmāṃsā-śāstrasyādimaśūtrasya omkāraḥ, etatsūtrāvayavo naveti vipratipattiḥ. Netyanye | Bhavatyeveti Vyāsamātānusārīṇaḥ | Tatra Anyeṣāṃ ayam abhisandhiḥ . . . ||

(52) *Piṣṭapaśu-Mīmāṃsā*^(m)

A work of this name is attributed to Vijayīndra by Dr. Nagaraja Śarma on p. 23 of his *Reign of Realism* (1931). The catalogues of various libraries examined by me, do not mention any such work. The subject dealt with is the propriety of substituting flour-made ewes for live animals, in Vedic sacrifices which is followed by the adherents of Madhva. It is of course well-known that the system of Piṣṭapaśu-yāgas, is as old as Uparīśrava Vasu, in the *Mokṣadharmā* section of the Mbh.³⁸

38. According to the *Skānda Purāṇa* (II. 9, 7, 29; 9, 13-14) Piṣṭapaśus have always been the Vedic law and the actual slaughter of animals has been due to a

The Advaitins and Viśiṣṭādvaitins on the other hand are advocates of the slaughter of live animals. Vijayindra's arguments are said to be based not merely upon considerations of sentiment but the difficulty of procuring duly qualified ṛtviks to officiate at the yajñas, in a degenerate age like this. To minimise the risk, Piṣṭapaśus have to be substituted. Such substitution is sanctioned by the Mīmāṃsakas and followed by all Vaidikas in respect of rites like the Sautrāmaṇī. According also to the law that a man shall sacrifice to the gods what he himself is in the habit of eating in daily life, actual slaughter of animals would seem to be unpardonable, especially in the case of Brahmins.

Belles Lettres.

Besides being a powerful controversialist and commentator, Vijayindra was something of a poet and a dramatist too. His known works in this field are :—

(53) *Subhadrā-Dhanañjaya*^(m)

A Sanskrit drama dealing presumably with the interesting story of the romantic marriage of Arjuna with Subhadrā. We have a very badly damaged Nandināgari Ms. of this work in the Madras O. L. (D. C. XXI, 12728). It is very difficult to make out the writing in the Ms.

(54) *Ubhayagrāsa-Rāhūdaya*^(m)

Believed to be an allegorical drama written as a counterblast to the *Prabodhacandrodaya* and *Samkalpasūryodaya*. Aufrecht notices a Ms. of this work (Catalogus, p. 69) from Jy. Oppert 2504.

Two more works attributed to Vijayindra Tirtha have been brought to light by Dr. R. Nagaraja Śarma, in his article on Vijayindra Tirtha published in the *Indian Express*, Madras, dated 10th July '37. These are :—

(55) *Kucodya-kuṭhāra*^(m)

A fragment of which is claimed to have reached his hands, by the Doctor. The work is said to deal with the "Sūtra-Prasthāna" of the Dvaita school and defend the particular arrangement of the subject-matter of the sūtras adopted by Madhva and his commentators against the attacks of later day critics like Appayya. It is presumably the same work as is preserved in the Mys. O.L., C-970, and wrongly (?) believed

misunderstanding of scripture in later times. The Ārya Samajists hold the somewhat improbable view that in vedic sacrifices, the animals were never meant to be killed but "touched".

to be a commentary on the *Candrikā*. Vijayīndra is said to refer in this work to the *Candrikā* saying that all the frivolous objections of the Monists have been silenced once for all in the *Candrikā*.³⁹

(56) *Advaita-śikṣā*^(m)

This is reported to be preserved in Ms. at the Library of the Sanskrit College, Uḍipi. The title of the work would show that Vijayīndra's work was in the nature of a general chastisement of the Advaita theory. It is believed to be modelled on such polemical tracts as the *Bhedojjīvana* and deal with the metaphysical points at issue between Monism and Dualism. The occurrence of certain characteristic verses of Vijayīndra in this tract confirms its genuineness as a work of that celebrated writer. The same cannot however be said of the *Kucodya-kūṭhāra*. I have since discovered a reference to the *Advaita-Śikṣā*, by name, in the *Nyāyamauktikamālā* of Vij. (Mysore A. 44):—

प्रपञ्चितं चैतदस्माभिर्द्वैतशिक्षायां श्रुत्यर्थसारादिष्वपीत्यलम् ॥

(57) *Śrutyarthasāra**

This is one of the works of Vij. referred to by him in the course of a passage in his *Nyāyamauktikamālā* (Mys. A. 44).⁴⁰ No Ms. of the work has however been brought to light.

(58) Yet another work—a theological tract attributed to Vij. is the *Līṅgamūlānveṣaṇa-Khaṇḍanam*^(m) dealing with the Purāṇic story of Viṣṇu's going in search of the root of the Līṅga-form of Śiva.

39. *Candrikā* dau vyaktatvāt na kucodyāvakaśaḥ (Ms.).

40. See passage quoted above from it.

SECTION III.

Post-Jaya Tirtha Writers

(Non-Polemical)¹

By

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CHAPTER I.

VIDYĀDHIRĀJA TĪRTHA

14. *Vidyādhirāja Tīrtha* (1388-1412)*

Vidyādhirāja was the immediate disciple and successor of Jaya Tīrtha on the Pīṭha. His former name is said to have been Kṛṣṇa-bhaṭṭa. He is assigned a 'rule' of sixty-four years in the Mutt Lists, which does not seem to be justifiable and which cannot be accepted without disturbing the otherwise settled chronology of his later successors. We have seen that the Mutt Lists themselves have pushed back the date of Madhva by two cycles, and that nothing more than the cyclic years recorded in them for each Pontiff can be admitted as certain. Even these are in need of revision in many cases.² Jaya Tīrtha himself lived up to a good age and occupied the Pīṭha for 23 years. His disciple Vidyādhirāja was evidently recruited from the Gṛhasthāśrama (as has been the custom ever since). Considering these facts, it seems unlikely that he could have been on the Pīṭha for 64 years. The cyclic year of his demise is given as Āṅgīrasa which would correspond to 1392 A.D. But it is equally improbable that he was Pontiff for *just* four years. He is the author of not less than three learned commentaries and his literary activities must have taken more of his time than four years. It seems to me then that the period of Pontifical rule assigned to him in the old Mutt lists, really represents the actual period of his life on earth: 64 years. He might have been about forty years old at the time of his accession in 1388 and might have died in or about 1412 A.D.

It was in the days of Vidyādhirāja that the first split in the "Mūla Maṭha" into two, took place. Tradition explains that he was taken

1. This paper is part of the writer's forthcoming work on the *History of Dvaita Literature*.

2. See for example the dates of Vyāsarāya, Brahmaṇya-Tīrtha, Vāḍindra etc.

seriously ill twice in his life on both of which occasions he was driven to the necessity of appointing a successor—the two to be so appointed being Rājendra Tīrtha and Kavindra Tīrtha. Rājendra's line is now represented by the Vyāsārāya Maṭha at Sosale. Kavindra was the common ancestor of what now go by the names of the Rāghavendra Svāmi and Uttarādi Mutts which branched off under similar circumstances in the days of Rāmacandra Tīrtha, the second in succession from Kavindra (See Table II *ante*). Vidyādhirāja died at Ergoḷa, where his mortal remains lie entombed.

WORKS

The *Satkathā* (S. K.) throws no light on the literary activities of Vidyādhirāja.³ But from other sources we gather that he wrote some three works two of which have been preserved in Mss. The other is known only through what appears to be a reference.

*Chāndogya-Bhāṣya-Ṭīkā*⁴

The above is known only through the following allusion in Śrīnivāsa Tīrtha's commentary on the *Taitt. Up. Bhāṣya* :—

विद्याधिराजादिमुनीस्तथा वेदेशयोगिनः ।

छान्दोग्यभाष्यसङ्कीर्तनवन्दे निरन्तरम् ॥

It is quite possible however to interpret the phrase : छान्दोग्यभाष्यटीका-कर्तृन् “so as to refer to *Vedēsa Bhikṣu* alone, and this seems the more probable interpretation—in which case, no commentary on the *Chāndogya-bhāṣya* need be admitted for Vidyādhirāja.

(1) *Gītā-Vivṛti*^(m)

Two Mss. of Vidyādhirāja's commentary on the *Gītā* are preserved in the Mysore O. L. (C. 1343, Dev. and 2982 N.) The former, examined by me, is in a decaying condition and is very badly written. It is indifferently styled as a *Ṭīkā* and as a *Vivṛti*. The author adheres closely to the

3. They are however alluded to in the introd. verse No. 6 of his C. on the *Nyāyavivaraṇa* by Raghūttama:

मध्वोक्तिद्युनदीजयार्यशुभवाक्सूर्यात्मजासंगमे
व्याख्यास्नानमहो विधाय नृहरेः प्राप्य प्रसादं परम् ।
प्रापुर्यै कृतकृत्यतां गतमला विद्याधिराजादयो

* * * * *

4. G.V.L. Catal. Kumbakonam.

G. B. of Madhva ; but while the latter passes over all those verses which are philosophically unimportant, Vidyādhirāja generally supplies a brief comment to the less important passages also. He has incorporated the additional explanations of Gītā-verses found in Madhva's G. T. But for his own distinctive style and this method of treatment, his commentary would be little more than a *rechauffe* of the G. B. of Madhva. Cf. Vidyādhirāja and Madhva on G. B. and G. T. on Gītā ii, 45.

The style of the author bears a strong family resemblance to that of Jaya Tirtha, in its simplicity and directness :—

ज्ञानिनो मोक्षनियमः । तथापि शुभकर्मणा आनन्दवृद्धिश्च । किञ्च, कुतः कर्म न कर्तव्यम् ? कर्माकरणस्यैव मोक्षसाधनत्वादिति चेत् , तर्हि मोक्षो नैष्कर्म्यशब्दवाच्य इत्येवमुच्यते ? उत कर्माकरणे कर्ममूलः संसारो न भवतीति ? आद्यं दूषयति—‘ न कर्मणाम् ’ इति ॥ (Gītā iii, 4)

The commentary is mentioned by Das Gupta in his *History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. 11, p. 443.

(2) *Viṣṇu-Sahasranāma-Bhāṣya* ^(m)

A well-written Devanāgarī Ms. of this is to be found in the Mysore O. L. (C. 137), running to nearly 1650 granthas. The author's name is given at the end :

एवं विद्याधिराजेन प्रीत्यै माधवमध्वयोः ।

विष्णुनामसहस्रस्य निरुक्तिः संप्रकीर्तिता ॥

Its importance seems to rest on two considerations : (1) that the *Viṣṇu-Sahasranāma* is held in very high esteem by Madhva ;⁵ and (2) that Vidyādhirāja's happens to be the earliest Dvaita commentary on it. There are other commentaries by subsequent writers of the same school, but they cannot be said to come up to the level of this one. It most probably represents a sort of dualistic reaction against the Advaitic commentaries in the field, the earliest known of which is the one attributed to Śaṅkara, which again some scholars are inclined to attribute to a later writer of that name belonging probably to the 13th century or later.

The commentary opens with an invocation to Viṣṇu, Vedavyāsa, Pūrṇa-bodha (Madhva), Sarasvatī, and to the preceptors of the author.

5. Cf. तच्चोक्तं-भारतं सर्वशास्त्रेषु भारते गातिका वरा ।

विष्णोर्नामसहस्रं च ज्ञेयं पाठ्यं च तद्ब्रूयम् ॥ इति ॥

(G.B. i. introd.)

The efficacy of the thousand names of the Lord, is emphasised with the help of a quotation from the G. T.

शास्त्रेषु भारतं सारं तत्र नामसहस्रकम् ।

The author repeats the well-known observation of Madhva that each one of the thousand names is capable of a hundred explanations:—

तत्प्रसादाद्यथाशक्ति शतार्थस्य निरन्तरम् ।

विष्णुनामसहस्रस्य निरुक्तिः संप्रकाश्यते ॥

He does not however presume to give *all* of them for each or even a few of these holy names. He contents himself with indicating as many explanations as can conveniently be attempted by him and digested by his readers at a time. His venture is merely illustrative not exhaustive. It is left to the ingenuity of the learned to work out for themselves many more explanations of the kind : दिङ्मात्रप्रतिपत्तये कानिचिन्निवर्चनान्युक्तानि, विद्वद्भिरन्यान्यप्युहितुं शक्यानीति ग्रन्थगौरवभयात् लिख्यन्ते ॥ He has given only the necessary etymological explanations leaving out all learned and abstruse discussion and application of the rules of Grammar and Etymology involved in the process : एवं निर्वचनमात्रमत्र क्रियते । प्रकृतिप्रत्ययावशेषस्तु प्रसिद्धव्याकरणेभ्योऽभ्युपगन्तव्यः (P. 4). Quotations are drawn from the AV, the Śrutis cited by Madhva, the *Ekākṣara Nighaṇṭu*, the G.B., *Brahmatarka* and the Mbh. T. N.

A noteworthy feature of this commentary is that it brings together a variety of explanations of names and epithets of the Lord that lie scattered in the major works of Madhva. Nearly a dozen explanations of the first holy name “Viśva”, are given. The commentary is a very attractive one on the whole, and deserves publication at an early date.

CHAPTER II.

VYĀSA TĪRTHA

15. Vyāsa Tīrtha (C. 1370-1400)⁶

i

This Vyāsa Tīrtha ought to be distinguished from his namesake and successor who flourished in the heydays of the Vijayanagar Empire under Kṛṣṇadevarāya and his successor. Aufrecht,⁷ P. P. S. Sastri⁸

6. The S.K. places him about 1200 Śaka, which is inadmissible.

7. *Catalogus Cat.* i, p. 619.

8. T.P.L. Cat. XIV p. 6225.

Vāsudeva Sastri Abhyankar⁹ and others¹⁰ have confounded the two Vyāsa Tīrthas and ascribed to the latter, works really written by the former. Aufrecht is again wrong (i p. 619) in making Vyāsa Tīrtha—“the founder of the Vyāsarāya Maṭha”—a guru of Vedeśa Bhikṣu.¹¹ It would be well therefore, to adopt for the later Vyāsa Tīrtha the name of Vyāsarāya with its variants: Vyāsarāja Svāmin and Vyāsayati by which he is most widely known in Mādhva circles.

The earlier Vyāsa Tīrtha with whom we are here and now concerned, was avowedly a direct disciple of Jaya Tīrtha.¹² He was not a Pontiff of any Mutt and was what in Kannaḍa is called a “Biḍi-Sannyāsi” (stray disciple).

ii

Vyāsa Tīrtha seems to have contributed glosses to eight out of the ten Upaniṣads commented upon by Madhva leaving out the *Īśa* and the *Praśna* commented upon by Jaya Tīrtha. A commentary on the *Mbh.* T. N. and two lives of Jaya Tīrtha—one bigger and the other a short one, are all the works written by him. The ascription of such polemical treatises as the *Candrikā* and the *Nyāyāmṛta* to him,¹³ has to be rejected even on grounds of style. His commentaries on the Upaniṣads are mentioned by Raghuttama Tīrtha¹⁴ and quotations from them occur in the *Bhāṣya-dīpikā* of Jagannātha Tīrtha¹⁵

(1) *Aitareya-Upaniṣad Bhāṣya-Vyākhyā**

No Ms. of this commentary has been found. The only textual allusion to it is to be found in one of the introductory stanzas in a gloss on

9. Edn. *Sarvadarśana Samgraha*, Bombay, p. 517.

10. Madras University Historical Series No. XI, p. 424.

11. This confusion is common to P.P.S. Sastri also (Vol. XIV, Cat. T.P.L. introd. p. xvii). The real Guru of Vedeśa was Vedavyāsa Tīrtha disciple of Raghūttama.

12. See colophon to his *Aṇu-Jayatīrthavijaya* (Madras R. No. 1447-a) Vedeśa also refers to him as जयराजनिषेवकान् (Chān. com.). That this refers to the earlier Vyāsatīrtha is clear from a subsequent reference to the author of the *Nyāyāmṛta* and *Candrikā*.

13. See footnotes 7-10.

14. येन वेदान्तभाष्याणि व्याख्यातानि महात्मना ।
तं वन्दे व्यासतीर्थार्यं वेदान्तार्थप्रसिद्धये ॥

15. ii. 1. 18 ; p. 268 etc.

the *Aitareya* by a late and more or less unknown commentator : Kṛṣṇācārya, of which a Ms. exists at the T. P. L. (iii, 1592):—

महैतरेयखण्डार्थो व्यासतीर्थादिभिर्लघु ।

सङ्गृहीतः स एवार्थो विस्तराल्लिख्यते मया ॥

(2) *Taittirīya-Bhāṣya-Vyākhyā* ^(p)15a
(Granthas 400).

His commentary on the (3) *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-Bhāṣya*, is a voluminous one running to 3500 granthas. Mss. of it are preserved at Baroda (O. L., AC. 3914), Mysore (C. 948) and Tanjore (iii, 1650). It is quoted by Jagannātha Tīrtha and mentioned by Raghūttama at the beginning of his commentary. His (4) *Chāndogyabhāṣya-Vyākhyā* is available in Mss. both at Mysore and Tanjore (1618), complete in eight Adhyāyas, running to over 2500 granthas. It is quoted on p. 428 of the *Bhāṣya-dīpikā*. The (5) *Kena or Taḷavakāra-bhāṣya-vyākhyā* in 100 granthas was printed in 1907. It is a very concise commentary but quite readable. The author culls *pratīkas* from the *Upaniṣad-Bhāṣya* of Madhva tho' not from the *Upaniṣad* as such. (6) The *Kaṭha-bhāṣya-vyākhyā* was published in 1905. It is quoted in the *Bhāṣyadīpikā*. That on the (7) *Muṇḍaka* ^(p) runs to 350 granthas and the one on the (8) *Māṇḍūkya* ^(p) to 330. The *bhāṣyārtha* and the *khaṇḍārtha* of the original are concurrently given. Of his com. on the (9) *Mahābhārata-tātparyanirṇaya*, a Ms. in Nāgari is reported from Mysore (O.L. 5063). His (10) *Jaya-tīrtha Vijaya* ¹⁶ is a metrical life of Jayatīrtha in 5 cantos, of various metres. The first two are taken up with the doings of Madhva and his four disciples, notably Narahari (St. 4-28) and Akṣobhya (31-68). The latter's encounter with Vidyāranya (St. 43) and the arbitration by Vedānta Deśika (St. 64) are referred to. The III Canto closes with the early life and marriage of Jayatīrtha whose name is given as "Dhoṇḍu" (St. 5). The IV sketches his meeting with Akṣobhya and the last deals with his conversion. No account is given of the Pontifical activities of Jayatīrtha, except his devotion to Sarasvatī (V. 8-11). The *Aṇu-Jayatīrthavijaya* ^(p) is a shorter metrical life in 34 sragdharās. Some legendary details are given about Jayatīrtha. Here too, he is represented as an incarnation of Indra and to have been miraculously favoured by the Goddess Durgā (St. 16). The works contain nothing of historical importance or worth and their artificial and uninspired nature makes it difficult to believe that they were really the work of a direct disciple of Jayatīrtha.

15a. Published by T. R. Kṛṣṇācārya, Kumbakonam.

16. Jayālaya Press, Mysore.

iii

Vyāsātīrtha is the earliest Mādhva glossator on the Upaniṣads. He may, in a sense, be even said to be the first *regular* commentator of his school, on the Upaniṣads; for, the ten Upaniṣad Bhāṣyas of Madhva, were but running commentaries on the originals. They did not give any word for word meaning of the passages, such as is to be found in the bhāṣyas of Śankara and his followers. Such commentaries from the Dvaita point of view were thus a desideratum—and Vyāsātīrtha addressed himself to this task. He also commented upon the bhāṣyas of Madhva at the same time. The clarity of his exposition and the simplicity of his language are alike remarkable. It is on the lines chalked out by him that subsequent commentators like Vedeśa, Viśveśvara and Rāghavendra have written their Khaṇḍārthas on the Upaniṣads.

CHAPTER III.

VIJAYADHVAJA TĪRTHA

16. *Vijayadhvaजा Tīrtha* (C. 1437-55)

From the genealogical tree of the Pejāvar Mutt of Uḍipi, given elsewhere, it will be seen that Vijayadhavaja Tīrtha was the seventh pontifical successor of Madhva on the pīṭha of that Mutt. The story in the *Satkathā* that he was a disciple of Jayatīrtha, seems to be due merely to a confusion between the names of Jaya-Tīrtha and Vijaya-tīrtha the grand preceptor परमगुरु of Vijayadhvaजा. Both as the seventh successor from Ānandatīrtha and as belonging to an order of Bālya-Sannyāsins, Vijayadhvaजा must undoubtedly have come *after* Jayatīrtha who was the fifth in succession from Madhva.

On the basis of a grant to Vidyā(dhi)rāja Tīrtha of the Kṛṣṇāpūr Mutt of Uḍipi, in the reign of Harihara II (1377-1402) and of a gift of land to the same Svāmi¹⁷ in the year 1409 A.D. by Devarāya Mahārāya (1406-18), we may be permitted to work out an average of nearly 20 years of rule for each pontiff in which case Vijayadhvaजा would automatically fall between C. 1437-60 A.D.¹⁸ This calculation has also the

17. See *Madras Ins.*, ii, p. 871, Nos. 236 and 241. The Svāmi was the fifth Pontiff of the Mutt.

18. He could not therefore have flourished "about the same time" as Vyāsarāya, as airily remarked by a writer on p. 313 of the *Vij. Sex.* Com. Vol.*

support of other dated inscriptions from Uḍipi bearing upon the Svāmīs of the Kāṇūr¹⁹ and Sode²⁰ Mutts.

Nothing is known about the early life and career of Vijayadhvaṇa. The S. K. (edn. 1896, p. 23), says that on one occasion, he had committed the offence of crossing the sea in a vessel and thereby incurred the odium of the orthodox. He was very probably a Tuḷu Brahmin like his brother-pontiffs of the Uḍipi Mutts. He was an indefatigable writer and a sincere soul. His mortal remains lie at *Kaṇva-tīrtha*, near Manjeshwar, ten miles south of Mangalore.

WORKS

Vijayadhvaṇa is best known to the followers of Madhva as the author of a voluminous commentary on the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa* called *Padaratnāvali*. It was printed at Belgaum in 1892 and is one of the representative commentaries included in the Variorum edition of the *Purāṇa* published from Brindāvan, in 1905, with many commentaries.

The *Padaratnāvali* is the earliest complete and standard commentary of the Dvaita school on the *Bhāgavata*. There have been many subsequent commentaries on the *Bhāgavata* by writers of the same school, like Yadupati, Satyadharma, etc.; but none of them has come up to the level of Vijayadhvaṇa's epoch-making commentary, be it in stylistic grandeur, expository brilliance or comprehensive grasp of subject-matter. It is as luminous as it is voluminous, running to over 35000 granthas. It is one of the distinguished contributions of the Uḍipi Mutts to the output of Dvaita Literature. The text of Vijayadhvaṇa shows important variations from the readings known to Jaya Tīrtha, of passages quoted in the works of Madhva.²¹

The *Padaratnāvali* is a word for word commentary on the entire *Bhāgavata* unlike the B. T. of Madhva, which is merely a running com-

19. No. 113 of 1901 mentions in a grant made in 1614, Vidyādhiśa and Vibudheśa Tīrtha of the Kāṇūr Mutt, the fourteenth and fifteenth Svāmīs of the Mutt. This Vidyādhiśa ought not to be confounded with his namesake in the Uttarādi Mutt, as has been done by Prof. V. Rangacharya.

20. Vide inscriptions relating to Vādirāja Tīrtha and his pupil in my *Date of Vādirāja*, Annals B.O.R.I., XVIII, pt. 2, pp. 195-6.

21. For instance in XI, 21, 43, Vij. reads लोके which he interprets as विद्वज्जनमध्ये but J in his C on B.S.B. i. 1, 4, has “साक्षात्.” The interpretations too are different. Cf. J. on G.B. ii, 24 and Vij. on Bhāg. ii, 7, 42 and III, 5, 39.

mentary on some of the crucial verses or parts of verses alone of the Purāṇa. Vijayadhvaṇya is indeed very much indebted to the B. T. in the writing of his commentary as can be seen from the numerous quotations and extracts which he gives from it. It appears further from one of his introductory verses, that he had before him another commentary on the Purāṇa,²² written by his own Paramaguru Vijaya Tīrtha :

आनन्दतीर्थविजयतीर्थो प्रणम्य मस्करिवरवन्द्यो ।

तयोः कृतिं स्फुटमुपजीव्य प्रवच्मि भागवतं पुराणम् ॥ (verse 11).

Vijayadhvaṇya's object in writing his commentary seems to have been to supplement the B. T. of Madhva and defend it, where necessary, against contemporary criticisms. (See his remarks under III, 10, 9, 40, X, 75, 52; 10, 72, 12; XI, 13, 7). Both Madhva and Vijayadhvaṇya are found to criticise certain powerfully established Advaitic interpretations of the Purāṇa. The former's references and criticisms being, as usual, very brief and enigmatic in the absence of a good commentary, Vijayadhvaṇya has ably supplied the want; i, 2, 12, 22, 24; i, 3, 3, 34; IV, 22, 40; VI, 9, 28; VII, 3, 34; VII, 9, 10; XI, 7, 51; XI, 21, 43; IV, 29, 10; IV, 33, 16; III, 5, 10; XI, 10, 13; XI, 15, 6; XI, 12, 20; IV, 24, 29 and VI, 4, 27. Besides making clear the nature and drift of Madhva's criticisms of the Advaitic interpretations of the verses, he has many independent criticisms to offer against Advaitic commentators of the Purāṇa : i, 1, 1, i, 2, 2; i, 9, 49; VI, 15, 7; VII, 3, 34; i, 3, 32; i, 5, 10; i, 7, 37; i, 9, 49. Vijayadhvaṇya gives copious extracts from certain of these commentaries but in the present state of our knowledge, it is not possible to fix the identity of the commentator or commentators censured by him. It would be time to say when the earlier commentaries of Citsukha and Puṇyāranya come to be published and studied closely, if the views embodied in them tally with those censured by Vijayadhvaṇya. As for Śrīdhara's commentary, there are a couple of indications that Vijayadhvaṇya was acquainted with it; Cf. the two on 'ज्ञान' and 'विज्ञान' in II, 9, 31. It must however be added that there are more than fifteen places in the *Padaratnāvalī* where Advaitic interpretations of verses are quoted and severely criticised. But only in two or three stray cases do these quotations agree even remotely with the views expressed by Śrīdhara in his commentary on those verses. In

22. It is also probable that Vijaya Tīrtha's com. was on the *Bhāṅgavata Tātparyā* of Madhva.

most cases, he differs fundamentally in spirit²³ and letter^{23a} from the Advaitic interpretations referred to by Vijayadhvaia. Where he agrees with them, the occasions are of trivial account, having no textual or metaphysical significance in themselves—agreements so to say of an ordinary and inevitable kind :—III, 1, 23 ; III, 5, 10 ; I, 2, 2 ; I, 10, 4 ; VI, 9, 28 ; VII, 9, 10 ; I, 3, 8 ; II, 2, 16. On more vital issues, he is frankly dualistic in his interpretation even where a monistic interpretation could be thought of (i. 18, 14 ; VII, 3, 34). He is even anti-monistic²⁴ at times: XI, 12, 20 ; admits the reality of the श्रीविग्रह and the continuation of Bhakti in Mokṣa. With all that, Śrīdhara was an Advaitin (1, 5, 20) and there is much more than a casual agreement between his interpretation of Bhāg. VII, 9, 10, and its criticism at the hands of Vijayadhvaia. The latter refers to two different explanations of the term द्विषद्गुण here, the first of which is to be found in Śrīdhara's ṭikā. In II, 2, 16 ; there is a marked resemblance in wording and interpretation between Śrīdhara and the Advaitic view criticised by Vijayadhvaia. At the same time, there is nothing to show that Śrīdhara himself could not, in these cases, have gone back to the earlier commentators of his own school. The *Gaurāṅgāṇodeśadīpikā* of Kavikarṇapūra makes Viṣṇu Purī a disciple of Jayadhvaia alias Jayadharma Tīrtha (1430-45). Since Viṣṇu Purī quotes Śrīdhara,²⁵ we may take the latter to have been a contemporary of Jayadhvaia himself. And since Jayadhvaia himself is not far removed from Vijaya-dhvaia, it may be assumed that Śrīdhara Svāmin was more or less an elder contemporary of Vijayadhvaia.

Though following strictly in the footsteps of Madhva, Vijayadhvaia does, on occasions, give additional interpretations of verses, not contemplated by the former, which he nevertheless piously believes, could be brought within the range of his Master's explanations : i, 1, 3 : अत्र पिबति-भक्षणार्थः, अनेकार्थत्वाद्वात्नाम् । न चायमर्थो आचार्योक्तार्थो नेत्यश्रद्धेयम्....॥

23. i, 1, 4 ; II, 9, 15 ; II, 8, 14.

23-a. II, 8, 14 ; IV, 29, 20, where the reading व्यवच्छिद्यते is unknown to Śrīdhara ; IV, 33, 16 ; 1, 2, 12 ; 1, 2, 22, 24 ; i, 3, 3, 34 ; i, 5, 10 ; 1, 7, 37 ; VI, 4, 27 ; VI, 15, 7 ; VII, 3, 34 ; XI, 3, 34 ; XI, 12, 20.

24. जीवयतीति जीवः परमात्मा । With this cf. Madhva : जीव इति भगवतोऽनिरुद्धस्याख्या (V.T.N.) and जीवयति जीवं करोतीति जीवः, न तु स्वयं जीवः (*Caitanya Candrodāya*, Bib. Ind. p. 156 and Śrīdhara on Bhāg. XI, 24, 27 ; III, 35, 31 ; III 9, 3 ; i, 1, 3 ; आत्मारामाश्च मुनयो (i, 7, 10) etc.

25. अत्र श्रीधरसत्तमोक्तिलिखनेन्यूनाधिकं यद्भवेत् ॥
India Office (Cat. VI, No. 2535, p. 1272, Col. 2,

Under XI, 15, 6, we have in Vijayadhvaṇa, a valuable reference to the commentary of a certain "Śuka Tīrtha," on the *Bhāgavata*.²⁶ We know nothing about this commentator from any other source.²⁷ His title "Tīrtha" would however suggest a Sannyāsin of the *Ekadāṇḍī* Order, though not necessarily a Mādhva ascetic. We have only a single reference to him in the whole of Vijayadhvaṇa's commentary, and in the present state of our knowledge, it is difficult to say to what extent some of the Advaitic interpretations criticised by Vijayadhvaṇa might have been directed against this commentator, had he really been (as is probable), an Advaitin, himself.

OTHER WORKS

Tradition ascribes to Vijayadhvaṇa a commentary also on the *Bhāgavata Tātparya* of Madhva. But no. Mss. of any such commentary has been brought to light. It seems unlikely moreover, that he would have troubled to write a fresh commentary on the B. T. when he had already dealt with the original in his *Padaratnāvalī* and made ample quotations from the B. T. therein. Most probably this ascription has reference to Vijaya-Tīrtha, the Paramaguru of Vijayadhvaṇa, who, we have seen, has been credited with a commentary dealing either directly or indirectly with the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa*.

Of the other works attributed to him are (2) a commentary on the *Yamakabhārata*;²⁸ (3) *Daśāvatāra-Harigāthāstotra*,^(p)²⁹ in praise of the ten Avatars of Viṣṇu and set to music; and (4) a *Kṛṣṇāṣṭakam*.

CHAPTER IV.

VIDYĀNIDHI TĪRTHA

17. *Vidyānidhi Tīrtha* (1435-44).

Aufrecht in his *Catalogus Cat.*, calls him the seventh successor from Ānandatīrtha, probably counting Jayatīrtha as the *second* instead of

26. इति उक्ता एवातर्भावाः, संख्याश्च ; नान्याः शुक्तीर्था-
युक्तविधा इति । Vij. XI, 15, 6. (re. Siddhis)

27. Jivagosvāmin, in his *Ṣaṣṣandarbhā*, mentions *Śukahrdaya* among a dozen standard commentaries on the Bhāg. It is doubtful however if its author was really the Śukatīrtha mentioned by Vijayadhvaṇa. Jiva mentions Vijayadhvaṇa too with great respect: दक्षिणादिदेशविख्यातविजयध्वज... वेदवेदार्थविद्वद्भ्रा-
णम्... (p. 21,-22).

28. M. M. Sangha List.

29. It has been published from Uḍipi along with the *Caturdaśa-Stotra* of the same author.

as the *fifth* from Madhva. Vidyānidhi's former name is said to have been Kṛṣṇa-bhaṭṭa. The S. K. in whose Table of Contents, he is mis-called Vidyānanda, considers him to have been a Tulu Brahmin, which is rather curious, seeing that he was the actual founder of the Uttarādi Mutt. He was the second disciple of Rāmacandra Tīrtha, the first one being Vibudhendra Tīrtha.

Absolutely nothing is known about the early life and career of Vidyānidhi. Tradition vaguely attributes to him a commentary on the *Gītā*, of which no Ms. is known. His tomb is at Ergoḷa.

CHAPTER V.

BRAHMAṆYA TĪRTHA

18. *Brahmaṇya Tīrtha* (1460-77) *

Brahmaṇya Tīrtha was third in descent from Rājendra Tīrtha. He thus belongs to the "main line" of disciples from Madhvācārya, and was evidently a Kārṇāṭaka Brahmin. The Mutt Lists give his date of demise as 1467 A.D. This was accepted by B. Venkoba Rau in his Introduction to the *Vyāsayogicarita*. It is however open to many objections. In the first place, it gives Brahmaṇya's disciple Vyāsarāya a Pontifical sway of over 70 years, which is too long. It also bestows upon the latter a life of 93 years and more which is not also corroborated by other evidence. Venkoba Rau himself refers (p. cxiv-cxv) to a tradition, according to which Brahmaṇya died soon after a great famine. On p. 100 of his *Forgotten Empire*, Sewell says that "about the year 1475 there was a terrible famine in the Deccan and in the country of the Telugus, which lasted for two years." Venkoba Rau himself refers to *two* such famines which broke out in the years 1423-25 and 1472-74.³⁰ The second one, it will be seen, synchronises with the date mentioned by Sewell. It is manifestly impossible that Brahmaṇya could have died in the first famine. The date is too early for him. We have therefore to assume that it was after the famine of 1475-76, that he died. The event thus cannot be placed *earlier than 1477*.

It was to the blessings of Brahmaṇya Tīrtha, that the parents of Vyāsarāya (his disciple), owed the birth of their children—notably of Vyāsarāya himself. He lived mostly at Channapatna (in the Mysore State) which is mentioned in the *Vyāsayogicarita*³¹ as his *permanent residence*. There he had a Mutt of his own which was entrusted to his

30. *Dharvar Gazetteer*, p. 405-06.

31. P. 26 (Text).

disciple (probably senior) Śrīdhara Tīrtha.³² His other disciple was the famous Vyāsarāya.

Only one work is traditionally ascribed to Brahmanya Tīrtha and that is a gloss on the *Tattvaprakāśikā* of Jaya Tīrtha. No Ms. of it has however come down; nor has the commentary been mentioned by Brahmanya's disciple Vyāsarāya in his celebrated commentary on the TP., the *Tātparyacandrikā*. The ascription therefore, does not seem to be well-founded.

CHAPTER VI.

ŚRĪPĀDA-RĀYA *alias* LAKṢMĪNĀRĀYAṆA TĪRTHA

19. Śrīpādarāya (1460-86)³³

Lakṣmīnārāyaṇa Tīrtha, more widely known as Śrīpādarāya, was Pontiff of Padmanābha Tīrtha's Mutt at Muḷbāgal. He was the seventh in descent from Padmanābha Tīrtha and the disciple and successor of Svarṇavarṇa Tīrtha, whose Bṛndāvana (tomb) has recently been discovered at Srirangam. According to a tradition recorded in the *Brahmanya Tīrtha-Vijāya*,³⁴ the mothers of Brahmanya and Śrīpādarāya were both uterine sisters. The cousins were in all probability, of the same age and lived up to the same age. It is indeed curious that both of them should have renounced the world and devoted themselves to the cause of their faith and what is more, played a conspicuous part in the spiritual evolution of their gifted disciple Vyāsarāya. Śrīpādarāya's demise may definitely be placed *after* 1457, in which year, we have a grant issued in the name of his Guru Svarṇavarṇa Tīrtha by Vijaya-Venkaṭapati, son of Virūpākṣa. (Ep. Car. IX, Muḷbāgal 1).

32. This Mutt which survives to this day, is variously known as the Kundāpūr Mutt, Abbūr or Cannapatna Mutt and so on. It has no direct connection with Vyāsarāya tho' in recent years a claim has been brought forward on behalf of the Kundāpūr Mutt that it is also directly descended from Vyāsarāya and entitled to the appellation "Vyāsarāya-Maṭha" which is denied by the Svāmīs of the Vyāsarāya Maṭha at Sosale who claim and are universally acknowledged to be the lawful successors of Vyāsarāya. There are misfits both in the genealogical table and the epigraphs cited by the Kundapur Mutt. Nor do the Svāmīs of that Mutt appear to have made *any* contribution to Dvaita literature. We shall therefore leave them out of further consideration here.

33. This is merely an approximate date for Śrīpādarāya's rule.

34. तं व्यासतीर्थं विद्यार्थं स्वमातुर्भगिनीसुतम् ।

श्रीपादराजनामानं प्रापयद्गुरुपुंगवः ॥ (quoted by Venkoba Rau,

p. lxxiii of his introd. to the *Vyāśayogicarita*).

Śrīpādarāya is further said to have been a contemporary of Raghunātha Tīrtha of the Uttarādi Mutt who came into power in 1444 and died in 1502. The *Śrīpādarājāṣṭaka* mentions their joint-pilgrimage to Benares.³⁵ From the same source, we gather that the former wielded considerable influence over Sāluva Narasimha I, and was specially honored by him after his return from the Kalinga campaign (1476 A.D.).³⁶ The fact also, that it was at the instance of Śrīpādarāya that his disciple Vyāsarāya went to the court of Sāluva Narasimha at Candragiri³⁷ in or about 1485-6, attests the position of influence which Śrīpādarāya held at the court of Candragiri. He must therefore have died sometime after the departure of Vyāsarāya, about the year 1486-87.

The only work ascribed to him is a commentary on the *Nyāyasudhā* called *Vāgvajra* (*Nyāyasudhopannyāsa-vāgvajra*) of which a Dev. Ms. is available at the Mysore O.L. (C. 1560). It is a lucid and attractive commentary in about 3500 granthas. The exposition is exhaustive³⁸ and the style full of grace.³⁹ The author has in many places incorporated passages⁴⁰ wholesale from the original NS. In spite of its many attractive features, it has not made much headway in traditional circles of scholarship. Even doubts have been expressed in certain quarters touching the correctness of the tradition which makes it a work of Śrīpādarāya.

CHAPTER VII

SOMANĀTHA KAVI

20. *Somanātha Kavi*. (C. 1480-1540)*

The memory of Somanātha Kavi, the author of a sumptuous biography of Vyāsarāya, in Campū form, was first brought to the notice of the world by the late B. Venkoba Rau in his article in the *Q. J. M. S.* for 1924. The work itself was published two years later. It has been a first class literary and historical discovery. For, besides being a contemporary account of the life and doings of one of the foremost Thinkers of Southern India during the early 16th century, the *Vyāsayogicarita* commands the admiration of all true Sahridayas as a Campū-Kāvya of great merit.⁴¹ As a historical work, its value

35. iii, 5. (S.M.).

36. III, 4.

37. P. 40 *Vyāsayogicarita*.

38. Cf. The passage beginning with “पेक्ष्यवादिनो हि....” (P. 75a, b, Ms.)

39. Vide p. 67—“ननु मया.....”

40. Cp. P. 69 (of Mys. Ms.) and V.T.N.—*ṭikā* of Jayatīrtha.

41. Curiously eno' it is not even mentioned in the chapter on 'Literature and Art' in the *Madras University Historical Series* No. XI! The same is the case in the *Vijayanagar Sex, Com. Vol.* too,

is even greater. For, not only does it add to the literary glory of the Vijayanagar dynasty in general and of its ablest sovereign Kṛṣṇadevarāya in particular but throws a new light on the extent of patronage accorded to the religion and philosophy of Madhvācārya and its exponents, by the Kings of the II and III Dynasties of Vijayanagar.

DATE

Somanātha says of himself that he was introduced to Vyāsarāya, in the reign of Acyutarāya, by Nārāyaṇa Yati. This Nārāyaṇa Yati, (of the Akṣobhya Tīrtha Mutt, Kūḍli), figures in an inscription of Kṛṣṇa-deva-rāya, dated 1527 A.D. It is clear therefore that both Nārāyaṇa Yati and his *protégé* lived at least for some years into the reign of Acyuta. The *Vyāsayogicarita* was probably completed about 1535. It may be safely assumed that Somanātha flourished in the former half of the 16th century.

LIFE

As his name and those of his ancestors indicate, Somanātha was a Smārta Brahmin. His work and the spirit underlying it put one in mind of the com. of Appayya Dikṣita on the *Yādavābhyudaya* of Vedānta Deśika. It certainly is an outstanding proof of the winsome personality of Vyāsarāya, to have been able to secure so notable a biographer as Poet Somanātha.

Somanātha gives us sufficient information about his personal and family history. We learn that he hailed from the village of Govinda-tīrthapura, in the Tuṇḍīra-maṇḍala, near Kāñcī (P. 84). Tradition and certain resemblances in style, have led the writer of the English Introduction to the *Vyāsayogicarita*⁴² to believe that Somanātha was on his mother's side, a nephew of Ananta-bhaṭṭa—the renowned author of the *Bhārata-Campū*.⁴³ Somanātha's genealogy is:—

1. Yajva Bhāskara
2. Devarāja Somapīthī
3. Bhaṭṭa Gayāmukti Bhāskara
4. (Father)
5. Somanātha Kavi

42. Bangalore Press, Bangalore City, 1926.

43. The evidence on this point has been discussed by Venkoba Rau in his introd. p. xlv-xlvi.

On his maternal side, he seems to have been connected with a certain Kāḷameghādhvarī.⁴⁴ Somanātha's grandfather Bhaṭṭa Gayā-mukti Bhāskara, was honored by several sovereigns including Bukka and Harihara. II.

His work is divided into eight *ullāsas* (chapters) and contains a little over a thousand granthas. It is written in the standard campū-style, full of puns, alliteration and other literary embellishments. The author has a perfect command over language and his expressions have all the naturalism of creative art. He does not strain after effect but is nevertheless a finished writer commanding ease and rhythm.

He says in the Epilogue, that he had his work publicly read out in an open assembly of scholars presided over by Vyāsarāya himself, by two good readers and had it duly approved. The salient points and the historical kernel of the biography will be found under "VYĀSARĀYA".

SECTION IV. THE AGE OF DIALECTICISM.

i

Tho' the first beginnings of Dialecticism in Dvaita Vedānta can be traced to such works of Madhva as the AV. and some of the Prakaraṇas, and tho' its employment became increasingly evident in the *Nyāya-sudhā*, *Vādāvali* and other works of Jayatīrtha, yet, it may, for convenience's sake, be assumed to have started and developed in right earnest only from the beginning of the 15th century. The history of thought and literature can never be squeezed into straight jackets of chronology and studied in "Parts" and "Periods". Yet, in the interests of a comprehensive survey, it would be necessary to have some kind of a definite chronological background and view the development of thought or literature in any given case, as a movement of intellectual energy along definite landmarks. One such landmark in the history of Dvaita-Vedānta and its literature, is indicated by the standardisation of the Dialectic Method, and its *regular* employment in the service of the creed, from about the beginning of the 15th century. The Prince and Father of this dialectic method was doubtless Vyāsarāya Svāmin, the illustrious author of the *Nyāyāmṛta*. But its actual forerunner came a century earlier, in the person of Viṣṇudāsācārya. It is gratifying to note that this Viṣṇudāsācārya himself was a disciple of Rājendra Tīrtha—the fourth lineal predecessor of Vyāsarāya.

44. A poet Kāḷamegha is said to "have been a *protégé* of Sāluva Gopa Tippa—one of Devarāya's officers governing a part of the Tamil country." *Madras Uni. His. Ser. No. XI*, p. 246.

CHAPTER I. VIṢṆUDĀSĀCĀRYA.

21. *Ṣaḍ-darśanī-vallabha Viṣṇudāsācārya* (C. 1390-1440)*

We know nothing at all about the personal history of Viṣṇudāsācārya except that he was a pupil of Rājendra Tirtha⁴⁵ (1412-30) and had the honorific “Ṣaḍ-darśanī-Vallabha”⁴⁶ (Master of the Six Darśanas).

His only work that has come down to us is the *Vādaratnāvali* of which a much-injured Nāgari Ms. is preserved in the Madras O. L. (R. No. 3167) and two incomplete ones, one in Devanāgarī and the other in Telugu script, in the Mysore O. L. (C—1473 and 3098). A complete Dev. Ms. is also available with Prof. D. Śrinivāsācār of Mysore.

The work is a polemical treatise devoted to the vindication of the principal tenets of Realism in Vedānta—such as the reality of the world and its values, the supremacy of God, the reality of Difference, the infallibility of Scripture (Vedas):—

“विश्वं सत्यं हरिः कर्ता जीवोऽन्यः परमार्थतः ।

वेदः सत्यं प्रमाणं चेत्येवं व्यासमतस्थितिः ॥”

It is divided into five “Sāras” (chapters), corresponding to the five topics for treatment indicated in the above verse. Following the requirements of a *वादग्रन्थ* the author has undertaken a dialectic refutation of the relevant doctrines of Monism. Its description therefore in the *Trien. Catal. of the Madras Oriental Lib.*, as a treatise “narrating the principles of Dvaita-Vedānta”, is quite jejune and misleading. It is a first-rate controversial classic which became the model for the more elaborate *Nyāyāmṛta* of Vyāsarāya. Certain quotations in the *Nym.* are actually traced to the *Vādaratnāvali* of Viṣṇudāsācārya, by Śrinivāsa Tīrtha in his com. on the former.⁴⁷ But the passages are found also in the *Siddhitraya* of Yamuna. There is no doubt however that in the writing of his *Nym.*, Vyāsarāya was very much indebted to the *Vādaratnāvali*, both for matter and manner which of course he has perfected and improved upon with distinctive touches

45. Vide Colophon: इति श्रीमत्सर्वतन्त्रस्वतन्त्रश्रीमद्राजेन्द्रतीर्थश्रीचरणकमल
.....विष्णुदासाचार्यविरचितायां.....” (Madras O.L., R. No. 3167).

46. इति षड्दर्शनाचार्यविष्णुदासार्यनिर्मिता ।

वादर्त्नावलिर्भूयात्प्रीत्यै माधवमध्वयोः ॥

(last verse in the *Vādaratnāvali*).

47. Vide his com. on: “यथा चोन्नतः सम्राडद्वितीयोस्ति भूतले.....”
and मिथ्यात्वस्य च मिथ्यात्वे.....” *Nym.* p. 48. (Bby.).

and contributions of his own. As in the *Nym.*, an elaborate discussion of the real import of the so-called "Monistic-texts" like *Tattvam Asi, Ekamevādviṭīyam*' is carried out in the *Vādaratnāvali*. But the discussions in the *Nym.*, are as a rule, more elaborate and incisive. Over a score of interpretations have been suggested for *Tattvam Asi* :—

“ दृश्यन्ते द्विदशं ब्रह्माः छन्दोगानां श्रुतेस्ततः ।

विदांकुर्वन्तु विद्वांसः सत्यां जीवेशयोर्भिदाम् ॥ ”

Quotations and rulings from the *Vyākaraṇa*⁴⁸ and *Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā*⁴⁹ Śāstras are introduced in profusion, to reinforce the Siddhāntin's doctrines and interpretation. This is also a feature common to the *Nym.* And certain sections are designated भङ्ग-s, as in the *Nym.* Still, there is a difference in methodology between the two. The discussions in the *Nym.*, are carried on from the very beginning in the approved form of the Naiyāyika—argumentation, with a formal statement of the issues: (*Vipratipatti-vākya*) and analytical refutation (*विकल्प*). This is not followed in the *Vādaratnāvali*, which is thus less formal in its tone—and procedure. There are references however, to the views of (1) the author of the *Vivaraṇa*, (2) Śrīharṣa (*Khaṇḍana*—”) and (3) Citsukha.

There are quotations also from (what appears to be) yet another work of the same author—a *Khaṇḍana-Khaṇḍana*, which, to judge from its title, seems to be a criticism of the *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍa-Khādya* of Śrīharṣa. This would show that the dialectic onslaught against Advaita, by the Dvaitins, dates from much earlier than the period of Vyāsarāya, tho' it reached its culmination only in the *Nym.* That would again show that works like the *Vādāvali*, *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍana*, *Vādaratnāvali*, etc., were but the counteractions from the Dvaitins' side to the attacks made on various types of realistic thought in such dialectical classics as the *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādya*, the *Nyāyamakaranda* and the *Tattvapradīpikā*. There is thus no point in the complaint that one sometimes hears against the Dvaitins,⁵⁰ that they were the first aggressors! The conflict between Monism and Dualism (Realism) is too old to be side-tracked by such trivial considerations.

48. There are quotations from the Sūtras of Pāṇini, the *Mahābhāṣya*, Kaiyaṭa etc.

49. And from the Vārtikas of Kumārila and various Nyāyas of the *Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā*.

50. Witness the remarks made by Śyṭ. Anantakṛṣṇa Sastri, in his Preface to his edn. of the *Nyāyamrta-Advaitasiddhi* etc., Calcutta Oriental Series, No. IX. p. 37.

SIDDHITRAYA

By

YĀMUNĀCĀRYA

Edited with English Translation and Notes

By

R. RAMANUJACHARI

AND

K. SRINIVASACHARI

श्रीः

। श्रीमते यामुनाय नमः ।

॥ ईश्वरसिद्धिः ॥

तत्र कस्यचिदेकस्य वशे विश्वं प्रवर्तते ।

इति साधयितुं पूर्वं पूर्वपक्षं प्रचक्ष्महे ॥

तत्र मीमांसकाः प्राहुः—नायं सर्वार्थदर्शनशक्तिसम्पन्नः पुरुषोऽभ्युपगममर्हति ; अतिपतितसकलसाधकप्रमाणसम्भावनाभूमित्वात् स्फुटविविधबाधकत्वाच्च । तथा हि— तस्य प्रत्यक्षमन्यद्वा साधकं भवेत् ? प्रत्यक्षमपि लौकिकं वैदिकं वा ?

व्यवस्थितमितस्वार्थं न तावदिह लौकिकम् ।

साधनं तेन सर्वार्थतज्ज्ञानादेरसिद्धितः ॥

In order to establish the truth that the universe runs its course under the control of some one person, let us, at the very outset, state the *prima facie* view on the matter.

THE MĪMĀMSAKA VIEW

In regard to this question, the Mīmāṃsakas say:—A person endowed with the capacity to perceive all things directly cannot be posited ; for such a person is beyond the reach of all the *pramāṇas* that could possibly help to prove his existence ; (besides) there are several conclusive means of proof running counter to it (belief in such a person). To make the matter clear—(It may be asked) is it perception or some other *pramāṇa* that proves his existence ? (If the reply is perception, there is the further question) is it ordinary perception (*laukika-pratyakṣa*) or super-normal perception (*yaugika-pratyakṣa*) ? The objects of ordinary perception being specific for each of the senses and being limited (to the *here* and *now*), ordinary perception cannot serve to prove the existence of the supreme soul ; for, with its aid, all objects (without an exception), knowledge concerning them, and so on, cannot be apprehended,

सर्वार्थदर्शनशक्तिशालिनमवगमयता हि देशकालस्वभावविप्रकर्षव्यवधानजुषस्सर्व
एवार्थास्तद्दर्शनं शक्तिश्च गोचरयितव्यानि । न च विद्यमानेन्द्रियसन्निकर्षयोग्यकतिपय-
विषयनियतवृत्तेर्लौकिकप्रत्यक्षस्य निरवधिरयं महिमा सम्भावनाभूमिरिति कथमिव तदिह
साधनमिति मन्येमहि । नापि योगिप्रत्यक्षमस्य साधकम् ; यतः—

प्रत्यक्षत्वे तदप्येवं विद्यमानैकगोचरम् ।

भूतादिगोचरं वा न प्रत्यक्षं प्रतिभादिवत् ॥

तत् खलु योगिविज्ञानमैन्द्रियकं न वा ? ऐन्द्रियकमपि बहिरिन्द्रियसम्भवमान्तरकरण-
जनितं वा ? बहिरिन्द्रियाणि तावत्समधिगतनिजविषयसन्निकर्षसहकारीणि तद्गोचरज्ञान-
जननानीति जगति विदितम् । अतो न रसनादिभिः रजतातिवृत्तव्यवहितादिसकलविषय-
वेदनप्रसङ्गः । न चाविद्यमानै रजतादिभिस्सम्भवति सन्निकर्षः ; तस्य व्याश्रयत्वादाश्रया-

The instrument of knowledge which could reveal a person endowed with the capacity to perceive everything must necessarily have for its object (1) all things, notwithstanding their distance, their time of existence and nature, and notwithstanding the factors obstructing their apprehension, (2) knowledge concerning all these, and (3) the capacity to have this knowledge. When it is impossible even to think of such an illimitable greatness ever becoming the object of ordinary preception, which operates as a rule (according to the specific capacities of the different senses) in certain objects which are capable of coming into contact with the senses at the time, how could we imagine ordinary perception to be the effective means of proving the existence of a person (endowed with such greatness) ?

Nor could the perception of the yogin be a means of proving his existence. For, if it is a mode of perception, it too can only reveal present objects. Were it to comprehend objects, past and future, it would, like intuitive insight (*pratibhā*), scarcely be perception. Besides, (there arises the question) is the knowledge of the yogin born of the senses or not ? Even on the view that it is sensory knowledge, there crops up the further question, is that knowledge born of the outer senses or of the internal sense ? It cannot originate from the outer senses ; for it is well-known that the outer senses, provided with the auxiliary causes, namely, contact with the object appropriate thereto, give rise to knowledge concerning those objects. That is why there is no possibility of knowledge concerning all things, (e.g.) silver, bygone objects, and whatever is screened from view, arising from the senses, such as, the tongue. With objects, such as silver, that do not exist at the moment, there can be no contact ; for contact presupposes two bases, and in the

भावे तुदसम्भवात् । अतोऽपेक्षितोऽर्थसन्निकर्षः । सहकारिविरहे कथमिन्द्रियाण्यतीतादिविषयसाक्षात्काराय कल्पेरन् ?

भवति च—यत् यत्सहकारि यत्कार्यजननं, तत्तदभावे न तज्जनयति, यथा क्षितिसलिलसहकारि अङ्कुरकार्यजननबीजं क्षित्याद्यभावेऽङ्कुरम् । अर्थसन्निकर्षसहकारीणि बहिरिन्द्रियाणि ज्ञानजननानीति तान्यपि नातीतेऽनागते वार्थे ज्ञानं जनयन्तीति न तदुपजनितं प्रत्यक्षं यथोक्तविषयनियममतिक्रामति ॥

नाप्यान्तरकरणसम्भवम् ; आन्तरगोचर एव सुखादौ स्वान्तस्वातन्त्र्यात् । बाह्यविषयमितिषु मनसो निरङ्कुशकरणताङ्गीकारे हि कृतं चक्षुरादिभिः । अतश्च न कश्चिदन्धो बधिरो वा भवेत् ।

भवति चात्र—विमतिपदं मनो बहिरिन्द्रियनिरपेक्षं न बाह्यप्रत्यक्षगोचरे प्रवर्तते, तत्र

absence of either basis, there is no possibility of contact. Therefore, contact with objects is required (for perception arising from the outer senses). When the auxiliary cause is absent, how would the senses be capable of directly apprehending objects, such as by-gone things ?

This may be expressed in syllogistic form :—That which produces a certain effect, when in association with a given auxiliary cause, cannot produce it in the absence of that auxiliary cause ; for example, the seed which produces the sprout, when in association with the soil and moisture, does not produce the same in the absence of the soil and the like. The external senses, in association with the auxiliary cause, namely contact with objects, lead to knowledge. Therefore, in conformity with this principle, the outer senses do not also lead to knowledge of the past object or the future one. It has, therefore, to be concluded that the knowledge generated by the external senses cannot override the rule herein mentioned with regard to objects (that they should be present at the time, unclouded and appropriate to the senses).

Nor can it (i.e., the knowledge of the yogin) originate from the internal sense. For it is only in the domain of pleasure and other internal states that the mind holds complete sway. If even in regard to knowledge of external objects, the manas were admitted to be the unfettered and unaided instrument, then, the outer senses would become superfluous. It would follow therefrom that none could be either blind or deaf.

To express it in syllogistic form :—Without seeking the assistance of the outer organs, manas, whose precise mode of apprehending external objects is under dispute, cannot enter upon the province of external perception ; for in regard to this field the activity of manas is dependent

तत्तन्त्रवृत्तित्वात् । यत् यत्र यत्तन्त्रवृत्तिः, न तत्तन्निरपेक्षं तत्र प्रवर्तते ; यथा आलोकूपेक्ष-
प्रवृत्ति चक्षुः स्वगोचरे अन्धतमस इति ।

न च सिद्धौषधमन्त्रतपस्समाधिमहिमसमासादितातिशयानि इन्द्रियाणि कदा-
चिदपजहति समधिगतविषयनियममिति सम्भवति ; सांसिद्धिकसामर्थ्याविर्भावैकफलत्वात्ते-
षाम् ; सामर्थ्यस्य च प्रतिनियमात् । न खलु सुप्रयुक्तभेषजशतविहितसंस्कारमपि श्रोत्रं
रूपरसविभागावगमाय कल्पते ।

भवति च — विवादाध्यासितबाह्याभ्यन्तरकरणपाटवातिशयोऽनुलङ्घितसीमा, ऐन्द्रिय-
कप्रकर्षत्वात्, दृश्यमानतत्प्रकर्षवत्, इत्यैन्द्रियकं ज्ञानं नातीतादि गोचरयति ।

भावनाप्रकर्षपर्यन्तजन्मनस्तु सत्यपि विशदनिर्भासित्वे प्राच्यानुभवगोचराद-
नधिकमधिकं वा अध्यवस्यतः स्मृतिविभ्रमस्रोतसोरन्यतरावर्तपरिवर्तिनः कुतः प्रामाण्यकूल-
प्रतिलम्भः ? कुतस्तराञ्च प्रत्यक्षतयोत्तम्भनम् ? प्रत्यक्षस्य वा सतः कथमिव विदितविषय-
upon the outer senses. That whose activity in a certain sphere is
dependent upon a given entity cannot act in that sphere independent of
that given entity ; for example, the eye, whose proper functioning is
dependent upon light, does not operate in its province, (viz., that of
colour) in darkness.

It is impossible for the senses even occasionally to transcend the
limitations which are known to prevail with regard to the object by
virtue of the merit acquired through the efficacy of the drugs administered
by perfected souls, of *mantras* (charms), austerities (*tapas*) and
yogic concentration. For these (i.e., drugs, etc.) have for their result
only the manifestation of the capacity inherent in the different senses ;
and this capacity is well-defined (for each of them). Though the ear
may have acquired excellent powers through a hundred drugs properly
administered, yet it is incapable of apprehending such diverse
qualities as colour and taste.

To put the matter in syllogistic form :—The excellence of the skill
belonging to the senses, external and internal, concerning which there
is dispute, does not transcend its limits or bounds ; for it is sensory ex-
cellence like the one perceived by us. Hence, sensory knowledge cannot
make known bygone things and the like.

Though the knowledge that arises at the culmination of the highest
stages of concentration shines forth clearly and distinctly, whether it sets
forth something additional to what is revealed in previous experience or
embraces nothing more than that, such a knowledge has to whirl in the
eddy of the one or the other of the two streams of remembrance (*smṛti*)
and illusion (*vibhrama*), and has no chance whatever of reaching the
shore of validity (*prāmāṇya*). There is much less chance of trying to

नियमव्यतिक्रमः ? अतिक्रमतो वा कुतः प्रत्यक्षत्वमिति न विश्वानुभवैश्वर्यशालिनि प्रत्यक्षं प्रमाणम् ।

नापि प्रमाणान्तरम् । तत्त्वत्वनुमानमागमो वा ? अनुमानमपि विशेषतो दृष्टं सामान्यतो दृष्टं वा ? तत्र सकल्पदवीदवीयसि भगवति न तावत् स्वलक्षणसाक्षात्कारपूर्व-
काविनाभाववाधारणाधीनोदयत्वादिदमनुमानमुदेतुमलम् । न ह्यनवगतचरहुतभुजस्तद-
विनाभावितया धूममनुसन्धातुमीशते । न च सर्वार्थनिर्माणसाक्षात्कारपटीयसि लिङ्गं
सामान्यतो दृष्टमपि किञ्चन लभ्यते ।

नन्वेकचेतनाधीनं विवादाध्यासितं जगत् ।

अचेतनेनारब्धत्वादरोगस्य शरीरवत् ॥

तथा सर्वार्थनिर्माणसाक्षात्करणकौशलम् ।

कार्यत्वादेव जगत्स्तत्कर्तुरनुमीयताम् ॥

enhance its validity by stating that it is perceptual knowledge. If it were a perception, how could it transcend the well-known limitations with regard to objects ? If it were to transcend these, how could it still be perceptual in character ? Hence, perception cannot be a valid means of proof in regard to the person endowed with the superhuman power of experiencing all things.

It cannot be any other *pramāṇa* either. (If it be) is that other *pramāṇa* inference or scripture (*āgama*) ? If it is inference, is that *viśeṣatodṛṣṭa* or *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa* ? (It cannot be *viśeṣatodṛṣṭa* ; for) concerning the existence of God, who is beyond the reach of all the means of proof, no inference can arise ; since the birth of the latter is dependent upon the assurance of universal concomitance (*avinābhāva*) between the *hetu* and the *sādhya*, which, in its turn, presupposes the direct perception of what is proved. Indeed, those who are ignorant of fire would be incapable of understanding smoke as a universal concomitant of fire. Nor is a mark of inference (*liṅga*) of the *sāmānyato-*
dṛṣṭa variety available in inferring the existence of a person who is competent to create all things and to perceive them directly.

THE NYĀYA ARGUMENTS FOR THE EXISTENCE OF GOD.

The world, concerning which the question is raised :—Is it, or is it not, due to divine creation ?—is subservient to a single intelligent entity ; for, like the body of one who is free from disease, it is constituted of non-sentient matter. Further, as the world is an effect, the ability to create all things and perceive them directly must be inferred to belong to its author.

सर्वं हि कार्यमुपादानोपकरणसम्प्रदानप्रयोजनसंवेदिचेतनरचितमवगतं घटमणिक-
गृहादि । कार्यञ्च विमतिपदमवनिगिरिमहार्णवादीति तदपि तथाविधबुद्धिमद्धेतुकमध्यव-
सीयते ।

न च कार्यत्वमसिद्धमिति वाच्यम् ; अवयवसन्निवेशादिभिर्हेतुभिस्तत्सिद्धेः । इह
चान्यावयविभ्यः प्रभृति आद्यणुकमखिलमवयविक्रमनिहीयमाननानावयवव्यतिषङ्गविशेष-
जनितमवगतमित्यन्तत उपादानं चतुर्विधाः परमाणवः प्रपञ्चस्य । तेषामादिपरिस्पन्दश्च
तदनुगुणादृष्टविशिष्टतत्क्षेत्रज्ञसंयोगासमवायिकारणक इति उपकरणमपि समस्तक्षेत्रज्ञ-
वर्तीनि धर्माधर्मलक्षणान्यदृष्टानि । प्रयोजनं पुनस्तदभिनिर्वर्तितविचित्रार्थक्रियाकार-
श्चेतनोपकारप्रकारभेदोऽपर्यन्तः । तदुपभुजस्त एव क्षेत्रज्ञास्सम्प्रदानम् । न चामी स्वसम-
वायिनावपि धर्माधर्मावलम्बलोकयितुमिति तदतिरेकी निखिलभुवननिर्माणनिपुणोऽधिकरण-

Indeed, all effects such as pots, water-jars and houses are found to be created by intelligent beings who know the material and the auxiliary causes and also know for whom and for what purpose they are intended.¹ The objects under discussion, such as the earth, the mountain and the wide ocean, are effects; hence it has to be concluded that they, too, have for their cause an intelligent entity.

It cannot be contended that their being effects is itself unestablished; for this is well established on the strength of reasons such as the arrangement of the parts. All objects, commencing from wholes which are not themselves the parts of other wholes (*antyāvayavi*) and ending with the diads (*dvyanukas*), are known to be constituted by the peculiar combinations of diverse parts which decrease (in number) in accordance with the scale of wholes; hence it follows that ultimately four different kinds of infinitesimal atoms are the material causes of the world. As for the auxiliary cause (*upakaraṇa*), it must be the unseen powers (*adr̥ṣṭa*) in the shape of merit (*dharma*) and demerit (*adharma*) existing in all individual souls (*kṣetrajña*); for the initial movement (*parispanda*) of the infinitesimal atoms has for its non-inherent cause (*asamavāyikāraṇa*) their conjunction with the manifold souls associated with unseen powers in the form of merit and demerit (*adr̥ṣṭa*) which are appropriate to this movement. As regards the purpose (of creation), it is the limitless and manifold forms of help rendered to the *jīvas*, a help which is in the shape of diverse, fruitful activities performed by them. The self-same *jīvas* who derive this help are the very persons for whom (*sampradāna*) the universe is intended. For the reason that these *jīvas* are incapable of perceiving the merits and demerits,

1. Compare Pāṇinī's sūtra-karmanā yamabhipraiti sa sampradānam. I. iv. 32.

सिद्धान्तसमधिगतनिरतिशयसहजसकलविषयसंविदैश्वर्यशक्त्यतिशयः पुरुषधौरेय एकः
किमिति न सामान्यतोदृष्टलिङ्गादनुमीयते ।

तदिदमविदितानुमानवृत्तस्य स्वमतिरचिततरलतर्कोल्लसितमिति परिहसन्ति मीमां-
सकाः । तथा हि—किमिदमेकचेतनाधीनत्वन्नामाभिप्रेतं तनुभुवनादेः ? तदायत्तत्वमिति
चेत् ,

किमस्य तस्मिन्नायत्तं किन्तु जन्माथवा स्थितिः ।

प्रवृत्तिर्वा द्वयोस्तावत्साध्यहीनं निदर्शनम् ॥

न खलु शरीरमेकचेतनाधीनोत्पत्तिस्थिति । ये हि यद्देहाधीनसुखदुःखोपभोगभागिनः,
भवति हि तदुचितादृष्टशालिनां सर्वेषामेव तेषां तद्देहिन इव तदुत्पत्तिस्थितिनिमित्तत्वम् ।

अपि च शरीरावयविनः स्वावयवसमवायलक्षणा स्थितिः अवयवव्यतिषङ्गविशेषाद्वे

even though they are inherent in themselves, why should it not be
inferred with the aid of a mark of inference (*liṅga*) of the
sāmānyatodṛṣṭa variety that there is a Supreme Person, who as under-
stood from the *Adhikaraṇa-siddhānta*, is different from these finite souls,
who is competent to create all the worlds, who is endowed with
a knowledge of all things, which is of the most excellent kind and which
is natural to him, and who is endowed with lordship and power of un-
surpassed excellence.

THE MĪMĀMSAKA CRITICISM OF THE NAIYĀYIKA VIEW

The Mīmāṃsakas ridicule this line of thought as being the outcome
of arguments which are unsustainable and which are framed by the
imagination of one who is ignorant of the methods of inference. To make
the matter clear—What is the precise significance of the statement that
the body, the world and the like are subservient to a single conscious
entity ? If it is said that it signifies dependence upon that entity, (it
may be asked) what is it that is dependent upon him ? Is it their
origin or continuance or activity ? On the first two alternatives, the
illustrative example cited would be defective in not possessing the
sādhya. Indeed, the body is not dependent for its origin and
continuance upon a single intelligent entity. All persons who share in
the enjoyment of the pleasures and pains dependent upon a given body
must also, equally with the person who owns it, be responsible for its
origin and continuance ; since they are endowed with unseen powers
(*adrṣṭa*) appropriate to that enjoyment.

The continuance of a complex whole like that of the body, which
is in the form of the inherence of the whole in its parts, requires no

न चेतयितारं परमपेक्षते । या पुनस्तदपेक्षिणी प्राणनलक्षणा स्थितिः, न सा पक्षीकृते क्षित्यादौ सम्भवतीति स्थितिमपि नैकरूपां पक्षसपक्षानुयायिनीमुदीक्षामहे ।

एकचेतनाधीनप्रवृत्तित्वे तु प्रबलबहुजनसरभसप्रयत्नप्रचाल्यैरुपलतरुरथादिभिर्व्यभिचारः । आरब्धत्वादेव चैतत्साध्यसिद्धावधिकमिदमुपादानविशेषवचनम् ।

चेतनाधीनतामात्रसाधने सिद्धसाध्यता ।

चेतनैर्भोक्तृभिर्भोग्यः कर्मभिर्जन्यते हि नः ॥

युक्तञ्चैतत्, यदुभयवासिसिद्धानामेव चेतनानां कर्तृत्वाभ्युपगमः ; लाघवात् ।

न चोपदानाद्यनभिज्ञतया तत्प्रतिक्षेपः ;

उपादानं पृथिव्यादि यागदानादि साधनम् ।

साक्षात्कर्तुं क्षमन्ते यत्सर्व एव च चेतनाः ॥

intelligent being apart from the peculiar inter-relation of the parts themselves. Continuance, understood in the sense of breathing, which stands in need of an intelligent person, is not met with in the earth and the like, which are offered as the *pakṣa* (minor term) in your argument ; hence we fail to discern a uniform type of continuance existing in common in both the minor term (*pakṣa*) and the illustrative example (*sapakṣa*).

Should it be said that 'dependence' means having an activity subject to the control of a single intelligent entity, then, in consideration of instances like huge boulders or trees or cars which could be moved only with the strenuous effort put forth by several strong persons, the argument is liable to be charged with the fallacy of *vyabhicāra*. Again, when the conclusion (namely, that the world presupposes an intelligent cause) follows from the very fact of the cosmos being constituted of (matter), the addition of the qualification 'endowed with a knowledge of the material cause and so on' is superfluous. If the argument were to establish only dependence upon a conscious entity, then, the argument is liable to be charged with the defect of proving what is already well-established ; for this world has been created by our own past deeds (*karma*) as something fit for enjoyment by conscious beings, experiencers (*bhoktā*). It is proper to admit that the agency for the creation of the world belongs only to the conscious beings posited by both the rival disputants ; for this hypothesis has the merit of economy of thought (*lāghava*).

It is impossible to deny agency to finite souls, on the score that they are not acquainted with the material cause and the like. For all intelligent beings are quite competent to perceive directly the material causes, namely, the elements like earth, and the auxiliary causes such as sacrifice (*yajña*) and gift (*dāna*).

अद्यदेव विश्वम्भरादयः क्रमप्राप्तागन्तुकोपचयापचयैकदेशशालिनो न युगपदेव निरवशेषविलयजननभागिन इत्यन्तिमपरमाणुसाक्षात्कारो न कर्तृभावोपयोगी ॥

कर्मणश्शक्तिरूपं यदपूर्वादिपदास्पदम् ।

मा भूत्प्रत्यक्षता तस्य शक्तिमद्भ्यक्षगोचरः ॥

न खलु कुलालादयः कुम्भादिकार्यमारम्भमाणास्तदुपादानोपकरणभूतमृद्दण्डचक्रादिकार्योत्पादनशक्तिं साक्षात्कृत्य तत्तदारभन्ते । यदि परं शक्तिमविदुषामभिलषितसाधने तदुपादानादिव्यवहारोऽनुपपन्नः । इह तु

आगमादवगम्यन्ते विचित्राः कर्मशक्तयः ।

तेन कर्मभिरात्मानस्सर्वं निर्मिमतां पृथक् ॥

अपि च तदेव चेतनकर्तृकं जगति परिदृश्यते, यदेव शक्यक्रियं शक्यज्ञानोपादानादि च । न तथा महीमहीधरमहार्णवादीति कथमिव तत्तत्कार्यत्वम् ? कथन्तराञ्च तदुपादा-

Direct perception of the infinitesimal atoms which are the ultimate building materials is not required for agency ; because earth and other elements possessing at all times, as at the present moment, partial growth and decay which take place occasionally and gradually, do not secure at any time total annihilation or creation.

(It is futile to contend that as *yāga* and *dāna* become the causes of creation only through the mystic power (*apūrva*) which they generate and as this power is imperceptible to the *jīva*, he cannot be the agent ; for) the mystic potency of activities which is referred to by terms, such as '*apūrva*,' may not be perceptible ; but, surely, the act itself possessing this power is open to perception. In fact, the potter and other agents engaged in producing objects, such as jars, do not enter upon their respective activities only after having directly perceived the potency to produce the effect residing in their material and auxiliary causes, such as, the lump of clay and the wheel. However, in producing objects that are desired, the utilisation of their respective material causes would be impossible to those who are altogether ignorant of their potency. But here, the manifold potencies of activities are learnt through scriptures. Therefore, let it be held that finite souls severally are the agents in creating everything in the world with the aid of their own deeds.

Moreover, only that which it is possible to make, and whose material cause can possibly be known, is found everywhere to have a conscious being for its agent. For the reason that the earth, the mountain and the mighty ocean do not possess this nature (i.e., it is impossible to make them ; and their material causes cannot be known), it is difficult to imagine how they can be regarded as the respective

नोपकरणादेस्साक्षात्कारगोचरता ? यादृशं हि कार्यमुपादानाद्यभिज्ञपूर्वकमवगतं घटमणिकादि, तादृशमेव हि तथाविधबुद्धिमद्वेतुकत्वानुमानाय प्रभवतीति ।

अपि चानीश्वरेण परिमितशक्तिज्ञानेन विग्रहवता अनवाप्तकामेन कृतमवगतं घटादिकार्यमिति तथाविधं बोद्धारमुपस्थापयन्हेतुरभिमतपुरुषसर्वज्ञसर्वैश्वर्यादिविपर्ययसाधनाद्विरुद्धः स्यात् ।

न चैवं सति सर्वानुमानव्यवहारोच्छेदप्रसङ्गश्शङ्कितव्यः । प्रमाणान्तरगोचरे हि लिङ्गिनि लिङ्गबलादापततो विपरीतविशेषांस्तत्प्रमाणमेव प्रतिरुणद्धि । इह पुनरतिपतितसकलमानान्तरकर्मभावे सर्वनिर्माणनिपुणे सिषाधयिषिते यावन्तोऽन्वयव्यतिरेकावधारिताविनाभावभाजो धर्मास्तानप्यविशेषेणोपस्थापयति ।

अपि च—

effects of different causes. It is even more difficult to conceive how their material and auxiliary causes could become the objects of direct perception. Only an effect like the jar or the water-pot, which is known to be dependent upon an intelligent entity acquainted with material and other causes, is capable of leading to the inference that an effect must have for its cause a sentient being possessing a knowledge of that kind (i.e., knowledge of *upādāna*, *upakaraṇa* and the like).

Further, in as much as an effect like the jar is known to be produced by a person who is different from God and who possesses limited powers and knowledge and who is endowed with a personality, and who has desires which are unfulfilled, the reason (*hetu*) cited by you, establishing as it does a knower answering to this description, is liable to be charged with *viruddha doṣa*. For it establishes the very reverse of omniscience and lordship over the universe which is sought to be proved as belonging to the person who is suggested to be the cause of the world.

(The *Mīmāṃsaka* continues :)—There is no room for the objection that if this were so there would be an end to all reasoning. For, if the thing proved (*liṅgin*) is open to any *pramāṇa* other than that on which it is at the moment based, this other *pramāṇa* itself would dispel the contradictory features suggesting themselves on the strength of the mark of inference (*liṅga*). In the present case, however, when a person who transcends the reach of all other *pramāṇas* and who is competent to create all things is desired to be proved, the reason (*hetu*) will, in addition to proving him, establish also all those features which possess invariable concomitance ascertained on the strength of positive and negative evidence,

स्वार्थकारुण्यभावेन व्याप्ताः प्रेक्षावतः क्रियाः ।

ईश्वरस्योभयाभावाज्जगत्सर्गो न युज्यते ॥

अवाप्तकामत्वान्न तावदात्मार्थे सृजति । प्रलयसमये प्रलीनसकलकरणकलेबरादि-
भोगोपकरणतया च चेतनानां दुःखाभावाद्दुःखदर्शनजनितकृपाप्रयुक्तिरपि नास्तीति व्यापक-
भूतस्वार्थकारुण्यनिवृत्तेर्व्याप्यभूतया प्रेक्षावत्प्रवृत्त्यापि निवर्तितव्यम् ।

सुखैकतानं जनयेज्जगत्करुणया सृजन् ।

तत्कर्मानुविधायित्वे हीयेतास्य स्वतन्त्रता ॥

न चोपादानादिसाक्षात्कारिण एव कर्तृत्वमित्यपि नियमः ; उपादानमुपकरणञ्चा-
विदुष एवात्मनो ज्ञानादिषु कर्तृत्वात् । अतः

असिद्धत्वाद्विरुद्धत्वादनैकान्त्याच्च वर्णितात् ।

कार्यत्वहेतोर्जगतो न यथोदितकर्तृता ॥

प्रयोगश्च भवति—महीमहीधरादि कार्यं न भवति, प्रसिद्धकार्यविलक्षणत्वात् ,

The activities of a person in his senses are always invariably characterised by thought of personal gain or love to others. Since, in the case of God, none of these exists, the creation of the world cannot justifiably be ascribed to him. As all his desires are already fulfilled, he does not create the world for his own sake. Since at the time of dissolution (*pralaya*) the jīvas are destitute of all the senses, body and other means of enjoyment, no sorrow is experienced by them ; as a consequence, creation cannot be the result of the mercy evoked by the perception of persons afflicted by sorrow ; hence, with the absence of the *vyāpaka* (the invariably concomitant), namely, personal gain and mercy, there must be the absence of the *vyāpya* (that which is inherent), namely, the activity of a sensible person. He who creates the universe out of mercy must have created it in such a fashion that pleasure alone is present in the universe. If it were suggested that he pays due regard to the past deeds of jīvas, his independence would be lost.

Besides, there is no rule to the effect that agency belongs only to that person who directly perceives the material cause and the like ; for in respect of activities, such as knowing, agency belongs to the soul even though the latter is ignorant of the auxiliary causes. Hence, in as much as the *hetu*, namely, 'being an effect' is liable (for the considerations mentioned just now) to be charged with the defects of being unestablished (*asiddha*), adverse (*viruddha*) and *anekānta* (straying), it is impossible that the universe should have for its cause a person like the one suggested by you.

This may be expressed in syllogistic form thus :—(1) Phenomena, such as, the earth and the mountain, are not effects, for the reason that,

गगनवत्, अशक्यदर्शनोपादानोपकरणत्वाद्वा व्यतिरेकेण घटादिवत् । परमाणवः न प्रत्यक्षाः, निरतिशयसूक्ष्मद्रव्यत्वात्, तथैव घटादिवत् । विमतिविषयः कालः न लोकशून्यः, कालत्वात् इदानीन्तनकालवत् । तनुभुवनादि ईश्वरकर्तृकं न भवति, कार्यत्वात्तद्वदेव । ईश्वरः कर्ता न भवति, प्रयोजनरहितत्वात्, अशरीरत्वाद्वा मुक्तात्मवत् । इति ।

अत्र ब्रूमो न कार्यत्वं क्षित्यादौ शक्यनिह्वम् ।

सभागत्वात्क्रियावत्त्वान्महत्त्वेन विशेषितात् ॥

तादृशादेव मूर्तत्वाद्वाह्यप्रत्यक्षतान्वितात् ।

ससामान्यविशेषत्वादित्यादिभ्यो घटादिवत् ॥

न चेदृश एव सन्निवेशः कार्यो नेतर इत्यवयवसन्निवेशप्रतिनियतं रूपभेदमुदीक्षामहे ।

यत्तु शक्यक्रियं शक्यज्ञानोपादानोपकरणं च क्रियत इति, तदस्तु नाम । किन्तु

like ether, they are thoroughly unlike what are well-known to be effects, or for the reason that here, unlike the case of jars, the knowledge of material and auxiliary causes is impossible to secure. (2) The infinitesimal atoms are imperceptible; for, unlike jars and the like, they are exceedingly subtle substances. (3) The period under discussion (i.e., *pralaya*) is not characterised by the absence of the world; for it is also a period like the present one. (4) The body, the world and the like do not have God for their agent; for, like the jar, they are effects. (5) God is not an agent, because he has no purpose in creating the world, or because, like the released soul, he is not possessed of a body.

THE NAIYĀYIKA REPLY TO THE MĪMĀMSAKA CONTENTION

To these arguments of the Mīmāṃsaka the Naiyāyika replies:—The character of being an effect cannot be denied to earth (*kṣiti*) and other substances; because, like the jar etc., they are endowed with parts, or with activities while they are yet big in magnitude, or with forms while they are yet big in magnitude, or with wider and narrower generality (*sāmānya-viśeṣa*) while they are open to external perception and because of other reasons like this. We know of no distinct feature associated exclusively with a particular configuration of parts, about which it could be said 'This mode of configuration alone is an effect, and none else is.'

The contention that that alone can be said to be created which it is possible to produce and whose material and auxiliary causes can possibly be known may be true enough; but the capacity to do and the power

ते क्रियाज्ञानशक्ती क्रियाज्ञानाभ्यामेव समधिगमनीये । ते च क्षित्यादिषु यथोक्तसाधनबल-
समुत्थापिते इति न विशेषः प्रसिद्धप्राकारगोपुरादिकार्येभ्यस्तनुभुवनादेः । न चैतावानेव
क्रियागोचर इति विषयनियमः कश्चित् क्रियाया दृष्टः, येनेदमशक्यक्रियमध्यवस्थेयम् । सिद्धे
च कार्यत्वे तदुपादानादिसाक्षात्करणतदधिष्ठानतत्प्रेरणानिपुणः पुरुषविशेषस्सिद्धयत्येव ।

अधिष्ठानं च तत्प्रवृत्त्यनुगुणसङ्कल्पवदीश्वरसन्निकर्षः ; क्षेत्रज्ञेनेव स्वशरीरादौ । स
च द्रव्यैस्संयोगलक्षणः । तद्गुणैस्तु संयुक्तसमवायरूपः ।

प्रवृत्तिश्च परमाणूनां परिस्पन्दलक्षणा । धर्माधर्मयोस्तु फलोदयानुकूलतादृश-
देशकालादिसहकारिसहितता ।

न च* ताभ्यां धर्माधर्माभ्यामेव फलम् ; चेतनानधिष्ठितानां सर्वेषामेतेषामचैतन्ये-

to know can only be inferred from activity and knowledge. And since these have been shown to exist in respect of the earth (*kṣiti*) and the like, on the strength of the reasons adduced already, it is clear that there is no special feature that could mark off the body, the world and the like from well-known effects, such as, the temple tower and the wall. No restriction to the effect 'The scope of activity is only this much' is noticed to limit activity to certain objects alone; and if such a restriction exists, we may assert that this cosmos is impossible of production. If it is proved to be an effect, it necessarily follows that there is a person who is competent to perceive directly its material and other causes, and to control and direct the same.

As in the case of the control of his own body and (senses) by the *jīva*, here also (i.e., in regard to the cosmos) control (*adhiṣṭhāna*) consists merely in the proximity (to the cosmos) of a God possessed of a will conducive to its activity. With regard to substances (*dravya*) this proximity takes the form of conjunction (*samyoga*); and in regard to their qualities, it is inherence (*samavāya*) in that wherein there is conjunction (*samyukta*).

Coming to activity (*pravṛtti*), that of infinitesimal atoms is merely change of place (*parispanda*). With regard to merit (*dharma*) and demerit (*adharma*), their activity is simply their coming into association with appropriate place (*deśa*) and times (*kāla*) and other auxiliary causes helpful to the starting of the fruits of deeds.

It is wrong to maintain that the fruits of activities result from merit and demerit themselves; for these and all other things not controlled by an intelligent entity cannot effect anything by themselves; since they are

*In the printed books and manuscripts this sentence reads thus, without the negative particle, 'tābhyām dharmādharmābhyām phalam'. But from the context it is clear that the text should be 'na ca tābhyām....'

नाकिञ्चित्करत्वात् । न हि चेतनेन वर्धकिनानधिष्ठिता वासी देशकालादिसहकारिशत-
समधिगमेऽपि यूपादीन्यापादयितुमलम् । बीजाङ्कुरादयस्तु पक्षान्तर्भूता इति तैर्व्यभिचार-
वचनमनभिज्ञतयैव श्रोत्रियाणाम् । एतेन सुखादिभिर्व्यभिचारोऽपि प्रत्युक्तः ।

न चोभयवासिसिद्धतामात्रेण क्षेत्रज्ञानामेवेदशाधिष्ठातृत्वकल्पनमुचितम् ; तेषां
सूक्ष्मव्यवहितादिदर्शनाशक्तेर्निश्चितत्वात् । दृष्टानुसारिणी हि सर्वत्र कल्पना ; न दृष्टविरो-
धिनी । न चैवमीश्वरस्याशक्तिर्निश्चिता ; प्रमाणान्तरतस्तत्सिद्धेः । यथोदितप्रमाणबलेन
सिद्धयन् सांसिद्धिकसर्वाधिदर्शनतत्प्रेरणशक्तिसम्पन्न एव सिद्धयति ; कार्यत्वस्य समर्थकर्तृ-
पूर्वकत्वेन प्रतिबन्धात् ।

devoid of sentience. Though provided with auxiliary causes, such as place and time, the axe not controlled by a carpenter, an intelligent being, is, indeed, incapable of making objects like the sacrificial post (*yūpa*). For the reason that instances such as seed-sprout are already included in the *pakṣa* (minor term), the suggestion that in view of the case of seed-sprout (where the non-sentient seed, not controlled by any intelligent agent, produces the seed by its own effort) the foregoing argument commits the fallacy of *vyābhicāra* is the outcome of the ignorance (of the methods of inference) found in persons who are merely versed in the vedas. On the same count, the attempt to level the charge of *vyābhicāra* by citing the instance of pleasure² and the like stands condemned.

It is not right to attribute control to finite souls themselves simply because they are accepted by both the rival disputants ; for the *jīva*'s incapacity to perceive what is subtle and what is screened from view is well established. (Rather than admitting a separate entity, God, would it not be better to attribute this capacity to perceive the subtle and the hidden to finite souls themselves ? The answer is in the negative) for what is posited must everywhere be in conformity with, and not contradictory to, what is known. It is not well established that the incapacity to perceive the subtle and the veiled belongs to God, as it belongs to the *jīvas* ; because by means of other *pramāṇas* the capacity to perceive them is proved to belong to him. The person whose existence is proved on the strength of the argument already advanced is surely ascertained to possess in his essential nature the capacity to perceive all things and to direct them ; for 'being an effect' is invariably concomitant with 'dependence upon a competent agent.'

2. Since pleasure and other affective states, which are devoid of consciousness, produce, even in the absence of any control from an intelligent person, their appropriate bodily responses, such as smiling, flow of tears and several organic and visceral changes, it may be urged that the argument is vitiated by *vyābhicāra doṣa*.

,यत्तु परिमितशक्तिज्ञानानैश्वर्याद्यापादनाद्धर्मविशेषविपरीतसाधनत्वमुद्भावितम्; तदतिस्थवीयः ; अप्रयोजकत्वात्तेषाम् । न हि किञ्चित्क्रियमाणं कर्तुरर्थान्तरविषयमसामर्थ्यमज्ञानं* वा स्वोत्पत्तयेऽपेक्षते ; स्वसम्पादनसमर्थकर्तृमात्राक्षेपात् केवलं व्यतिरेकासिद्धेः† । तावतैवोपपद्यमाने कार्योदयेऽसम्बन्धिनोऽकिञ्चित्करस्यार्थान्तरविषयस्याभावस्य हेतुत्वकल्पनानुपपत्तेः ।

अपि च किं तदितरसमस्तवस्तुविषयमज्ञानादिव्यापकमुत कतिपयगोचरमिति विवेचनीयम् । न तावदशेषविषयम् ; अनुपलब्धेः । न खलु कुम्भकारः कुम्भातिरेकि किमपि न विजानाति । अथ कतिपयविषयम् ; तदपि न, अनियतविषयतया तस्य तस्य व्यभिचारदर्शनात् । न चास्ति किञ्चिद्व्यवस्थितं, यदविद्यादिमानेव कर्तृतामनुभवति ।

The objection raised already (vide p. 162), namely that, as the *hetu* points only to limited capacity and fragmentary knowledge and to the absence of lordship, it establishes only the reverse of the qualities intended to be proved, is highly superficial; for, clearly, the *hetu* in question does not lead to the inferring of limited powers and the like. In fact, for its own production any object that is being produced does not require on the part of its agent either the incapacity to effect other things or ignorance concerning them; for, in as much as it would only lead to the inference that there is a person competent to make it, the absence of the capacity to produce other things does not follow therefrom. When the production of an effect may well take place solely with the aid of knowledge and power concerning the same, it is quite unnecessary to consider what is wholly unrelated to it and what has nothing to do with it, namely the absence (of knowledge and power) concerning other effects, as being responsible for its production.

Further, it has to be carefully ascertained whether what is said to be invariably concomitant (*vyāpaka*), namely, 'ignorance of other things and incapacity to effect them', concerns all things other than the effect in question or certain things only. It cannot be ignorance pertaining to all things; for we know of no such ignorance. Indeed, the potter is not ignorant of everything excepting the pot. If it be urged that the ignorance pertains to certain things only, even this suggestion fares no better; for, so long as the object of ignorance is left unspecified, the argument is liable to be charged with *vyabhicāra doṣa* in view of the fact that even in the absence of ignorance concerning any given object, agency is still possible. No one object has been specified in order to be able

* The reading found in all books is ' . . . asāmarthyam jñānam . . . ' but it ought to be ' . . . asāmarthyamajñānam . . . '

† All books examined read 'kevalavyatirekāśiddheḥ'. Perhaps a better reading would be 'kevalam vyatirekāśiddheḥ'.

न च शरीरिणैव कर्त्रा भाव्यम् ; शरीरग्रहणेनैवानैकान्त्यात् । न खलु शरीर-
विशिष्टस्त्रेवायमात्मा शरीरमुपादत्ते ; योगिनो युगपदनेकशरीरग्रहणायोगात् । पूर्वदेह-
परित्यागेन देहान्तरप्रापककर्मप्रेरितप्राणसहाय एव देहान्तरं प्रविशतीत्युपपादितमात्म-
चिन्तायाम् ।

किञ्च आत्मनश्शरीरमधितिष्ठतोऽधिष्ठानक्रियाकर्मभूतस्य देहस्याधिष्ठातृदेहानुप्र-
वेशोऽनुपपन्नः ; युगपदेकक्रियायामेकस्य कर्मकर्तृत्वविरोधात् । अधितिष्ठासितदेहसंयोगवत्
एव तत्प्रवृत्त्यनुगुणप्रयत्नयोगलक्षणमधिष्ठानं दृष्टमिति चेत् , न ह्येतत् । किन्तु तदसम्बद्धस्य
तदधिष्ठानानुपपत्तेः* प्रेर्यवस्तुसम्बन्धिना प्रेरकेण भवितव्यमिति । किन्तु न पुनर्देहसम्बन्धेन
भाव्यमिति कुतो निर्णयः ? इत एव यतोऽन्यदप्यधिष्ठोयमानं मानदण्डादि स्वसम्बन्धिनैवा-

to assert "Only that person who is ignorant of such and such an object is fit to become an agent."

There is no need to contend that the agent should only be a person endowed with a body ; for this contention is liable to be charged with *anekānta doṣa* in view of the very fact of the activity of assuming a body. Indeed, the soul does not take up a body while being already associated with a body ; for, then, it would be impossible for the yogin to take up several bodies simultaneously. When discussing the nature of the soul it has been shown that it is only after relinquishing the former body the soul enters upon another solely with the assistance of vital breath (*prāṇa*) which is induced to activity by past deeds which procure a fresh body.

Moreover, the body which is the object of the controlling activity on the part of the self, the controller of the body, cannot intelligibly be included in the very body of the definition of the controller ; for one and the same thing being at once the agent and the object in the selfsame activity involves a contradiction. If it be maintained that control, which is simply the possession of an effort conducive to the activity of the body, is known to belong only to him who is in conjunction with the body which is sought to be controlled, it has to be replied : 'let it be admitted that the controller should be related to the object controlled ; since the control of a given object is impossible to him who is unrelated to it.' (It may be asked) How is it determined that this relation need not be the bodily relation ? (The reply is) "It is for this reason, namely, that other objects also, such as

* In preference to the two readings (i) *astvekatattvasambandhasya adhiṣṭhānā-nupapatteḥ* (Chaukamba edition) and (ii) *astvekatattvasambaddhasya adhiṣṭhānā-nupapatteḥ* (Telugu edition), the variant reading suggested in the Telugu edition—*naḥyetaḥ* | किन्तु तादासम्बद्धस्या तादधिष्ठानानुपपत्तेः—has been adopted,

धिष्णीयते । तेनाधिष्ठानक्रियापेक्षिताधिष्ठेयपदार्थसम्बन्धमात्रातिरेकेण देहसम्बन्धो नामापरो नानर्तव्यः । अस्ति चेश्वरस्यापि जगदुपादानोपकरणैस्सम्बन्ध इत्युक्तमेव ।

अथ स्वदेहव्यतिरिक्ते वस्तुनि प्रवृत्तिविशेषकरत्वं देहद्वारेणैव ; दृष्टं हि दण्डचक्रादिषु करसंयोगादिना कुलालादेः प्रवर्तयितृत्वमित्युच्येत ; तदपि न ; अभिध्यानमात्रेण परशरीरगतगरनिरसनविसारणदर्शनात् ।

कथमसति शरीरे परप्रेरणात्मकः सङ्कल्प इति चेत्, किं शरीरं सङ्कल्पयति येन तदभावे न भवेत् । करणमिति चेन्न ; मनसः करणत्वात् ।

किमस्तीश्वरस्य मनः ? बाढम् । नन्वेवं विग्रहधर्माधर्मानैश्वर्यादयस्साधारणधर्माः प्रादुष्युः । मैवम् ; कार्यत्वाक्षिप्तसमर्थकर्तृमत्त्वद्रदिन्नैवापास्तत्वात् । मनसो नित्येन्द्रियतया देहापगमेऽपि सम्बन्धाभ्युपगमादनैकान्तिकश्च । यावद्धि दृष्टानुगुणं व्याप्यु-

the measuring rod, are controlled by one who is merely related to them." Therefore, apart from what is required for the controlling activity, namely, mere relation to the object controlled, no other relation, like the relation to the body, need be countenanced. And it has already been pointed out that relationship to material and auxiliary causes of the cosmos exists in God.

It may be objected that the causing of any particular form of activity in things other than the body is done only with the aid of the body ; for it is found that the power in the staff, wheel and the like belongs to the potter and other agents only in virtue of factors, such as contact with the hand. This objection too is untenable ; for the extraction and the scattering of the poison that has entered one's body is observed to be effected by another by the mere exercise of his will.

When the body is absent how, it may be asked, could the will to cause movements in other things arise ? (The reply is) Then is it contended that it is the body that wills ? If that is so, in its absence there will be no will. Should it be urged that the body (does not itself will, but) is the instrument (*karana*) in the act of willing, it may be replied "not so" ; for the mind (*manas*) is the instrument of willing.

Has God, then, a *manas* ? (The answer is) "Quite so". If it be said that in that event, certain common features, such as the possession of a body, merit and demerit and the absence of sovereignty, would have to be attributed to God ; the reply is "not so." For this objection is set aside on the very strength of the fact of the world having a competent agent, a fact inferred with the aid of the *hetu* that it is an effect. Moreover, since even when the body perishes contact with *manas* has been admitted, in as much as it is an eternal organ of sense, the argument is vitiated by *anekānta doṣa*. In fact, only that much which is

पयोगि, तावदनुज्ञायते । न चास्मदादेर्मनसाप्यचिन्त्यरचनस्यापर्थन्तविस्तारस्य महा-
भूतभौतिकप्रपञ्चस्य प्रादेशिकशरीरकः किञ्चिज्ज्ञः पुण्यपापपरवशगतिरलं निर्माणा-
येत्यपरिमितज्ञानैश्वर्यशक्तिः शरीराद्यनपेक्षस्सङ्कल्पादेव सकलभुवननिर्माणक्षमः कर्ता
सिद्धः ।

ईदृशेन कर्त्रा घटादिषु कार्यत्वस्य सम्बन्धो न दृष्ट इति चेत्, अतिगहनगिरितटा-
धिष्ठानेन अतिप्रकृष्टादृष्टचरेन्धननिवहसम्बन्धिना हुतवहविशेषेण महानसादौ धूमस्य
वा किं सम्बन्धो दृष्टः, येन धूमविशेषदर्शनाद्विरिशिखरे तथाविधाग्निरनु-
मीयते । यादृशो धूमो यत्रावगतस्तत्रैव तादृशस्तत्सम्पादनसमर्थः । दृष्टान्तभूमाव-
परिदृष्टोऽपि सामान्यव्याप्तिबलेन पक्षधर्मतावशात्सिद्ध्यतीति चेत्, तदिदमस्मा-
भिरभिधीयमानं किमिति न हृदयमधिरोहति भवताम् । इहापि कार्यत्वं

relevant to the inductive relation and which is in conformity with what is perceived is admitted. Since a person whose body occupies a limited area, whose knowledge is limited and whose action is subject to merit and demerit, is incapable of creating the world composed of the primal elements and what is constituted of these, and possessed of a structure inconceivable even by our minds and an extent which is boundless, it has to be concluded that there is an agent who is endowed with illimitable knowledge, sovereignty, and power and who, without requiring the body, is capable of creating all the worlds with the sole aid of his will. If it be said that in instances such as the jar no invariable relation between the character of being an effect and an agent of this description is observed, (we ask in reply) is the relation of smoke with fire of a description which exists on the dense hill side, which is never experienced before, which is huge in volume and fed by an enormous quantity of fuel ever noticed in the kitchen? If it were so, on the perception of a particular kind of smoke it could be inferred that on the hill-top there is fire of that description. If it be said that when a certain kind of smoke is found in a given place (to be concomitant with a particular kind of fire) that kind of smoke will be capable of leading to inference of that kind of fire in that locality alone, and that a fire of a different description, even when it is not noticed in the illustrative example, could still be inferred with the aid of the inductive relation of smoke in general with fire in general, in consideration of the pakṣa wherein it resides (in this argument it is the hill), (we ask) how is it that when we maintain the same position it fails to appeal to your mind? Here also the character of being an effect, which is known in examples, such as the pot, to have an invariable concomitance with dependence

समर्थकर्तृपूर्वकत्वेन घटादिषु विदितसम्बन्धनियमं क्षित्यादिषु दृश्यमानं स्वसम्पादन-
समर्थमदृष्टपूर्वमेव बुद्धिमत्कर्तारमुपस्थापयति । यथैव हि देशकालेन्धनपरिमाणादि-
विशेषानादरेण धूमस्य स्वोदयानुगुणहुतवहमात्रेण सम्बन्धनियमः, तथैव अनीश्वरत्वकिञ्चि-
ज्ज्ञत्वशरीरित्वपुण्यपापपरवशत्वमनुप्यत्वादिविशेषप्रहाणेन कार्यस्य स्वनिर्माणसमर्थबुद्धि-
मत्कर्तृमात्रेण सम्बन्धनियमनिश्चय इति न कश्चिद्विशेषः ।

अपि च विभुद्रव्यसंयोगिनः परिस्पन्दवत्तश्च सर्वत्र स्पर्शवत्त्वाव्यभिचारेऽपि ज्ञान-
सुखादिनित्यद्रव्यविशेषगुणानुमितात्मसंयोगिनः मनसः कथमिव स्पर्शरहितत्वम् ? । कथं
च वायवीयद्रव्यस्य महिमगुणशालिनो नियताधिष्ठानस्पर्शनत्वनियमदर्शनेऽपि त्वगिन्द्रिये
upon a competent agent, when noticed in the case of earth and the like,
points to an intelligent agent, who is capable of producing them and is
hitherto unknown. Just as by ignoring the place where fire is found,
the time of its existence, the fuel by which it is fed, the size and other
characteristics of fire, the invariable concomitance of smoke with fire
alone which is responsible for its very existence is established ; even
so by eliminating the special characteristics of the agent, such as, the
absence of lordship (*anīśvaratva*), the possession of fragmentary know-
ledge, the character of owning a body, of being subject to merit and
demerit, and of being human, universal concomitance of an effect with
an intelligent agent merely, who is competent to make it, is ascertained.
Hence, there is no special feature marking off these two cases.

(Difficulties arise when it is insisted that all the special features
found in the illustrative example should be found in all the cases coming
under that *vyāpti*. For example) :—When an object, which is in con-
junction with an all-pervasive substance and which possesses move-
ment, is known without exception to be everywhere associated with the
possession of touch, how can the mind³ whose conjunction with the soul
is inferred from consciousness, pleasure and other special qualities of
an eternal substance, be devoid of touch (*sparsā*) ? When what is com-
posed of wind and what possesses visible magnitude is found to be
invariably concomitant with the character of being the object of the
sensation of touch and is also found to have a particular abode, how
can the opposite character be met with in the sense of touch ?⁴

3. The Naiyāyika raises this objection against the Prābhākara school, and not against the Bhāṭṭa school, of Mīmāṃsā ; for the former believes that *manas* is atomic, while the latter maintains that *manas*, like the *ātman*, is all-pervasive (*vibhu*). And on the Naiyāyika view that there cannot be any *saṃyoga* between two *vibhu-dravyas*, *manas* cannot be in conjunction with the soul.

4. Some entities constituted of *vāyu*, such as *prāṇa*, *apāna*, *viyāna*, *udāna* and *samāna*, dwell only in particular regions of the body. For example, *prāṇa* is said to dwell in the heart (*hṛdi*) ; and *samāna*, in the navel (*nābhi*). And the air outside is cognisable by the sense of touch. The sense organ for touch, however, has the

तद्विपर्ययः ? तैजसस्य वा रूपस्पर्शयोरन्यतरस्य वा प्राकट्यनियमेऽपि रूपोपलम्भसाधनतानुमिततैजसभावस्य चक्षुषो नियमेन तदुभयानुद्भवाभ्युपगमः ? ।

अथ कार्यदर्शनानुमितसद्भावानां तैजसादिभावेऽपि तत्तद्विशेषाणां योग्यानुपलब्धिबाधितत्वात् तदभ्युपगमेऽनेकनियमभङ्गप्रसङ्गाच्च तथाभ्युपगमः, हन्त तर्हि प्रकृतविषयेऽपि प्रसङ्गितधर्मविशेषाणामनुपलम्भबाधाविशेषादनेकनियमविघातप्रसङ्गाच्च तथाभ्युपगम इति सर्वं समानमन्यत्राभिनिवेशात् ।

दृश्यन्ते हि नीतयः—यथा, विवादास्पदं परमाण्वादि प्रेक्षावत्प्रेरितं चेष्टते, अचेतनत्वात् । यदचेतनं, तत्तथा, यथा तथाविधं कन्दुकादि । तथा विवादाध्यासिता बाह्याभ्यन्तरप्रवृत्तयः प्रकृत्युपकरणप्रत्यक्षपूर्विकाः, कार्यत्वात्, तद्वदेव ।

When either the colour (*rūpa*) or the contact (*sparsā*) of fiery objects must invariably be explicit, how could it be admitted that these two are never explicit in the eye, which is inferred to be fiery, for the reason that it is the instrument for cognising colour ?

If it be said that it is so admitted (i.e., that the eye is devoid of explicit *rūpa* or *sparsā*) for the reason that the belief in the special qualities (i.e., explicit *rūpa* or *sparsā*) appropriate to the respective cases is contradicted by effectual non-apprehension (*yogyānupalabdhi*), even though the character of being fiery is attributed to these (i.e., the eye and so forth) whose existence is inferred from a knowledge of their activity, and for the reason that on this admission (namely, that the special features found in the illustrative examples should be inferred to exist in other cases as well), there would be an end to all inference ; (it may be replied) well, if that be so even in the case under discussion it may be admitted that these qualities do not belong to the creator of the world, because the special qualities of the potter, which in your opinion would have to be attributed to the creator of the earth and the like, are likewise contradicted by non-apprehension and because such an admission would mean an end to all inductive generalisation. Thus, the two cases are in every respect similar, except your prejudice.

In fact the following arguments are met with (1) The infinitesimal atoms and so forth, the precise manner of whose activity is under dispute, act under the direction of an intelligent person ; for they are non-sentient and whatever is a non-sentient object, acts in this way ; for example, the ball and other non-sentient objects. (2) All activities, internal and external, concerning which there is difference of opinion, presuppose the perception of their material and auxiliary causes ; because, like the activities of the examples cited in the previous argument,

entire body for its adhiṣṭhāna and not merely a particular region thereof. Nor is it the object of the sense of touch.

*प्रत्यक्षं तत् प्रमेयत्वात्पदार्थत्वाद्धटादिवत् ।

एकेच्छानुविधायीदमचैतन्यात्स्वदेहवत् ॥

एकेनाधिष्ठिताः कार्यं कुर्वते सर्वचेतनाः ।

देहसम्बन्धसापेक्षकार्यकृत्त्वात्त्वगादिवत् ॥

they are effects. (3) The infinitesimal atom is perceptible ; because, like the jar, it is an object of knowledge and is an entity. (4) The world is dependent upon the will of a person ; for, like our own body, it is devoid of consciousness. (5) All intelligent persons act only under the control of a single intelligent entity (i.e., God) ; for by standing in need of contact with their bodies they enter upon their

* In the Chaukamba and Telugu editions the following variant reading for the text commencing after the word योग्यानुपलब्धिबाधितत्वात् and ending with तद्वदेव is suggested :—

तदभ्युपगमेऽनेकनियमदर्शनविधातप्रसङ्गाच्च पक्षधर्मताबलभ्यार्थविशेषावबोधकाने-
कश्रुत्यादिमानबाधप्रसङ्गाच्च समर्थकर्तृपूर्वकत्वेन घटादिषु विदितसम्बन्धनियमं कार्यत्वं
क्षित्यादिषु दृश्यमानं स्वोत्पादकमदृष्टपूर्वमेव बुद्धिमत्कर्तारमद्वितीयं पुरुषधौरेयं साधयती-
त्यभ्युपगन्तव्यम् । तरतमभावापन्नवैचित्र्यवत्तत्कार्येषु कार्यत्वमेव तत्तदनुगुणं कर्तारमनुमा-
पयति चेत्, महीमहीधरादिरूपजगद्गतकार्यत्वमपि तदनुगुणं कर्तारमनुमापयतीति
कैमुत्यसिद्धेऽर्थे व्यर्थोऽयं निरीश्वरमीमांसकस्यात्र दुरभिनिवेशः । दृश्यन्ते ह्यस्मिन्नर्थे
अन्ये च हेतवः (1) त्रैकालिकं कृत्स्नं जगत् तदनुगुणशक्त्यादिगुणगणवदायत्तस्थितिलयकं,
अचिन्त्यविविधविचित्ररचनत्वात्, अतिकुशलैकायत्तस्थित्यादिकतया प्रमितचित्रप्रतिमा-
दवत् । (2) विभूतिपदाभिधेयं कृत्स्नं एकाधेयविधेयशेषभावं, तच्छरीरत्वात्, मच्छरीरवत् ।

Except for the two new arguments which this passage sets forth at its end, it contains no substantial change. These arguments are :—

(1) The world existing at all times, the past, the present and the future, possesses a continuance and a destruction which are subject to a person endowed with a group of qualities, such as power, appropriate thereto ; because it has manifold wonderful shapes inconceivable even by the mind ; for example, pictures and dolls which are well known to have their continuance and so forth subject to a very competent person. (2) All things denoted by the expression *vibhūti* possess the characters of being supported by (*ādheyatva*), being controlled by (*vidheyatva*), and existing for the sake of (*śeṣatva*) a person ; for, in the manner of one's own body, they constitute his body.

एकप्रधानपुरुषं विवादाध्यासितं जगत् ।
चेतनाचेतनात्मत्वादेकराजकदेशवत् ॥

* * * * *

॥ श्रीयामुनाय नमः ॥

एतावानेवायं ग्रन्थ उपलभ्यते ।

activities, like the sense of touch and so forth. (6) The world, which is the object of all this dispute, points to a single Supreme Person ; because, like a country ruled over by a supreme monarch, the world consists of sentient and nonsentient entities.

* * * * *

The text of Īśvara-Siddhi available is only this much.

NYAYAKULISA

EDITED WITH INTRODUCTION AND NOTES

By

R. RAMANUJACHARI

AND

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श्रीः

॥ श्रीमते रामानुजाय नमः ॥

॥ भूमिका ॥

श्रीमन्न्यायकुलिशाभिधानं प्रबन्धरत्नमिदं जयति सर्वस्वमिव श्रीभगवद्रामानुज-
मुनिप्रतिष्ठापितस्य विशिष्टाद्वैतसिद्धान्तस्य । प्रणेता चास्य विश्वविख्यातकीर्तिः कविता-
किंकसिंहस्य, सर्वतन्त्रस्वतन्त्रस्य, श्रीमद्वेङ्कटनाथस्य वेदान्ताचार्यदेशिकमणेरुपाचार्यो मातुल-
श्चआत्रेयरामानुजगुरुः ; यस्यानितरसाधारणं वादाहवकौशलमध्यक्षितवद्विस्तदानोन्तन-
बुधवरैर्वितीर्णं प्रशस्तिनाम 'वादिहंसाम्बुवाह' इति ।

आचार्यवर्योऽयं श्रीभगवद्रामानुजमुनेरन्तरङ्गशिष्यस्य 'यतीन्द्र माहानसिक' इति 'घटाम्बु' इति च आचार्यदास्यविशेषनाम्ना विश्रुतस्य आत्रेयस्य प्रणतार्तिहरा-
चार्यस्य नप्ता, रामानुजाचार्यस्य पौत्रः, श्रीपद्मनाभाचार्यस्य पुत्रश्चेति—

‘दुर्मोचोद्भटकर्मकोटिनिबिडोऽप्यादेशवश्यः कृतः
बाह्यैर्नैव विमोहितोऽस्मि कुदृशां पक्षैर्न विक्षोभितः ।
यो माहानसिको महान् यतिपतेर्नीतश्च तत्पौत्रजा-
नाचार्यानिति रङ्गधुर्य ! मयि ते स्वल्पावशिष्टो भैरः, ॥’

इति श्रीमन्निगमान्तमहादेशिकसूक्त्या अन्यैश्च सम्प्रदायवचनैस्कुटमवगम्यते ।

‘नमो रामानुजार्याय वेदान्तार्थप्रदायिने ।
आत्रेयपद्मनाभार्यसुताय गुणशालिने ॥’

इति सम्प्रदायागतं वचनमप्यस्य पद्मनाभार्यः पितेति सुस्पष्टमवबोधयति । अयमाचार्य
एवात्र प्रतिवादमन्ते स्वपितृपादनामधेयं श्रीपद्मनाभार्य इति निर्दिशति ।

‘चैत्राद्रासम्भवं काञ्च्यां रङ्गराजगुरोस्सुतम् ।

सुप्रतिष्ठांशमात्रेयं रामानुजगुरुं भजे ॥’

इति सम्प्रतिपन्नवचनान्तरदर्शनादेतत्पितृ रङ्गराचार्य इति नामान्तरमप्यस्तीति विज्ञायते ।

गुरुरसौ स्वपितुरात्रेयरङ्गराजाचार्यस्य सकाशान्मन्त्रमन्त्रार्थान्, वात्स्यवरदगुरोस्सकाशाच्छ्रीभाष्यादिकांश्च ग्रन्थानध्यगीष्टेत्यविगीता सम्प्रदायसरणिः ।

सर्वेष्वपि तन्त्रेषु निराबाधं पन्थानमवगन्तुमलङ्कर्मिणोऽसौ स्वाचार्यवरदगुरोरादेशेन प्रियभागिनेयस्य श्रीमद्वेङ्कटनाथस्य सकलाः कला उपदिश्य तमेतं विंशब्द एव विश्रुतनानाविधविद्यमकरोत् । अयमर्थः—

‘श्रीमद्भ्यां स्यादसावित्यनुपधि वरदाचार्यरामानुजाभ्यां
सम्यग्दृष्टेन सर्व सह निशितधिया वेङ्कटेशेन कृतः ।’

इति अधिकरणसारावलीग्रन्थोपक्रमश्लोकेन,

‘श्रुत्वा रामानुजार्यात्सदसदपि ततस्तत्त्वमुक्ताकलापं
व्यातानीद्वेङ्कटेशो वरदगुरुकृपालम्भितोद्दामभूमा ।’

इति तत्त्वमुक्ताकलापप्रारम्भसूक्त्या, मीमांसापादुकोपक्रमगतेन

‘यस्मादस्माभिरेतद्यतिपतिकथितप्राक्तनप्रक्रियोद्य-
त्कर्मब्रह्मावमर्शप्रभवबहुफलं सार्थमग्राहि शास्त्रम् ।
तं विष्वग्भेदविद्यास्थितिपदविषयस्थेयभूतं प्रभूतं
वन्देयात्रेयरामानुजगुरुमनघं वादिहंसाम्बुवाहम् ॥’

इति मङ्गलपद्येन 'विंशत्यब्दे विश्रुतनानाविधविद्य' इति सङ्कल्पसूयोदयवाक्येन च तत्र तत्र स्फुटमवगम्यते ।

अस्य च 'अप्पिळ्ळार्' इति भाषाव्यवहारोऽपि जागर्ति । अदसीयं सकलासु कलासु विलक्षणं वैचक्षण्यं साक्षात्कृतवन्तस्तदानीन्तना महान्तः 'श्रीभाष्यकारप्रियशिष्यः' 'पिळ्ळान्' इति प्रसिद्धः कुरुकेशः स एव वासावित्युत्प्रेक्षिषत । ततः प्रभृतीदं प्रशस्तिनाम आसीदिति तत्त्वविदां साम्प्रदायिको निर्णयः ।

तस्यैतस्य वादिहंसाम्बुवाहस्य प्रपितामहानां प्रभावमेवं वर्णयन्ति साम्प्रदायिकाः । कदाचिच्छ्रीभाष्यकारस्य रामानुजमुनेर्भिक्षावसरे विषसम्मिश्रान्नदानेन तं लोकान्तरं प्रापयितुं केचिच्छठाः प्रायतन्त । तामेतां तेषां प्रवृत्तिमुपलभ्य ससंभ्रमं श्रीभाष्यकारगुरवस्तत्र समागताः । शिष्यकोटिभिः परिवृतं रामानुजमुनिं जीवन्तं पश्यन्तोऽमन्दमानन्दमलभन्त । तत्र चासङ्ख्येयेषु शिष्यजनेषु प्रणतार्तिहरार्यस्य श्रीभाष्यकारशरीरेऽतिशयितं प्रेमातिशयं बहुधा परीक्ष्य तमेतं तस्यान्तरङ्गकैङ्कर्येषु न्ययूयुजन् । ततः प्रभृति श्रीभाष्यकारस्य घटतीर्थाहरणादिकमन्तरङ्गकैङ्कर्यं कुर्वाणोऽयं 'घटाम्बु' इति विरुदमलभत । त एते वादिहंसाम्बुवाहस्य प्रपितामहाः श्रीमत्प्रणतार्तिहराचार्याः श्रीभाष्यकारस्य प्रियशिष्यास्स्वीयेन पाण्डित्यप्रकर्षेण 'वेदान्तोदयन' इति प्रसिद्धिमासादितवन्तो विशिष्टाद्वैतसम्प्रदायं बहुधा तत्र तत्र प्रवर्तयन्तो व्यराजन्त इति । अत एव श्रीमन्निगमान्तमहादेशिकाः—

‘इति यतिराजमहानसपरिमळपरिवाहवासितां पिबत ।

विबुधपरिषन्निषेव्यां वेदान्तोदयनसम्प्रदायसुधाम् ॥’

इति तस्यैतस्य सम्प्रदायस्य यतिराजमहानसपरिमळवासितत्वेन बुधजननिषेव्यतां वर्णयन्ति ।

एतस्यैव चाचार्यवर्यस्यानवद्ये वंशे कृतावतारास्तुप्रसिद्धवैभवा गोपालार्यमहादेशिकाः कुम्भघोणे विरचितनिवासाश्श्रीमतां ज्ञानानुष्ठानवैराग्यशेवधीनां 'साक्षात्स्वामी'

इति जगति विख्यातानां न्यासविद्यादर्पणश्रीतत्त्वसिद्धाञ्जनादिग्रन्थनिर्माणेन विशिष्टाद्वैत-
सिद्धान्तस्य बहूपकृतवतां श्रीमद्वेदान्तरामानुजमहादेशिकानां वरिवस्यया अधिगतसकल-
वेदान्ततत्त्वार्थाः, पाण्डित्यानुष्ठानवैराग्यादिभिराचार्यताप्रयोजकैर्गुणगणैः ‘अपरोऽयं निग-
मान्तमहादेशिकस्यावतारः’ इति तदानीन्तनैर्बुधवरैरुत्प्रेक्षिताः, तत्त्वार्थाधिजिगमिषया
शिष्यवृत्त्या स्वीयं पादमूलमासेदुषां वेदान्तरामानुजमहादेशिकादीनां त्रयाणामुत्तमाश्रमिणां
वेदान्तार्थानुपदिश्य तन्मुखेन विशिष्टाद्वैतसम्प्रदायमविच्छिन्नमद्य यावत्प्रवर्तितवन्तो, निक्षे-
पचिन्तामण्यादिग्रन्थानां विशिष्टाद्वैतसिद्धान्तसमर्थनपराणां रचयितारश्च, गुरुपङ्क्तिहार-
यष्टेरनर्घं नायकरत्नमिव विराजन्ते’ । विश्वगुणादर्शादिप्रबन्धनिर्मातारः श्लेषयमकचक्र-
वर्तिनः श्रीवेङ्कटाध्वरिणोऽप्यस्यैवाचार्यमणेशे समजनिषतेति तत्सन्ततिगता वंशावलि-
रवबोधयति ।

भगवतः श्रीभाष्यकारादनन्तरं प्रणतार्तिहराचार्यस्तत्पुत्रपौत्रपौत्राश्चेति चत्वार एते
आत्रेया महानुभावा आचार्यपङ्क्तिमलङ्कुर्वन्तीति नेदं सम्प्रदायज्ञानां पुरस्तादिदम्प्रथम-
मावेदनीयम् । तस्यैतस्य वादिहंसाम्बुवाहस्य वरदार्यो रङ्गराजार्थ इति पुत्रद्वयमासीदिति
तत्सन्ततिसमुद्भवास्समुदाहरन्ति ।

‘न्यायकुलिशादिग्रन्थत्रयकर्तारः’ इति तद्वंशैस्तत्र तत्र पठ्यमानं तदीयं
प्रशस्तिपत्रमावेदयत्यन्यच्च ग्रन्थद्वयं नूनमनेन विरचितमिति । परन्तु किं तद्ग्रन्थद्वयमिति
नाद्य यावन्निश्चेतुं शक्यते । हन्त—महदिदं विषादस्थानम् ! यत् श्रीभगवद्रामानुजसि-
द्धान्तस्य अथवा सर्वस्य सिद्धान्तस्य यद्बहवः प्राचामाचार्याणां वाग्विस्तरा एतर्हि
श्रोतुमपि दुर्लभतां गमिता इति ।

(१) तानेतानाचार्यान्धिकृत्य श्लोकोऽयमनुसन्धीयते—

यः श्रीशो भुवि वादिहंसजलमुग्वंशेऽवतीर्णोऽखिलान्
श्रीकृष्णाध्वरिदेशिकात्समवितुम् गोपालसूर्यात्मना ।
शिष्यैः सूरिगणैः श्रितः सुविमलैर्वेदान्तरामानुज-
श्रीरङ्गेशरमानिवासयतिराण्मुख्यैस्स जीयाद् गुरुः ॥

श्रीमन्निगमान्तमहादेशिकाः ‘वादिहंसाम्बुवाहाश्शुकवन्मामशिक्षयन्’ इति ‘तैर्मम हृदि लिखितं पत्रे लिखामि’ इति च वर्णयन्तस्स्वीयां निरतिशयां गुरुभक्तिं प्रकाशयन्ति ।

विस्मरणाहंस्य दुरवगाहस्याप्यर्थस्याक्लेशेन शिष्यजनहृदयेषु समुचितैरुदाहरणैर्दृढप्रतिष्ठापनेऽस्य वादिहंसाम्बुवाहस्यानितरसाधारणं नैपुण्यमासीदिति नेदमविदितं रहस्यत्रयसारादिग्रन्थाध्येतॄणां विदुषाम् । तत्र द्वित्राण्युदाहरणानि प्रदर्श्यन्ते—

‘अग्रतः प्रययौ रामस्सीता मध्ये सुमध्यमा

पृष्ठतस्तु धनुष्पाणिर्लक्ष्मणोऽनुजगाम ह ॥

इति श्रीमद्रामायणपद्यमुदाहृत्य श्लोकोऽयं प्रणवस्य यथाक्रमं परतत्त्वपुरुषकारचेतन-प्रतिपादनपरस्यार्थानुसन्धाने सुकर उपायः । तथा अर्जुनस्थः पुरतस्सारथिं परमात्मानं पश्चादर्जुनश्च चेतनं विभ्राणः प्रणवार्थानुसन्धानस्याक्लिष्ट उपाय इति वादिहंसाम्बुवाहोप-देश इति वेदान्तगुरवः । काव्यरसिकता कथमेषामुपयुज्यत इति सहृदयाः परामृशन्तु । तथा ये भगवतः परत्वमात्रमालोच्य सौलभ्यमजानन्तस्तस्माद्गूरीभवितुं प्रयतन्ते, तेभ्यो ‘नराधमाः’ इति गीताचार्यैर्निन्दितेभ्यस्सौलभ्यमात्रवेदिनो ये गोपीवद्विवेकशून्या अपि

(१) இப்படி.....கீழும் மேலுமுள்ள பாசுரங்களெல்லாம் வேதாந்தோதயன ஸம்பிரதாயமான மடப்பள்ளிவார்த்தையை ஆசார்யன் பக்கவிலே தாங்கேட்டருளினபடியே கிடாம்பியப்புள்ளாரடியேனைக் கிளியைப் பழக்குவிக்குமாப்போலே பழக்குவிக்க அவர் திருவுள்ளத் திவிரக்கமடியாகப் பெருமாள் தெளியப்பிரகாசிப்பித்து மறவாமற்காத்துப் பிழையறப் பேசுவித்த பாசுரங்கள். रहस्यत्रयसारे.

வெள்ளைப்பரிமுகர் தேசிகராய் விரகாலடியோம். உள்ளத்தெழுதிய தோலையிவிட்டனம். रहस्यत्रयसारे—निगमनाधिकारे.

(२) இதில் ப்ரதமபதத்தில் அர்த்தங்களை அர்ஜுனரதத்திலும், ‘अग्रतः प्रययौ रामः’ என்ற சுலோகத்திலும் கண்டு கொள்வது.....இதுஅர்த்தாறு ஸந்தானத்திற்குக் குறிப்பாக வப்புள்ளாரருளிச்செய்த விரகு. रहस्यत्रयसारे—प्रधानप्रतितन्त्राधिकारे.

சன்தோ ஢கவந்தமுபஜி஢மிஷந்தி, தோ ஢ரமாஸ்திகா: ஸ்லா஢்யதமா இதி வாதி஢்சா஢்஢ுவா஢ானா஢ுக்தி-
ரिति நி஢மான்தமா஢ா஢ேஸிகா: ।

ஂதஸ்ய ஢ேஸகாலநிர்ணயஸ்ய ஸிஷ்ய஢்ஸிஷ்யகரமா஢ாதஸஸு஢ம ஂவ । ததா ஢ி—ஂத஢்஢ா-
஢ினேயஸ்ய ஸிஷ்யஸ்ய ஑ ஸ்ரீமா஢்஢ே஢ான்த஢ேஸிகஸ்ய க்ரேஸ்தவவர்த்தே ஸஸ்த்யுத்தர஢்஢ிஸதா஢ிகஸ஢஢்ஸதமே
(1270) ஂவிர்஢ாவ இதி விர்ஸகானா் நிர்ணய: । ஂத: க்ரேஸ்தவத்ரயோ஢ஸதஸதகேஸ்யா஢ி ஸ்திதி-
ரஸீ஢ிதिति நிஸ்த்ரீயதே । ‘஑ேத்ரா஢்ரீஸ஢்஢வ் கா஢்஑்யா஢்’ இஸ்யா஢ிர்஢ிவ்஑னேஸ்ரீகா஑்ரீகேத்ரே வி஑்ரம-
வர்த்தேத்ரா஢்ரீயா஢ஸ்யாவிர்஢ாவ இதி ஸ஢்஢ா஢ாயகரமா஢ாதோ நிர்ணய: ।

தஸ்யேதஸ்ய ஢்஢ானி஢ேரா஑ார்யஸ்ய ஸ்வ஢்ரதி஢ா஢்ரவிணநிஸே஢ாயமாண் ந்யாயகுலிஸா஢ி஢ான்
நிவந்஢நமி஢மேதஸ்த்ரீயஸிஷ்யேண வே஢ான்த஢ுரூணா ந்யாய஢்ரிஸு஢்஢ா஢ோ தத்ர தத்ரோ஢ா஢்஢மாஸ்தே ।

யதா ந்யாய஢்ரிஸு஢்஢ாவநுமானா஢்யாயே கேவலவ்யதிர்கி஢ஜ்ஜே² ‘ஂக்த஑ ந்யாயகுலிஸே
ஸ்வ஢்ரகாஸா஢ே ஸ்ரீமா஢்஢ா஢ு஑ா஑ார்ய:—‘ந ஑ ஸி஢்஢ான்திநோஸ்ய் ஢்ரஸஜ்ஜ: ; கேவலவ்யதிர்கி஢ா-
மாண்யான஢்யு஢்ரமாத்’ இதி । ஂவமத்ரேவா஢்யாயே ஑துர்த்தா஢்஢ிகே ‘஢ாணி஢ா஢ா஢ிஸு ஢்ரத்யேகஸ஢ு-
஢ாயா஢்வவி஑்ர஢ானு஢்ர஢்஢்யா஢யஸ்யாஸ்மா஢ா஑ார்யேந்யாயகுலிஸே ஢்ர஢்஢ிதா: ஢்ரஸ்பஸ்த஢நுஸந்஢ேயா:’³
இதி ஑ । ந்யாயஸி஢்஢ா஑்஑்஑னே ஑ு஢்஢ி஢்ரி஑்஑்஑ேஸி ‘ஂக்த஑ ந்யாயகுலிஸே । ஸ்யோ஢ஸ்து
஢்ரஸரணவै஢வா஢ி஢்ரதி஢ா஢கஸாஸ்த்ரவலா஢ாஸ்தி இதி’ । ”

ய஢ேவ யாவ஢ேவ ஸ்ரீமாந்ரி஢மான்த஢ுரூணா ஑஑ித்க஑஑ி஢ு஢ா஢்஢வாக்யஸகலத் த஢திர்கித்
கிய஢஢ி ந கேவலமஸ்மா஑் வ்யாஸ்யாதுணாம஢ி ஢ூர்வேஸா் ஢்஢ிவிஸய஢ூத் நாஸீ஢ியந்தம஢ி கால஢் ।

(1) இவ்விடத்தில் ஸர்வேசுவரனுடைய ஢ரத்வமாத்திரத்தை
யறிந்தகலுக்கையாலே ஢ராதமனென்று ஢ேர்஢ேற்ற ஢ிறந்து கெட்டானிற்
காட்டில் இ஢ைச்சிகளைப் ஢ோலே விவேகமில்லையேயாகிலும் ஢ௌஸப்
யத்தையறிந்து ஂந்ரலனு஢ையொருவனை ஢னு஑ுமவனை ஢ரமாஸ்தி
கனென்ற஢்஢ுள்ளாரருளிச்செய்யும் ஢ாகரம். ர஢்யத்ரயஸரே—஢்ரிகரவி஢ா஢ா஢ிகாரே.

(2) ந்யாய஢்ரி P. 66

(3) „ P. 185

(4) ந்யாயஸி஢்஢ா. P. 269.

अत इदं निबन्धनं नाममात्रशेषमासीदिति मन्यमानानां विद्याव्यसनिनां दुनोति स्म मानसम् । तदिदानीं 'यदा मृतस्य संप्राप्तिः' इत्युक्तरीत्या लब्धप्रचारमस्माकं परमं प्रीणयति मनः । अत्र न केवलं विशिष्टाद्वैतिनां, सर्वेषामपि वैदिकमतस्थानामुपजीव्यास्सिद्धार्थव्युत्पत्तिसमर्थनस्वतःप्रामाण्यवर्णनादयो बहवो विषया उपलभ्यन्ते ।

एतद्ग्रन्थस्यातीव दुरवगाहत्वं समुचितोपकारविशेषश्च प्रबन्धादौ ग्रन्थकृतैव प्रतिपाद्यते । यथा—

‘ अमेघं सर्वेषां हतकुमतिगोत्रप्रसरणं

यतीन्द्रादेशैकप्रवणसुमनस्त्राणनिपुणम् ।

कठोरेष्वात्रेयान्वयतिलकरामानुजकृतं

कथायुद्धेष्वाविष्कुरुत निशितं न्यायकुलिशम् ’ ॥

इति । अतोऽत्र दुर्ग्रहाणां वादार्थानां सर्वेषां सुग्रहत्वाय वादार्थसारस्सङ्गृह्यते । अस्मिन्निबन्धने संहत्य त्रयोदश वादाः ।

तत्र प्रथमे सिद्धार्थव्युत्पत्तिसमर्थनवादे वेदान्तवाक्यानां सिद्धे ब्रह्मणि प्रामाण्यसिद्ध्यर्थं सर्वशब्दानां कार्य एव व्युत्पत्तिं वदन् प्राभाकरो व्युदस्यते ।

स ह्येवम्मुने—सिद्धे व्युत्पत्तिर्न भवितुमर्हति । शिक्षको जनः पित्रादिः कञ्चित्कालं अङ्गुलिनिर्देशपूर्वकं तत्तच्छब्दांस्तेषु तेष्वर्थेषु प्रयुङ्क्ते । चेष्टापरिज्ञानवान् व्युत्पत्त्यव्युत्पादकानां प्रवृत्तिं व्युत्पादनार्थां जानाति । ततश्चेष्टामन्तरेण केवलशब्देनापि स्वस्यार्थप्रतिपत्तिं दृष्ट्वा शब्दार्थयोस्संबन्धान्तरादर्शनात्परिशेषाद्बोध्यबोधकभावसम्बन्धेनैव अयं शब्द इममर्थं बोधयति' इति व्युत्पद्यत इति हि सिद्धार्थे व्युत्पत्तिर्वक्तव्या । सा तु न सङ्गच्छते । अङ्गुलिनिर्देशस्थले शब्दोऽर्थवद्बोध्यकोटौ निविशते ? उत निर्देशवद्बोधककोटौ ? इति विशये, निर्देशस्य बोधकताया उभयसम्प्रतिपन्नत्वात्तेनैव प्रतिपन्ने वस्तुनि शब्दस्याप्युपायत्वकल्पने प्रयोजनाभावादर्थवद्बोध्य एव शब्दः, न तु बोधक इति निर्णीयते ।

किञ्चाङ्गुलिनिर्देशेन प्रत्येकपदार्थव्युत्पादने शब्दानां प्रत्येकमर्थेषु सङ्गतिग्रहा-
दितरान्वितार्थ एव शक्तिरिति सिद्धान्तोऽपि विरुद्धेयत । अतो 'गामानय' इत्यादिवृद्ध-
व्यवहारेण व्युत्पत्तिबीजभूतेन कार्यान्वित एव शक्तिग्रहात्सिद्धान्तार्थे शक्तिर्नास्तीति ।

सिद्धान्तस्तु—व्युत्पादकस्य प्रयोजनाभिसन्धिनैव चेष्टया सह शब्दप्रयोगः ।
तत्रार्थस्य बोध्यत्वे हानोपादानादिरूपं प्रयोजनमस्ति । शब्दस्य बोध्यत्वे तन्नास्ति ।
अतश्शब्दस्य बोध्यत्वं न युक्तम् । यथा व्युत्पादनाय पर्यायशब्दप्रयोगो लोके दृश्यते, तथा
प्रकृते द्वयोर्बोधकत्वेऽपि सह प्रयोग उपपद्यते ।

अन्विताभिधानस्यापि न विरोधः । प्रथममर्थस्याभिधानं नास्ति । अपि तु
प्रत्येकमर्थानां स्मरणमात्रम् । अथ आकाङ्क्षायोग्यतादिपरामर्शः । अनन्तरमेव संहतानां
पदानां परस्परस्मारितार्थान्वितस्वार्थाभिधायकत्वम् । यथा—सिद्धपरत्वे विशेष्यपदं विशेष-
णपदस्मारितार्थान्वितस्वार्थाभिधायि, विशेषणपदं विशेष्यपदस्मारितार्थान्वितस्वार्थाभि-
धायि ; एवं कार्यपरत्वे कारकपदं क्रियान्वितस्वार्थाभिधायकम्, क्रियापदं कारका-
न्वितस्वार्थाभिधायकमिति विभाग इति—

इति सिद्धान्तव्युत्पत्तिसमर्थनवादः ॥

अथ स्वतः प्रामाण्यवर्णनवादे द्वितीये वेदस्य स्वतःप्रामाण्यसिद्धयर्थं कुमारिल-
मतानुसारेण ज्ञानानां स्वतःप्रामाण्यं निर्णीयते । अत्र मुख्यः पूर्वपक्षी नैयायिकः ।
अस्यायमाशयः—

अन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां गुणाधीनं प्रामाण्यं दोषाधीनमप्रामाण्यञ्च संवादिविसंवादिप्रवृ-
त्तिभ्यामनुमीयते इति न तयोरुत्पत्तौ ज्ञप्तौ वा स्वतस्त्वम् । विषयप्रकाशकत्वं परं
स्वभावः । तत्तु शिशुपापलाशादिषु वृक्षत्वमिव प्रमाणाप्रमाणयोः साधारणम् । शिशुपात्व-

पलाशत्वादिवत् प्रामाण्याप्रामाण्येऽसाधारणे । शिशुपायां पलाशत्वस्य, पलाशे शिशुपा-
त्वस्य च निवृत्तावपि वृक्षत्वानिवृत्त्या यथा शिशुपात्वाद्यपेक्षया वृक्षत्वमतिरिक्तसामान्य-
धर्मस्तद्वदेव प्रमाणज्ञानेऽप्रामाण्यस्य, अप्रमाणज्ञाने प्रामाण्यस्य च, निवृत्तावप्यर्थपरि-
च्छेदकत्वरूपस्य ज्ञानत्वस्यानिवृत्तेरनधिगताबाधितार्थप्रकाशकत्वरूपप्रामाण्यात् केवलार्थप्रका-
शकत्वरूपं ज्ञानत्वमतिरिक्तं सामान्यधर्म इति निश्चीयते । प्रामाण्यनिश्चयश्च गुणज्ञानात्,
संवादज्ञानात्, अर्थक्रियाकारित्वज्ञानाद्वा ; न तु स्वतः । अप्रामाण्यनिश्चयस्तु दोष-
ज्ञानात् । स्वतः प्रामाण्यवादिमते प्रामाण्यस्य व्यवसायात्मकज्ञानग्राहकेणानुमानेनैव
व्यवसायवद्भानाङ्गीकारेण प्रामाण्यसंशयो न स्यात् ; व्यवसायनिश्चयस्यैव प्रामाण्यनिश्चय-
रूपत्वात् । वेदस्थलेऽपि गुणात्प्रामाण्यस्योत्पत्तिः । अप्रामाण्यहेतोर्वक्तृदोषस्याभावाच्चा-
प्रामाण्यं शङ्कास्पदमपि । अतः प्रमा ज्ञानहेत्वतिरिक्तहेत्वधीना, कार्यत्वे सति तद्विशे-
षत्वात् ; अप्रमावत् इति ॥

राद्धान्तस्तु—ज्ञानानां प्रामाण्यं स्वत एव, न तु गुणात् । तथा हि—विशे-
षणविशेष्यतदुभयसम्बन्धात्मकं यथावस्थितार्थप्रकाशकत्वमेव प्रामाण्यम् । तच्च ‘अयं
घटः’ इति प्रमास्थल इव ‘इदं रजतम्’ इति भ्रमस्थलेऽपीदमाद्यंशे वर्तते । अतो बह्वेर्दा-
हकत्वमिव स्वाभाविकं तत् । ईदृशं प्रामाण्यमेव ज्ञानत्वम् ; न त्वतिरिक्तम् । अतिरि-
क्तत्वेऽपि ज्ञानसामान्यवृत्त्येव प्रामाण्यं ज्ञानत्वव्यञ्जकम् । यथा गोसामान्यवृत्त्येव सास्ना-
पुच्छकर्णशृङ्गादिसंस्थानं गोत्वव्यञ्जकम् ; यथा वैतेषामन्यतमापायेऽपि शेषं संस्थानं
गोत्वं व्यञ्जयति, तथा भ्रमस्थले विशेषणविशेष्ययोस्संसर्गाभावेऽपि शेषांशेन ज्ञानत्वव्यक्तौ
न दोषः । अतो ज्ञानत्वव्यञ्जकत्वात्प्रामाण्यस्य गोत्वव्यञ्जकसंस्थानस्येव साधारणत्व-
मुपपद्यते । प्रामाण्ये ज्ञानत्वव्यञ्जकताया अनभ्युपगमे ज्ञानत्व एव मानाभावः । निस्स्व-
भावत्वं ज्ञानस्य प्रसज्येत ।

शिशुपापलाशादिविशेषेषु वृक्षत्वमिव प्रमाणाप्रमाणसाधारणं ज्ञानत्वम् । तदवान्तर-
धर्मौ प्रमाणत्वाप्रमाणत्वे इति वक्तुं न शक्यते । दृष्टान्ते हि शाखास्कन्धादिसामान्य-
रूपं तत्तदसाधारणं पर्णस्पर्शादिभेदवत्त्वञ्चेति रूपद्वयमुपलभ्यते । तत्र सामान्यरूपेण

शाखादिना वृक्षत्वं, असाधारणरूपेण पर्णादिना शिशुपात्वादिकञ्चाभिव्यज्यताम् । ज्ञाने तु ज्ञानत्वव्यञ्जकसामान्याकारातिरेकेण प्रमाणत्वव्यञ्जकाकारविशेषो नोपलभ्यते । अतो ज्ञानत्वप्रमाणत्वयोस्सामान्यविशेषरूपत्वं नाभ्युपगन्तुं क्षमम् ।

प्रामाण्यग्रहोऽपि न गुणज्ञानादिना । अपि तु स्वत एव । ज्ञानेन हि विषये ज्ञाततात्त्व्यो धर्म उत्पाद्यते । स एवार्थप्रकाश इत्युच्यते । तज्जनकत्वमेव ज्ञानस्यार्थ-प्रकाशकत्वरूपं प्रामाण्यम् । अनया कार्यभूतया ज्ञाततया कारणभूतं ज्ञानमनुमीयते । ज्ञातताल्लिङ्गकानुमानेनैव व्यवसायगतप्रामाण्यस्यापि ग्रहः । व्यवसायविषयकज्ञानग्राह्य-त्वमेव स्वतो ग्राह्यत्वं प्रामाण्यस्य । एवमपि प्रामाण्यसंशयस्य न विरोधः । प्रामाण्यस्य ह्यपवादोऽप्रामाण्यम् । तच्छङ्कया प्रामाण्यसंशयः । अपवादशङ्काकळङ्करहितमेव प्रामाण्य-ज्ञानं प्रामाण्यसंशयविरोधि ; न तु प्रामाण्यज्ञानमात्रम् । अप्रामाण्ये निरस्ते चोत्सर्गिकं प्रामाण्यमवतिष्ठते ; यथा बीजस्याङ्कुरोत्पादनसामर्थ्यं स्वाभाविकं निश्चितमप्यग्निसंसर्गा-दिदोषसंशयात्संशयविषयो भवति ; दोषसंशये निरस्ते च स्वाभाविकसामर्थ्यनि-श्चयः । नैतावता बीजस्य अङ्कुरोत्पादनसामर्थ्यस्य स्वभाविकत्वमपैति ; तद्वदिहापि । अत उदाहृतमनुमानं हेत्वसिद्ध्यादिदोषग्रस्तमिति ॥

इति स्वतःप्रामाण्यवर्णनवादो द्वितीयः ॥

अथ तृतीये ख्यातिनिरूपणवादे तार्किकाभिमतता अन्यथाख्यातिः परमसिद्धान्त-भूतयथार्थख्यातिश्च समर्थ्यते । पूर्वपक्षिणो गुरुमतानुसारिणः, अनिर्वचनीयख्यातिवादि-नोऽद्वैतिनश्च । तत्र गुरुमतानुसारिणामयमाशयः—शुक्तिं दृष्ट्वा इदं रजतमिति ज्ञानमन्यथा-ख्यातिरिति न वक्तुं शक्यते ; तत्र रजतेन सहेन्द्रियसन्निकर्षाभावात् । किन्तु इदमिति पुरोवर्तिविषयकानुभवः । रजतमिति च पूर्वानुभूतरजतविषयकस्मृतिमात्रम् । स्मृतिवत्वे देशान्तरोल्लेखेन तत्र रजतमिति हि ज्ञानाकारेण भवितव्यमिति नाशङ्कनीयम् : दोषव-

शाद्देशान्तरानुल्लेखोपपत्तेः । रजतत्वस्य पुरोवर्तिभास्वरद्रव्यनिष्ठतया भानाभावेऽपि स्मर्यमाणरजतभेदाग्रहात्प्रवृत्त्युपपत्तिरिति । अत्रान्यथाख्यातिवादिनः—

‘ वादिनां विमतेर्बाध्याद्यवहारारम्भमोक्तिः ।

स्वारस्याच्चान्यथाख्यातिः प्रसिद्धा नापनीयताम् ॥ ’

इति वदन्ति । तथा हि—१. कश्चित् शब्दो नित्य इति वदति, अन्यश्च अनित्य इति । तयोरन्यतरोऽन्यथा गृह्णातीति वक्तव्यम् । तत्रापि ज्ञानद्वयाभ्युपगमेऽधिकरणभेदेन नित्यत्वानित्यत्वयोर्विरोधाभावाद्विवादविलयप्रसङ्गः । अतो वादिनां विवादकार्यकारणतयान्यथाख्यातिसिद्धिः ।

२. एवं इदं रजतमिति शुक्तिकां रजतमित्यध्यस्य समनन्तरं स एव सम्पन्नपरिशुद्ध-सामग्रीको नेदं रजतमिति जानाति । तत्र नेदं रजतमिति बाधकज्ञानमन्यथाख्यातिरूप-शुक्तिकारजतज्ञानस्य बाध्यस्याभावे न बाधकं भवति । तस्माद्बाध्यबाधकाभावान्यथानुपपत्त्या अन्यथाख्यातिसिद्धिः ।

३. एवं व्यवहारात्—स च व्यवहारो भेदाग्रहे स्वरूपज्ञानमात्रेण न भवितुमर्हति । नेयं शुक्तिरिति शुक्तिस्फुरणदशायामपि शुक्तिभेदाग्रहस्य स्वरूपज्ञानस्य चाङ्गीकार्यत्वात् । तत्र शुक्तौ शुक्तिभेदाग्रहेऽन्यथाख्यातिस्वीकारापत्तेः । अतश्शुक्तिभेदाग्रहात् नेयं शुक्तिरिति ज्ञानदशायामपि शुक्तिव्यवहारोदयप्रसङ्गः । अतो व्यवहारान्यथानुपपत्त्या अन्यथाख्यातिसिद्धिः ।

४. एवं भ्रान्तिशब्दो ज्ञानविशेषगोचरो भेदाग्रहेऽभावरूपे न भवति । अन्यथा सुषुप्तावपि भ्रान्तिशब्दः प्रयुज्येत । मिथ्याज्ञानं भ्रान्तिरिति च पर्यायौ । अतोऽप्यन्यथाख्यातिसिद्धिः ।

५. स्वारस्याच्च—शुक्तिं दृष्ट्वा इदं रजतमिति मे मतिरासीदिति विशिष्टज्ञानं प्रत्यक्षमवसीयते । नत्वसंसर्गो नानुभूत इति । असंसर्गाग्रहपक्षे तथैव किल ज्ञानाकारेण भाव्यम् । तस्माल्लोकप्रभितिस्वारस्याच्चान्यथाख्यातिसिद्धिरिति ।

अनिर्वचनीयख्यातिवादिनस्त्वेवमाहुः । स्वयंप्रकाशा ज्ञप्तिरेव परमार्थः । तस्या निर्धर्मकत्वादर्थेन सह विषयविषयिभावो नोपपद्यते । अर्थश्च सदसदनिर्वचनीयः । असच्चेन्न प्रतीयेत, सच्चेन्न बाध्येत । अतः ख्यातिबाधान्यथानुपपत्त्या अनिर्वचनीयत्वरूपं मिथ्यात्वमर्थस्य । ज्ञानज्ञेययोरध्यासाधिकरणत्वव्यतिरेकेण न सम्बन्धः कश्चिदपीति ।

अत्र सिद्धान्तः—पारोक्ष्यापारोक्ष्यानुभवत्वस्मृतित्वादिधर्माणामुपलब्धेर्ज्ञानं न निर्धर्मकम् । अतो विषयविषयिभावोपपत्तिः । प्रतीत्या सत्त्वं बाधेनासत्त्वञ्चेति संभवात्, नार्थस्यानिर्वचनीयत्वसिद्धिः । अर्थस्य पारमार्थ्यं विना रूपान्तरं नास्ति । उत्पत्तिमत्त्वादर्थक्रियाकारित्वाच्च सत्यत्वम् । विश्वमपि पञ्चीकृतभूतारब्धम् । अतः सर्वत्र सर्वं यथासंभवं विद्यते । शुक्तावपि रजतांशो मनाविद्यते । शुक्तयंशस्तु तत्र भूयान् । तत्र शुक्तिं दृष्ट्वा इदं रजतमिति शुक्तिभूयस्त्ववैकल्येन ग्रहः । नेदं रजतमिति तु शुक्तिभूयस्त्वसाकल्येन ग्रहः । तत्र नेदं रजतमिति शुक्तिभूयस्त्वे गृहीते, इदं रजतमिति शुक्तिभूयस्त्ववैकल्यज्ञानेन जायमाना प्रवृत्तिर्बाध्यते । बाध्यप्रवृत्तिकत्वमेव इदं रजतमिति ज्ञानस्य नेदं रजतमिति ज्ञानेन बाध्यत्वं नाम । तस्मात्सर्वं ज्ञानं यथार्थमिति ।

इति ख्यातिनिरूपणवादस्तृतीयः ॥

चतुर्थे स्वयंप्रकाशवादे भाट्टमुरारिमिश्रनैयायिकानां मतं निरस्य ज्ञानानां स्वयंप्रकाशत्वं समर्थ्यते । तत्र भाट्टाः—ज्ञानमतीन्द्रियम् । अयं घट इति ज्ञानेन विषये घटे ज्ञातताख्यः कश्चिद्धर्म उत्पाद्यते । स एव प्रकाश इत्युच्यते । तेन कार्यभूतेन प्रकाशेन कारणभूतं ज्ञानमनुमीयते । अतो ज्ञातताल्लिङ्गकानुमितिगम्यत्वाज्ज्ञानस्य न स्वयंप्रकाशत्वमिति वदन्ति ।

मिश्रादीनामयमाशयः—यथा वा चक्षुश्शक्तिविशेषाच्चाक्षुषज्ञाने विशेषमभ्युपेत्य रूपादावेव ज्ञातताख्यधर्मश्चाक्षुषज्ञानेनोत्पाद्यत इत्युच्यते ; न तु सत्यपि संयुक्तसमवा-

NĪTIMĀLĀ

By

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By

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श्रीः

॥ श्रीमते रामानुजाय नमः ॥

॥ नारायणायैः अनुगृहीता नीतिमाला ॥

॥ प्रथमो वादः ॥



वस्त्वाविरस्तु पद्माक्षं मम श्रीधरमच्युतम् ।

अबुद्धयधीनसन्दर्भभारतीमूर्धभूषणम् ॥

उन्मीलयन्ति चैतन्यचक्षुर्येऽहेतुकं मम ।

हृदि १सन्निदधीरंस्ते गुरवः करुणाश्रयाः ॥

वेलां लीलाविभूतिं प्रबलमितिशिलाराशिभिः पूर्वक्लृप्तां

ब्रह्माग्भोधेर्विषाणैः कुनयकुलमयैर्भेत्तुमुद्युज्जते ये ।

तान्वादीभान्सुतीक्ष्णैर्नयकुलकरजैः पाटयलक्ष्मणार्यः२

पञ्चास्यो रङ्गधामक्षितिधरनिलयो मङ्गलं मे विधत्ताम् ॥

मुनीन्द्रपारिजातोत्थसुनीतिकुसुमैरहम् ।

मालां ग्रथ्नामि रङ्गेशवरिवस्या३विधित्सया ॥

पौर्वापर्यस्य नियमः कर्मब्रह्मविचारयोः ।

तथा वेदान्तवाक्यानामप्रामाण्यनिराक्रिया ॥

१. सन्निदधुस्ते मे—पा०.

२. लक्ष्मणार्यः—पा०.

३. परिचर्या—पा०.

विवर्तपक्षक्षपणं परिणामनिराकृतिः ।

शक्तिविक्षेपभङ्गश्च ब्रह्मणो निर्णयस्तथा ॥

निर्णयः पुरुषस्यापि विधिरूपविनिर्णयः ।

मोक्षसाधननिर्णीतिर्मोक्षस्य च विनिर्णयः ॥

१दशार्थानधिकृत्येयं **नीतिमाला** प्रवर्तते ।

दोषानत्र तिरस्कृत्य गृह्यन्तां सूरिभिर्गुणाः ॥

ब्रह्मभागविचारस्य कर्मभागविचारानन्तर्यं सूत्रितम्—‘अथातो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा’ इति ।

तत्र केचिदाहुः—

त्रय्यन्तार्थविचारस्तु तदध्ययनपूर्वकः ।

तदधीनात्मलाभत्वात्त्रयीवाक्यविचारवत् ।

अनधीतवेदस्य विचारानुपपत्तेर्धर्मजिज्ञासाया वेदाध्ययनपूर्वकत्वं यथा, तथा ब्रह्मजिज्ञासाया अपि वेदान्ताध्ययनपूर्वकत्वमेव युक्तम् । अथाध्ययनक्रमानुरोधेन कर्मभागविचारानन्तर्यं ब्रह्मभागविचारस्योच्यते, तदयुक्तम् ; भिन्नाधिकारत्वात्कर्मब्रह्मभागयोः । स्वर्गादिसाधनभूतयागादिकर्मप्रतिपाद्य(दः?)कस्त्रयीभागो बुभुक्षाधिकारः । परब्रह्मतत्प्राप्तितदुपायभूततदुपासनविषयो वेदान्तभागो मुमुक्षाधिकारः । अतो मुमुक्षुभिर्वेदान्ताध्ययनानन्तरं ब्रह्मविचारः कर्तव्यः ।

यद्यप्युद्गीथादीनां कर्माङ्गित्वादिविचाराय^१ (कर्माङ्गित्वादिविचाराय?) उपासनचिन्तायाः शरीरके क्रियमाणायाः कर्मविचारोऽपेक्षितः, तथापि तेषामुपासनानां वीर्यवत्तत्त्वादिफलत्वाद्ब्रह्मविचारं कृत्वापि क्रियमाणः कर्मविचारो न विरोधमावहेत् ।

ननु चार्थज्ञानपर्यन्तमध्ययनं विदधतो विधेर्बलेन मुमुक्षुणापि प्रथमं कर्मविचारस्य कर्तव्यत्वात्तदानन्तर्यं ब्रह्मविचारस्यावर्जनीयमापतेत् । नैवम् ; अक्षरग्रहणमात्रपर्यवसानादध्ययन-

१. दर्शनार्थानिमान्वक्तुम्—पा०.

२. कर्माङ्गित्वादिविचाराय—पा०.

विधेः । तथाहि—अध्ययनानन्तरभावित्वादक्षरग्रहणस्य तदेव तस्य फलं भवितुमर्हति, न त्वनेन व्यवहितमर्थज्ञानम् । अक्षरग्रहणस्याप्यपुरुषार्थत्वादनुद्देश्यत्वमुच्यमानमर्थज्ञानस्यापि समानम् । नन्वर्थज्ञानस्य स्वरूपेणापुरुषार्थत्वेऽपि स्वर्गादिपुरुषार्थसाधनत्वेनोद्देश्यत्वं सम्भवतीति चेन्न ; अनुष्ठानसाध्यत्वात्स्वर्गादिः । अथानुष्ठानमर्थज्ञानस्यावान्तरव्यापार इति मतम् , तथासत्यध्ययनानन्तरभाविनोऽक्षरग्रहणस्य स्वर्गादिसाधनतयोद्देश्यत्वमुपपन्नमिति तदुत्तरकालभाविनी १ अर्थज्ञानानुष्ठाने २ तस्यावान्तरव्यापारतामनुभवत इति सन्तोष्यम् ।

गृहीतस्वाध्याये पुरुषेऽधीतवेदत्वप्रसिद्धेऽक्षाक्षरग्रहणफलमध्ययनम् । अधीतवेदो हि श्रोत्रियः । न हि गृहीतस्वाध्यायमश्रुतमीमांसं श्रोत्रिय इति न वदन्ति । व्यापकत्वाच्चाक्षरग्रहणमेव फलमध्ययनस्य । नह्यध्ययनसंस्कृतानि वेदवाक्यानि न ग्रहणगोचरतां भजन्ते । अध्ययनकर्मत्वमपि स्वाध्यायस्येप्सिततमत्वात् स्वशक्त्या धर्मार्थकामादिपुरुषार्थतत्साधनावबोधित्वात् स्वरूपेण जपपारायणादिनांभीष्टसाधनत्वाच्च । एवमाकारभेदेनोभयार्थत्वाद्विनिर्मुक्तविनियोगदोषो न स्यात् ; यथानेर्दाहभासमानत्वयोः ।

ननु अर्थज्ञानस्यावैधत्वे स्वाध्यायाध्ययनानन्तर्यं मीमांसाया न स्यात् ; ‘अधीत्य स्नायात्’ इति स्मृतिप्राप्तेन स्नानेन ग्रस्तावसरत्वात् । अतोऽर्थविचारस्याध्ययनानन्तर्यसिद्धये तत्कालोपनिपातिस्नानबाधार्थमनिच्छतोऽपि वैधत्वमङ्गीकरणीयमापद्येत ।

नैवम् ; अर्थविचारस्य रागप्राप्तत्वादेव न तावद्वैधत्वम् । स्नानस्मृतिस्तु न विचारं बाधितुं क्षमते ; रागबलाद् गुरुगृहान्निवृत्तेन कर्तुं शक्यत्वात् । अतः प्राक्तनीं स्थितिमुपजीव्य ३ विचारः प्रवर्तिष्यते । अध्ययनस्य समाप्तत्वात्सकलब्रह्मचारिवृत्तिनिवृत्तिः स्नातकस्य भवति । उत्तरक्रतुविधयोऽप्यविद्वत्त्वतया नैनमास्कन्दन्ति ।

अथवा अधीत्येत्यत्र त्वाप्रत्ययस्य पूर्वकालतामात्रविहितत्वात् स्नानस्मृतिविचारयोर्न विरोधः । अथवा अध्ययनार्थविचारयोरानन्तर्यनियमो नास्माकमवश्यम्भावी । अधीतवेदत्वमेव हि

१—२. द्विवचनान्ते इमे—पदे.

३. विचारे—पा०.

विचारस्यापेक्षितम् । तदध्ययनस्य पूर्वभावित्वमात्रेणापि सिद्धयतीति स्मृत्यनुसारेण स्वात्वापि विचारयिष्यति ।

ननु च ‘स्नातकस्सदृशीं भार्यां विन्देत्’ इति स्नानोत्तरकालस्य दारसङ्ग्रहणावरुद्धत्वात्तत्रापि न विचारः कर्तुं शक्यते । तर्हि कृतदारो विचारयिष्यति, तदा ह्यर्थार्जनवदर्थ-विचारोऽप्यहरहः क्रियमाणो न विरोधमावहेत् । अनर्थकानां हुम्फडित्यादिवाक्यानामध्ययन-स्यार्थज्ञानप्रयोजनत्वाभावाददृष्टफलत्वमक्षरग्रहणफलत्वं वाभ्युपेयं स्यात् । तदा विधिवैरूप्यं भवति । किञ्च सत्रबृहस्पतिसवादिषु क्षत्रियवैश्ययोरनधिकारात्तत्प्रतिपादकस्य वेदभागस्याध्ययनं वाक्षरग्रहणादिफलत्वं (ध्ययनमदृष्टफलमक्षरग्रहणादिफलं ?) वा स्यात् । न चाविधेय-त्वेऽर्थविचारो निर्निबन्धनस्यादिति वक्तुं शक्यम् ; अन्यनिबन्धनत्वादर्थविचारस्य । विधिरपि पुरुषार्थमविरोधयन्नेव प्रवृत्तिहेतुर्भवति । इहापि साङ्गाध्ययनेन वेदवाक्येभ्यः प्रयोजनवदर्थानामापाततः प्रतीतेस्तन्निर्णयफले विचारे पुरुषः स्वयमेव प्रवर्तते । अतः साङ्गाध्ययनादेवाक्षर-ग्रहणफलात्प्रयोजनवदर्थवबोधकामनाद्वारेणार्थविचारे प्रवृत्तेर्नार्थविचारो निर्निबन्धनः । अर्थ-ज्ञानस्याविधेयत्वेऽपि स्वाध्यायस्यार्थपरत्वं स्वतःप्रामाण्यन्यायसिद्धम् । अतो मुमुक्षोर्ब्रह्मवि-चारेऽध्ययनविधेरप्रतिबन्धकत्वेन मुमुक्षुणा अध्ययनानन्तरं ब्रह्मविचारः कर्तव्य इति कर्मविचारा-नन्तर्यं ब्रह्मविचारस्य न युक्तमिति ॥

अत्राभिधीयते—

यज्ञादीनां तु विद्याया उत्पत्तौ विनियोगतः ।

तेषामकरणे दोषबाहुल्यश्रवणादपि ॥

पूर्वकाण्डोदितन्यायसापेक्षत्वस्य दर्शनात् ।

विचारः कर्मणां हेतुर्ब्रह्मभागविचारणे ॥

यदुक्तमध्ययनविधेरक्षरग्रहणपर्यवसानान्न तन्निबन्धनोऽर्थविचारः, साङ्गाध्ययनादेव प्रयोजन-वदर्थानामापातप्रतीतेस्तन्निबन्धनोऽर्थविचार इति ; तत्सुष्ठुक्तम् ।

यत्तु कर्मज्ञानभागयोर्भिन्नाधिकारत्वान्मुमुक्षोर्न कर्मविचारापेक्षेति ; तदपेशलम् ; 'यज्ञेन दानेन तपसा अनाशकेन' इत्यादिभिर्यज्ञादीनां साधनत्वेन विद्योत्पत्तौ विनियोगात् । विविदिषन्ताति वचनाद्विविदिषायां यज्ञादीनामुपयोगः न विद्योत्पत्ताविति चेन्न ; विविदिषायास्साध्यत्वस्यैवासम्भवात् । पुरुषार्थस्तत्साधनं वा साध्यम् । न तावद्विविदिषा पुरुषार्थः ; नापि तत्साधनम् ; 'ब्रह्म वेद ब्रह्मैव भवति' इति विद्याया एव पुरुषार्थसाधनत्वश्रवणात् । अत एव विविदिषा अर्थसिद्धेति न सा पुरुषव्यापारेण साध्या । विविदिषन्तीति व्यपदेशस्तु अश्वेन जिगमिषतीतिवत् द्रष्टव्यः ॥

ननु वेदनस्य वा कथं कर्मसाध्यत्वम् ? तदपि १ प्रमाणाधीनम् । तत् स्वसामग्रीभूता-
द्वेदान्तवाक्याज्जायत इति किमिति कर्माण्यपेक्षते । तेषां वा कथं प्रमाणसामग्रीत्वम् ?
उच्यते—नास्माभिर्वाक्यजन्यं ज्ञानं यज्ञादिसाध्यमुच्यते । अपि तु उपासनात्मकं ज्ञानम् ।
तत्तु फलाभिसन्धिरहितैः परमपुरुषाराधनभूतैः कर्मभिः परिशुद्धान्तःकरणस्य जायत इति
युक्तं तस्य यज्ञादिसाध्यत्वम् ।

ननु अस्तूपासनस्य यज्ञादिसाध्यत्वात्तस्य तदपेक्षित्वम् ; कर्मब्रह्मविचारयोः कथं पौर्वा-
पर्यनियमः ? उच्यते—ब्रह्मस्वरूपतदुपासनतत्फलानि त्रीण्यपि शारीरके चिन्त्यन्ते । तत्रोपसान-
विचारवत्तदुपायभूतकर्मविचारोऽप्यपेक्षितत्वात्कर्तव्य एव । कर्मविचारस्य कर्तव्यतायां सत्यां
कर्मणां साधनत्वात्तद्विचारस्यैव प्राथम्यमुचितम् । २ अनिर्णीतं साधने साध्यनिर्णयानुपपत्तेः ।
अत एव पूर्वकाण्डे स्वर्गादिफलचिन्तायाः प्रागेव साधनभूतयागादिचिन्ता क्रियते । अतः
कर्मब्रह्मभागविचारयोः पौर्वापर्यमुपपन्नम् ।

किञ्च नित्यनैमित्तिकानां कर्मणामकरणे प्रत्यवायबाहुल्यं श्रुतिभिरुद्घुष्यते । अतो
मुमुक्षुरपि कर्मविचारे प्रथमं प्रयतते । अनर्थं परिहृत्यैव ह्यभ्युदये यतितव्यम् ।

अपि च सद्विद्यादहरविद्यादीनां भेदाभेदनिर्णयः कर्मभेदाभेदनिर्णयहेतुभिर्न्यायैः
शारीरके क्रियते । उक्तञ्च भगवता **बादरायणेन**—'हानौ तृपायनशब्दशेषत्वात्कुशाच्छन्द-

१. तदपि प्रमाणज्ञानम्—पा०.

२. अननुष्ठिते—पा०.

स्तुत्युपगानवत्तदुक्तम्^१ 'प्रदानवदेव तदुक्तम्^२' इत्यादि । अतः कर्मविचारस्यैव पूर्ववृत्तत्वं युक्तम् ।

केचिदाहुः—

अद्वितीयात्मविज्ञानमविद्याविनिवर्तकम् ।
 श्रूयते तस्य चोत्पत्तौ समाधिः कारणं श्रुतौ ॥
 औचित्याच्च विरुद्धत्वाच्छमादेः कर्मणामपि ।
 शमाद्यनन्तरं कर्तुं युक्तं ब्रह्मविचारणम् ॥

‘एकधैवानुद्वष्टव्यम्’ ‘तरति शोकमात्मवित्’ इत्यादिभिरद्वितीयात्मविज्ञानमपवर्गसाधनतया श्रुतम् । तस्य ‘शान्तो दान्त उपरतस्ति तिक्षुस्समाहितो भूत्वात्मन्येवात्मानं पश्येत्’ इति शमादीनां साधनत्वं च श्रुतम् । यज्ञादिकर्मणां साधनत्वश्रवणेऽपि करणेतिकर्तव्यताद्यनेकभेदगर्भत्वेनाद्वितीयत्वज्ञानं प्रति तेषां साधनभावो नोपपद्यते । शमादीनां तु सर्वेन्द्रियव्यापारोपरतिरूपाणां साधनत्वमुपपन्नम् । तस्माच्छमाद्यानन्तर्यं ब्रह्मविचारस्यौचित्यादु(द्युः)क्तम् ।

उच्यते—

दिव्यदेहविभूत्यादिविशिष्टब्रह्मवेदनम् ।
 साधनं त्वपवर्गस्य बह्वीषु श्रुतिषु श्रुतम् ॥
 तृतीयाश्रुतिसामर्थ्यात्तस्य कर्मादि साधनम् ।
 शमादयः परिकरा विरोधो न च विद्यते ॥

यदुक्तम्—अद्वितीयात्मविज्ञानमपवर्गस्य साधनमिति । तत्राद्वितीयत्वं विवेचनीयम् । यदि निर्विशेषत्वमद्वितीयत्वम्, तत्सर्वप्रमाणविरुद्धम् । अथ अनेकगुणविभूतिविशिष्टस्य ब्रह्मण एकत्वम्, तदभिमतमेव । तथाविधस्य ब्रह्मणो वेदनमपवर्गसाधनतया अस्मायते च—‘य एषो-

१. ब्र. सू. ३. ३. २६.

२. ब्र. सू. ३. ३. ४२.

ऽन्तरादित्ये हिरण्मयः पुरुषः दृश्यते हिरण्यश्मश्रुर्हिरण्यकेश आप्रणखात्सर्व एव सुवर्णस्तस्य यथा कप्यासं पुण्डरीकमेवमक्षिणी तस्योदिति नाम स एष सर्वेभ्यः पाप्मभ्य उदितः । उदेति ह वै सर्वेभ्यः पाप्मभ्यो य एवं वेद', 'भोक्ता भोग्यं प्रेरितारञ्च मत्वा', 'पृथगात्मानं प्रेरितारञ्च मत्वा जुष्टस्तस्तेनामृतत्वमेति' इत्यादिभिः । स्मर्यते च—

प्रशासितारं सर्वेषामणीयांसमणीयसाम् ।

स्वमाभं स्वप्नधीगम्यं विद्यात्तु पुरुषं परम् ॥

इति । एवं तर्हि 'एकधैवानुद्वष्टव्यम्' इत्यादिश्रुतेरर्थो वर्णनीयः । न वयं व्याख्यातारः । व्याख्यातञ्च भगवता भाष्यकारेण । तत्रैवानुसन्धध्वम् । एवंविधं ब्रह्मणो वेदनं कर्मानुष्ठानसाध्यमुक्तम् ।

यत्तु शमादीनां वेदनसाधनत्वं 'शान्तो दान्तः' इत्यादि श्रुतिसिद्धमिति; तदपि न । 'यज्ञेन दानेन' इति तृतीयया श्रुत्या यज्ञादेः साधनत्वेन विनियोगात् 'शान्तो दान्तः' इत्यादिवचनं शमादीनामनुग्राहकत्वाभिप्रायम् । व्यापारसाध्यानां कर्मणां तदुपरतिरूपाणां शमादीनाञ्च विरोधादेककार्यान्वयो न सम्भवतीत्येतदपि नास्ति; विषयभेदात् । विद्यासाधनभूतकर्मविषयो व्यापारः । अविहिताप्रतिषिद्धकाम्यनिषिद्धकर्मविषयाः शमादय इति । तदेवं कर्मसापेक्षत्वाद्ब्रह्मज्ञानस्य कर्मविचारानन्तरं ब्रह्मविचारः कर्तव्य इति सूत्रितम् ॥

इति नीतिमालायां ब्रह्मविचारस्य

कर्मविचारानन्तर्यनिर्णयाधिकारः प्रथमः ॥

श्रोः

नीतिमालायां

द्वितीयाधिकार आरभ्यते.



वेदान्तवाक्यानां ब्रह्मणि प्रामाण्यमसहमानाः केचिदाहुः—

सम्बन्धग्रहणापेक्षं शब्दादर्थवबोधनम् ।

तच्च कार्यार्थ एवेति न शास्त्रं ब्रह्मगोचरम् ॥

शब्दार्थयोस्सम्बन्धमजानतः पुरुषस्य शब्दो नार्थप्रत्ययहेतुर्भवति । सम्बन्धश्च वृद्धव्यवहारत एव ग्रहीतव्यः । व्यवहारश्च कार्यैकगोचरः । तथा हि—गामानयेत्यादि-प्रयोजकवाक्यश्रवणसमनन्तरं प्रवर्तमानं प्रयोज्यमुपलभ्य पार्श्वस्थो व्युत्पित्सुरेवमवधारयति, अहं कार्यावगतिरसमनन्तरं सर्वथा(दा?) प्रवर्ते । अस्याप्येतद्वाक्यश्रवणसमनन्तरं प्रवर्तमान-त्वादिह(दिदं?) वाक्यमस्य कार्यज्ञानबुद्धिमुत्पादयतीति । पुनर्गवानयनदर्शनात्कार्यविशेषं निश्चि-नोति । पुनरपि गां बधानेत्यादिप्रयोगभेदात्पदानामावापोद्वापवशेनावयवार्थमवगच्छति । एवं कार्यार्थ एव व्युत्पत्तेर्न सिद्धार्थे शब्दस्य प्रामाण्यम् ।

न च 'पुत्रस्ते जातः' इत्यादि वाक्यश्रवणसमनन्तरं मुखविकासादिलिङ्गेन पुत्रजन्मा-द्यर्थनिश्चयसम्भवात्कार्यार्थ एव सम्बन्धग्रहणमिति नियमो नास्तीति वाच्यम् ; तत्रापि सुखप्रसवाद्यर्थानां हर्षहेतूनां बहूनां सम्भवाद्धर्षहेतुविशेषनिश्चयहेतुत्वायोगान्मुखविकासादेः । एवं कार्यार्थ एव व्युत्पत्तेस्सर्वशब्दानां कार्य एव प्रामाण्यमिति सिद्धरूपे ब्रह्मणि न वेदान्त-वाक्यानां प्रामाण्यमिति ।

अत्राभिधीयते—

सिद्धार्थेष्वपि वाक्येषु सम्बन्धग्रहणं भवेत् ।

तस्मात्कार्यार्थ एवेति निर्बन्धो निर्निबन्धनः ॥

‘पुत्रस्ते जातः’ इत्यादि सिद्धार्थेष्वपि वाक्येषु सम्बन्धग्रहणं दृश्यत एव । यदुक्तं मुखविकासालिङ्गस्य हर्षहेतुविशेषनिश्चयहेतुत्वं न सम्भवतीति । तत्र ; एतद्वाक्यश्रवणानन्तरं पुत्रजन्मसाक्षात्कारेण तदसाधारणोत्सवत्व(त्सव ?)लिङ्गेन वा पुत्रजन्मविशेषनिश्चयसम्भवात् । साधारणतयावगतस्य हर्षहेतुविकासस्य पुत्रजन्मविशेषपर्यवसानसम्भवे सति अनिर्धारितहेत्वन्तरविषयत्वशङ्कानुपपत्तेश्च ।

किञ्च गामानयेत्यादिवाक्यसमनन्तरं प्रयोज्यस्यानुषङ्गिकानेकव्यापारसम्भवात्कार्यविज्ञानमपि सामान्येनावगतमिति तत्र विशेषावधारणं दुश्शकमेव । अपि चायं व्युत्पत्तिस्तुः स्वस्य प्रवृत्तिहेतुभूतायाः कार्यावगतेः पदार्थविज्ञानपूर्वकत्वावगमात्प्रयोज्यवृद्धस्यापि प्रयोजकवाक्यं पदार्थज्ञानमुत्पादयतीति निश्चिनोति । तस्माद् वृद्धव्यवहारेऽपि सिद्धार्थेष्वेव शब्दस्याभिधानमिति निश्चयः ।

किञ्च प्रकारान्तरेणापि शब्दार्थसम्बन्धग्रहणं प्रचुरमुपलभ्यते । तथाहि—बालाः पितृमातुलादिभिः शशिपशुपक्षिप्रभृतीनर्थानुद्दिश्य १‘एनमवेहि, २इममवगच्छ’ इत्यभिप्रायेणाङ्गुल्या निर्दिश्य तत्तच्छब्दैस्तेषु तेष्वर्थेषु प्रयुज्यमानैर्बहुशः शिक्षिताः, पुनश्च काव्यनाटकाभिज्ञपुरुषसकाशमुपगम्य पदविच्छेदं कृत्वा अस्य शब्दस्यायमर्थ इति शिक्षिताः, सर्वशब्दानामर्थमवगम्य तत्तच्छब्दश्रवणसमनन्तरं तेषु तेष्वर्थेषु स्वात्मनां बुद्धद्युत्पत्तिं दृष्ट्वा सम्बन्धान्तरादर्शनात्सङ्केतयितृपुरुषाज्ञानाच्च तेषु तेषु तेषां (तेषां तेषां?) शब्दानां प्रयोगो-बोधकत्वनिबन्धन इति निश्चिन्वन्ति । अतः सिद्धार्थे व्युत्पत्तेस्तस्मिन् शब्दस्य प्रामाण्यं सम्भवतीति वेदान्तवाक्यानि ब्रह्मणि प्रामाण्यं प्रतिपद्यन्त एव ।

अपर आहुः—

जगत्सावयवं कार्यं तच्च खोचितकर्तृकम् ।

कर्ता च कल्प्य एकोऽतो नासौ शास्त्रप्रमाणकः ॥

१. एनं शब्दम्—पा०.

२. इममर्थम्—पा०.

अस्तु सिद्धार्थेऽपि शब्दस्य प्रामाण्यम्, तथापि जगत्कारणभूत ईश्वरो न शास्त्रप्रमाणकः ; शास्त्रस्य प्रमाणान्तराप्तार्थविषयत्वात् । अनुमानेन जगत्कर्तृसिद्धेश्च । तथाहि—विचित्र-सन्निवेशं भूभूधरादिकं कृत्स्नं जगत् सावयवत्वात् कार्यं भवितुमर्हति । कार्यञ्च स्वोपादानोप-करणसम्प्रदानप्रयोजनाद्यभिज्ञकर्तृकं दृष्टम् । न चेदमशक्यक्रियमशक्योपादानादिविज्ञानम् ; कर्तृस्वरूपवज्ज्ञानशक्त्योरपि कार्यानुमेयत्वात् । न च जीवानां कर्तृत्वकल्पनं युक्तम् ; तेषां १प्रतिसर्गावस्थायां प्रलीनकरणकळेवरतया अचित्कल्पानां ज्ञानशक्तिवैकल्येन विचित्र-जगन्निर्मातृत्वानुपपत्तेः ।

यदपि तेषामेव कर्मद्वारेण कर्तृत्वमुपपद्यत इति, तदपि न ; युगपदुत्पद्यमान-२ जगन्निर्माणप्रयोजनतया अनन्तैर्जावैरेकदानुष्ठितानामनन्तानामेकरूपाणां कर्मणां सम्भवे प्रमाणाभावात्ततो विलक्षणज्ञानशक्तियुक्त एकः कर्ता भवितुमर्हति ।

अथ विचित्रसन्निवेशगोपुरप्राकारादेर्विलक्षणज्ञानशक्तियुक्तानेककर्तृकत्वदर्शनादत्यन्त-विचित्ररचनस्य जगतो निरतिशयज्ञानशक्तियुक्तबहुकर्तृकत्वकल्पनं युक्तमिति चेत्, तच्चा-युक्तम् ; कर्तृकल्पनायामनेककल्पनादेककल्पनस्यैव युक्तत्वात् । न च जगत्कर्तुरनुमेयत्वे व्याप्तिबलेन कर्मवश्यत्वादिप्रसङ्गः ; तेषां कर्मवश्यत्वादीनां जगत्करणेऽनुपयोगात् । अनुप-योगा(गिः)नामपि व्याप्तिमात्रेण पक्षप्राप्तौ सर्वानुमानोच्छेदप्रसङ्गाच्च । अतो जगत्कर्तुरनु-मानसिद्धत्वान्न वेदान्तप्रमाणकं ब्रह्मेति ।

अत्रोच्यते—

जगतः कर्तृमत्त्वञ्च सिद्धयत्येवानुमानतः ।

विशिष्टकर्तृकत्वन्तु शास्त्रादेवावगम्यते ॥

यदुक्तं विचित्ररचनस्य जगत्कार्यस्य विचित्रलक्षणैककर्तृकत्वं सिद्धयतीति, तदयुक्तम् ; विचित्र-रचनस्य रथगोपुरप्रासादादेर्बहुकर्तृकत्वदर्शनात् । तत्र यदुक्तमनेककर्तृकल्पनादेककल्पनं लघीय

१. प्रतिसर्गः—प्रलयः.

२. युगपदुत्पद्यमान—पा०.

इति, तदप्यसाधु ; पूर्वोक्तादेव च हेतोर्बहुकर्तृकल्पनस्यैव युक्तत्वात् । कार्यसिद्धये हि कर्तृमत्त्वं कल्प्यते तद्यथोपपद्यते तथैव हि कल्पनीयम् ।

किञ्च अनुमानेन जगत्कर्तारं साधयतो यत्कर्तुरकर्मवश्यत्वसर्वज्ञत्वादिकं सिद्धाधयिषितम्, तदपि विरुद्धमापतेत्; व्याप्तिबलेन तस्य कर्तुः कर्मवश्यत्वाल्लक्षणत्वादेः साधकत्वाद्धेतोः । तत्र यदुक्तं सपक्षे सहस्रदृष्टानां धर्माणां दर्शनमात्रेण पक्षे प्राप्तौ सर्वानुमानोच्छेदप्रसङ्ग इति ; नैतदस्ति । व्याप्तिबलेन पक्षे प्रसज्यमानानां येषां प्रमाणान्तरेण न प्रतिहतिर्भवति, तेषामेवानुमापकत्वाल्लिङ्गस्य ।

अथ कर्मवश्यस्य अल्पज्ञस्य सकलजगन्निर्माणानुपपत्तेः पक्षधर्मत्वबलादेवाकर्मवश्यः सर्वज्ञ एव जगत्कर्ता सेत्स्यतीति मतम्, तदप्ययुक्तम् ; अकर्मवश्यस्य शरीरेन्द्रियाद्युपकरणाभावेन जगत्कर्तृत्वानुपपत्तेः । शरीरेन्द्रियाद्युपकरणरहितस्यापि सङ्कल्पमात्रेण कर्तृत्वमुपपद्यत इति चायुक्तम् ; अशरीरस्य सङ्कल्पायोगात् । अत एवेच्छानिमित्तशरीराद्युपकरणवान् जगत्करोतीत्युत्प्रेक्षितुमपि न शक्यम् ।

अथ नित्यानि जगत्कर्तुः शरीरेन्द्रियाद्युपकरणानि ; अतस्तस्य जगत्करणं सुशकमिति मन्यीत, तदपि न साधीयः ; नित्यत्वेन तस्य शरीरादीनां सावयवत्वहेतोरनैकान्तिकत्वात् । अतोऽनुमानेन जगत्कर्ता न सेत्स्यति । जगतो विलक्षणैककर्तृमत्त्वे सिद्धेऽपि निमित्तोपादानशक्तियुक्तेनैकेन पुरुषेणैकदैव सङ्कल्पपूर्वकं निखिलजगत्करणं शास्त्रैकप्रमाणकमिति वेदान्तवेद्यं ब्रह्म ।

अन्ये पुनराहुः—

प्रयोजनपरं वाक्यं प्रमाणं नेतरद्भवेत् ।

तत्प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्तिभ्यामेव साध्यं प्रयोजनम् ॥

त्रय्यन्तस्याक्रियार्थत्वान्न स्यात्तस्य प्रमाणता ।

सर्वं हि वाक्यजातं प्रयोजनपर्यवसाय्येव प्रमाणं भवति ; लोके प्रयोजनशून्यानां प्रमाणतया क्वचिदप्यनुपलब्धेः ।

ननु प्रत्यक्षादीनि हि हेयोपादेयापेक्ष(योपेक्ष?)णीयस्य(यस्व?)विषयावबोधनं कुर्वन्ति प्रमाणानि दृश्यन्ते । शब्दस्य को विशेषः, येन प्रयोजनवदर्थवबोधकत्वमाश्रीयेत । उच्यते— परप्रत्यायनार्थं हि वाक्यं प्रयुज्यते । परश्च न निष्प्रयोजनानि वाक्यानि श्रावयितुं शक्यः । तस्मात्प्रयोजनशून्यानामुदय एव दुर्लभः । अतः शास्त्रं प्रयोजनपर्यवसाय्येव । प्रमाणप्रयोजनञ्च द्विविधम् । सुखं दुःखनिवृत्तिश्चेति । तद् द्विविधं प्रयोजनं प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्तिभ्यामेव लभ्यते ; यथा कामिनीपरिष्वङ्गेन कामावाप्तिः, अपथ्यसेवानिवृत्तेरभिमान्धनिवृत्तिः; यथा(तथा?)ज्योतिष्टोमेन स्वर्गावाप्तिः, अपगोरणनिवृत्त्या शतयातनानिवृत्तिः । अतः प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्तिसाध्यं प्रयोजनम् ।

न च वाच्यं 'स्ववेश्मनि निधिरस्ति' 'नायं सर्पः' इत्यादिवस्तुस्वरूपोपदेशपरवाक्य-श्रवणसमनन्तरं निधिसद्भावसर्पनिवृत्तिभ्यां हर्षभयनिवृत्तिदर्शनात्तेषामपि वाक्यानां प्रयोजनपर्यवसानमस्तीति । तत्राप्यज्ञातस्य निधिसद्भावादेः पुरुषार्थहेतुत्वाभावाज्ज्ञानविधिपरत्वस्यैवाश्रयणीयत्वात् । तस्मात्प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्तिभ्यामेव पुरुषार्थ इति प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्त्यन्वयविरहिणां वेदान्त-वाक्यानां प्रामाण्यं दुर्लभमिति, न वेदान्तप्रमाणं ब्रह्मेति ।

अत्र ब्रूमः—

निध्याद्यवगतेश्चापि सिद्धयत्येव प्रयोजनम् ।

तस्माद्वेदान्तवाक्यानां प्रामाण्यमनपोदितम् ॥

यत्तावदुक्तं प्रयोजनपर्यवसाय्येव शब्दः प्रामाणमिति, (तत् ?) तथैव । यत्पुनरुक्तं प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्तिभ्यामेव प्रयोजनावाप्तिरिति, नैतन्नियतम् ; निधिसद्भावादिप्रतिपादनपराणामपि वाक्यानां पुरुषार्थावाप्तिहेतुत्वदर्शनात् ।

तत्र यदुक्तं अज्ञातस्य निधिसद्भावादेः पुरुषार्थहेतुत्वाभावेन ज्ञानविधिपरत्वमेवाश्रयणीयमिति, तदयुक्तम् ; ज्ञानस्यापुरुषतन्त्रत्वेन विधेयत्वासम्भवात् । न च ज्ञानार्थव्यापारस्य विधेयत्वेन तेषां ज्ञानविधिपरत्वं युक्तं वक्तुम् ; तत्तद्वाक्यजन्येन निधिसद्भावादिज्ञानेन हर्षभयनिवृत्त्योर्दर्शनात् । बालातुराद्युपच्छन्दनवाक्यवदसत्येऽप्यर्थे निधिसद्भावादिज्ञानमात्रेण हर्षादीनां सम्भवान्नार्थपरत्वं सिद्धयतीति च न शङ्कनीयम् ; उपच्छन्दनवाक्येऽप्यर्थसद्भावभ्रान्त्या

पुरुषार्थवाप्तिः । अत एव ह्यर्थस्याभावे निश्चिते सति तदानीमेव हर्षादयो निवर्तन्ते । अतो निध्यादिसद्भावप्रतिपादनपराणां वाक्यानां पुरुषार्थहेतुत्वं सम्भवत्येव ।

किञ्च 'विश्वजिता यजेत' 'न कलञ्जं भक्षयेत्' इत्यादीनां प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्तिपराणां वाक्यानां क्रियाफलसम्बन्धाश्रवणात्प्रथमं प्रयोजनान्वयो न ज्ञायते । यदा विज्ञायते, तथा-
(दाः) पि प्रयोजनं मन्दतरञ्च । वेदान्तवाक्योक्तं तु निरतिशयानन्दं ब्रह्म श्रवणवेळायामेव प्रतिपन्नमिति तेषां वाक्यानामेव साक्षात्प्रयोजनपर्यवसानमिति वेदान्तवाक्यानां ब्रह्मणि प्रामा-
ण्यमुपपन्नम् ।

इति नीतिमालायां वेदान्तप्रामाण्यनिर्णयाधिकारो द्वितीयः ॥

—

श्रीः

नीतिमालायां तृतीयाधिकार आरभ्यते.



इदानीं ब्रह्मस्वरूपं निरूप्यते ॥ अत्र केचिदाहुः—

जगज्जन्मस्थितिध्वंसकारणं ब्रह्मशब्दितम् ।

तच्च सच्चित्सुखाद्वैतस्वरूपं श्रुतिषूदितम् ॥

“यतो वा इमानि भूतानि जायन्ते, येन जातानि जीवन्ति, यत्प्रयन्त्यभिसंविशन्ति, तद्विजिज्ञासस्व तद्ब्रह्म’ इति इति श्रुत्या जगत्कारणं ब्रह्मेति प्रतिपादितम् । तच्च ‘सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं ब्रह्म’, ‘विज्ञानमानन्दं ब्रह्म’ ‘आनन्दो ब्रह्म’ इति श्रुतिभिः सच्चिदद्वितीयानन्दस्वरूपं प्रतिपादितम् । एवं निर्विशेषस्वयम्प्रकाशसुखस्वरूपस्य सन्मात्रस्य ब्रह्मण एव अनाद्यज्ञानतिरोहितस्वरूपतया सुख्यहं, दुःख्यहं, देहोऽयं, मनुष्योऽयं, घटोऽयं, पटोऽयम्, इत्याद्यान्तरबाह्यवि-विधाध्यासोपादानतया जगत्कारणत्वमुपपद्यत इति । ते प्रतिक्षिप्यन्ते ।

सत्तादेर्दुर्निरूपत्वात्तिरोधेरप्यसम्भवात् ।

कारणत्वस्य वा सिद्धेः पक्षोऽयं नोपपद्यते ॥

सच्चित्सुखाद्वितीयस्वरूपं ब्रह्मेति वदद्भिः सदादिशब्दानां ब्रह्मणि प्रवृत्तौ निमित्तानि वक्तव्यानि । न तानि वक्तुं शक्यन्ते ; सत्तादीनां दुर्निरूपत्वात् । तथाहि—न तावत्सत्ता जातिः सद्व्यक्तिभेदाभावात् । न च प्रमायाः सम्बन्धयोग्यत्वं सत्त्वम् ; ब्रह्मणः प्रमेयत्वानङ्गीकारात् । अथोसद्व्यावृत्तिः सत्त्वमिति चेत्, तदपि न । सदसद्विलक्षणस्य प्रपञ्चस्याप्यसद्व्यावृत्तत्वेन सत्त्वप्रसङ्गात् । अथ सत्तैव सच्छब्दस्यार्थो वर्ण्यते, तदप्यसाधु ; लोके सत्तायां धर्मत्वेन प्रसिद्धत्वात् ब्रह्मणः कञ्चन धर्मिणं प्रति धर्मत्वप्रसङ्गात् । तस्मात्सुदुर्निरूपम् ।

एवं चैतन्यगुणयोगिनि वस्तुनि चिच्छब्दस्य प्रसिद्धेः ब्रह्मणश्चैतन्यगुणानङ्गीकारा-
त्तस्य चित्त्वमपि न निरूपणमर्हति । यदि तु चैतन्यमेव चिच्छब्दवाच्यं स्यात्, तदा प्रमाण-
ज्ञानानामपि ब्रह्मत्वं भवेत् । अथ प्रमाणज्ञानं न चैतन्यम्, अपि त्वन्तःकरणवृत्तिरूपत्वाज्जड-
रूपमिति चेत्, तर्ह्यन्तःकरणवत्तत्सादपि विषयोपलब्धिर्न स्यात् । अथ जडव्यावृत्तत्वं चित्त्वम्,
तच्च स्वाधीनस्वप्रकाशत्वमिति मतम् ; तच्च नैवम् ; स्वव्यतिरिक्तप्रकाशानभ्युपगमेन स्वाधीन-
प्रकाशत्वाभावात् । तस्माच्चित्स्वरूपत्वं ब्रह्मणो दुर्विवेचम् ।

एवं सुखरूपत्वमपि ब्रह्मणो न निरूपयितुं शक्यम् । सुखं मे स्यात्, सुखी भूयास-
मिति ह्यात्मगुणत्वेन तदनुभूयते । तथा पदार्थविदोऽपि बुद्धिसुखदुःखेच्छादीनामात्मगुणत्व-
माचक्षते । तस्मात्तस्य गुणत्वप्रसिद्धेर्न सुखरूपं ब्रह्म भवितुमर्हति ।

अथ अनुकूलत्वं सुखरूपत्वमिति मतम्, तदा (थाः) पि वक्तव्यं, ब्रह्म कस्यानुकूलं
भवतीति । न तावज्जीवानाम् ; ब्रह्मव्यतिरिक्तानां तेषामनभ्युपगमात् । स्वस्यैवेति चेत्, तत्रापि
वक्तव्यम्, किमिदमानुकूल्यन्नामः । भोग्यत्वमिति चेत्, तदपि न सिद्धयेत् ; स्वस्य भोक्तृत्वा-
भावेन भोग्यत्वानुपपत्तेः । दुःखनिवृत्तिरूपत्वमिति च न वाच्यम् ; ब्रह्मणो निवृत्तिरूपत्वेना-
भावात्मकत्वप्रसङ्गात् । निरपेक्षत्वं सुखरूपत्वमिति चायुक्तम् ; काष्ठलोष्टादीनामपि निरपे-
क्षत्वेन सुखरूपत्वप्रसङ्गात् । तस्मात्सुखरूपत्वमपि ब्रह्मणो दुरुपपादम् ।

यदिदमद्वितीयत्वं ब्रह्मण उक्तं, तदपि चिन्त्यम् । किं सदृशद्वितीयरहितत्वं तद्युक्तम् ;
ब्रह्मद्वित्वासम्भवात् । स्वकार्येण प्रपञ्चेन सद्वितीयं न भवतीत्यद्वितीयं ब्रह्मेति चेत्, तदपि न
विरुद्धम् ; कार्यकारणयोरेकत्वात् ।

अथ 'सदेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीत्, एकमेवाद्वितीयम्' इति प्रतिसर्गावस्थायां सन्मात्रस्य
ब्रह्मणः सजातीयविजातीयस्वगतभेदरहिततयाभिधानात् 'नेह नानास्ति किञ्चन' 'अथात
आदेशो नेति नेति' ब्रह्मणि नानात्वनिषेधात् 'वाचारम्भणं विकारो नामधेयं मृत्तिकेत्येव
सत्यम्' इति घटादिकार्यस्यासत्यताप्रतिपादनमुखेन ब्रह्मकार्यस्य प्रपञ्चस्य मिथ्यात्वप्रतिपाद-
नात् 'सर्वं खल्विदं ब्रह्म' इति बाधितार्थसामानाधिकरण्यात्, 'तरति शोकमात्मवित्' इति प्रमा-
त्रादिलक्षणस्य संसारस्य ज्ञाननिवर्त्यत्वोपदेशेन मिथ्यात्वावगमाच्च निर्धूतनिखिलविशेषमद्वि-

तीयं ब्रह्मेत्यभिधीयते । न च भेदावलम्बिभिः शास्त्रैः प्रत्यक्षादिभिश्चासां श्रुतीनां विरोधः शङ्कनीयः ; भेदवासनादोषमूलत्वेन तासां दौर्बल्यात् । प्रत्युताद्वैतश्रुतीनां द्वैतनिषेधपरत्वेन परत्वात्ताभिर्भेदावलम्बिनां शास्त्राणामेव बाध्यत्वं भवति ।

अनुमानादप्यद्वितीयत्वं प्रपञ्चमिथ्यात्वञ्च साधयितुं शक्यम् । तथाहि—विगीतो भेदव्यवहारोऽद्वैतवस्त्ववलम्बनः, भेदव्यवहारत्वात्, चन्द्रभेदव्यवहारवत् ; विप्रतिपन्नः प्रपञ्चो मिथ्या, दृश्यत्वाच्छुक्तिरूप्यतादात्म्यवत् इति । तस्मान्निरस्तविशेषमद्वितीयं ब्रह्मेति ।

तदसाम्प्रतम् ; प्रकृतिप्रत्ययात्मकपदसङ्घातरूपवाक्यस्यानेकपदार्थसंसर्गावबोधकत्वेन कस्यचिदपि वाक्यस्य निर्विशेषवस्तुप्रतिपादनासामञ्जस्यात् । शास्त्रं तावन्नाद्वैतवस्तुनि प्रमाणम् । ‘सदेव सौम्येदमग्र आसीत्’ ‘एकमेवाद्वितीयम्’ इति वाक्यमपि सविशेषमेव वस्तु प्रतिपादयति । तथाहि—अग्र इति कालविशेषः प्रतीयते । आसीदिति क्रियाविशेषः । इदं सदिति जगतः सदात्मकत्वम् । एकमेवेति नामरूपविभागाभाववचनेन सच्छब्दवाच्यस्य ब्रह्मण उपादानत्वम् । अद्वितीयमित्यधिष्ठात्रन्तरनिराकरणेन निमित्तत्वम् । अत एवानन्तशक्तियोगश्च । अतो नानेन निर्विशेषवस्तुसिद्धिः ।

‘नेह नानास्ति किञ्चन’ इति वाक्यमपि तत्त्वोपदेशपरमुपासनोपदेशपरं वा । उभयथापि सर्वभेदनिषेधो नानेन शक्यते वक्तुम् । प्रमात्राद्यभावेनोपदेशानुपपत्तेः । अत इदं वाक्यमब्रह्मात्मकनानावस्तुनिषेधपरम् । उपबृक्षितञ्चैतद्भगवत् ।

‘न तदस्ति विना यत्स्यान्मया भूतञ्चराचरम्^१’ इति ।

‘अथात आदेशो नेति’ इति वाक्यमपि ब्रह्मणः पूर्वं प्रस्तुतमाहात्म्येयत्तानिषेधपरम् ; उत्तरत्रापि तन्माहात्म्यकथनाय (नात् ।?) निरणैषीच्च भगवान्बादरायणः ‘प्रकृतैतावत्त्वं हि प्रतिषेधति ततो ब्रवीति च भूयः^२’ इत्यत्र । अत इदमपि वाक्यं न निर्विशेषपरम् ।

१. गी. X. ३९.

२. ब्र. सू. ३. २. २१.

‘वाचारम्भणं विकारो नामधेयं मृत्तिकेत्येव सत्यम्’ इति वाक्यमपि न कार्यघटा-
देर्मिथ्यात्वं ब्रूते, किन्तु तस्य कारणभूतमृदद्रव्यादनन्यत्वं वक्ति । अतस्तेनापि प्रपञ्चस्य
ब्रह्मकार्यतया ब्रह्मात्मकत्वमवगतमिति न ब्रह्मणो निर्विशेषत्वमवगम्यते । नापि प्रपञ्चस्य
मिथ्यात्वम् । अन्येषामप्येवञ्चातीयानामियमेव गतिः ।

यदुक्तं भेदावलम्बिनां शास्त्रप्रत्यक्षाणां भेदवासनादोषमूलत्वेन दौर्बल्यात्तेषां तैर्बाध्य-
त्वमिति, तदयुक्तम् ; भेदवासनाया दोषत्वे प्रमाणाभावात् । भेदज्ञानस्य भ्रमत्वेन तज्जन्य-
वासनाया दोषत्वं निश्चीयत इति चेन्न ; अन्योन्याश्रयणात् । भेदज्ञानस्य भ्रमत्वे निर्णति
तद्वासनाया दोषत्वनिर्णयः, तद्वासनाया दोषत्वे निर्णति भेदज्ञानस्य भ्रमत्वनिर्णय इति ॥

अथ वेदान्तवाक्यानां निरस्तसमस्तभेदवस्तुपरत्वनिश्चयेन भेदज्ञानस्य भ्रमरूपत्वनिर्णय
इति नान्योन्याश्रयणमिति मतम्, तदा चक्रकाश्रयापत्तिः । भेदावलम्बिनां भेदवासनामूलत्वेन
दौर्बल्ये निर्णति वेदान्तवाक्यानां निरस्तसमस्तभेदवस्तुपरत्वनिश्चयः ; तेषां निरस्तसमस्तभेद-
वस्तुपरत्वनिश्चये भेदज्ञानस्य भ्रमत्वनिश्चयः ; भेदज्ञानस्य भ्रमत्वनिर्णये तद्वासनाया दोष-
मूलत्वेन भेदावलम्बिनां प्रमाणानां दौर्बल्यमिति ।

यत्पुनरुक्तमद्वैतवस्तुपराणां शास्त्राणां द्वैतनिषेधपरत्वेन बलीयस्त्वमिति, तदप्यसङ्ग-
तम् ; निषेधात्मकस्य परस्यैवाप्रामाण्यदर्शनात् । चन्द्रैकत्वे ज्ञाते सत्येवावष्टम्भादिना अनेकचन्द्र
इति मनीषा समुन्मिषति । न च सा प्रमाणम् । तस्माद्भेदावलम्बिनां प्रमाणानां न दौर्बल्यम् ॥

यदुक्तं ‘सर्वं खल्विदं ब्रह्म’ इति बाधितार्थसामानाधिकरण्याद्विलक्षणस्य प्रपञ्चस्य
मिथ्यात्वं सिद्धयति इति, तदपि न सिद्धयेत् ; तज्जलानीति तज्जत्वतलत्वतदनत्वैः प्रपञ्चस्य
ब्रह्मात्मकत्वोपदेशपरत्वात् ; नेदं रजतमिति वद्वाधस्याप्रतिसन्धानाच्च ।

यत्तु प्रपञ्चस्य ब्रह्मज्ञाननिवर्त्यत्वोपदेशान्यथानुपपत्त्या मिथ्यात्वमवगम्यत इति, तदपि
मनोरथमात्रम् ; वाक्यजन्यज्ञानस्य संसारनिवर्तकत्वाभावात् । उपासनोपदेशपरत्वात्तेषां
वाक्यानाम् । तस्माच्छ्रुतिभिर्वा श्रुत्यन्यथानुपपत्त्या वा न निर्विशेषवस्तुसिद्धिः ।

यच्चेदमद्वितीयत्वे प्रपञ्चमिथ्यात्वे चानुमानद्वयमुपन्यस्तम् ; तत्सर्वप्रमाणबाधितत्वा-
त्कालात्ययापदिष्टम् । किञ्चैवमप्यनुमानं शक्यम्—असद्ब्रह्म, अदृश्यत्वाच्छशविषाणवत् ;
विप्रतिपन्नः प्रपञ्चस्त्यः, अबाधितत्वादात्मवदिति ।

किञ्च 'सर्वज्ञस्सर्ववित्' 'सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं ब्रह्म' इत्यादिभिर्वस्तुस्वरूपोपदेश-
परैश्शास्त्रैः ज्ञानादिगुणविशिष्टतया ब्रह्मणोऽवगतस्य निर्विशेषत्वमनुपपन्नम् । न चैते
गुणाः काल्पनिकास्सत्यवचनाः ; प्रमाणान्तरात् (राद ?) प्राप्तानां तेषामुपदेशानुपपत्तेः ।

अथ स्यात् 'सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं ब्रह्म' इति न विशिष्टं ब्रह्म प्रतिपादयति ; अख-
ण्डैकरसब्रह्मस्वरूपप्रतिपादनपरत्वात्तस्य । तात्पर्ये हि शब्दः प्रमाणं भवति । समानाधि-
करणपदसमूहात्मकस्य वाक्यस्यार्थैकत्वे तात्पर्यमिति सर्वसम्मतम् । न च विशिष्टवस्तुवैक्यस्य
प्रतिपादनं सामानाधिकरण्यस्य युक्तम् ; विशेषणसम्बन्धे प्रमाणाभावात् । इदमेव विशेषण-
सम्बन्धं विशिष्टैक्यञ्च प्रतिपादयतीति न युक्तम् ; वाक्यभेदप्रसङ्गेनोभयविधानस्या-
शक्यत्वात् । विशिष्टैक्यप्रतिपादने विशेषणानां व्यावर्तकत्वस्वाभाव्याद्विशेषणभेदेन विशेष्य-
भेदप्रसङ्गः । नीलमुत्पलमित्यादिषु नीलिमादिसम्बन्धस्य प्रत्यक्षसिद्धत्वाद्विशिष्टैक्यप्रति-
पादनमविरुद्धम् । सत्यादिपदानां स्वार्थप्रहाणेन वस्तुस्वरूपोपस्थापनपरत्वे लक्षणादोषो
भवतीत्युत्प्रेक्षा चायुक्ता ; प्रामाण्यानुगुणत्वाल्लक्षणायाः । न च पदानां पर्यायता ; सत्य-
त्वादिविरोध्यसत्यत्वादिव्यावृत्तिरूपब्रह्मस्वरूपोपस्थापनेन तेषामर्थवत्त्वात् । अत एव तेषां
प्रवृत्तिनिमित्तभेदोऽप्युपपन्नः ; न च व्यावृत्तीनां धर्मत्वेन ब्रह्मणः सविशेषणत्वप्रसङ्गः ;
सकलेतरव्यावृत्तिरूपत्वाद्ब्रह्मणः ; यथा गुणजातिक्रियादिविशेषाणां स्वेतरविशेषव्यावृत्तिः
स्वरूपमेव भवति । तस्मादेतद्वाक्यं निर्विशेषं वस्तु प्रतिपादयतीति न सगुणब्रह्मप्रतिपादन-
परत्वमस्य वाक्यस्येति ॥

तदेतदसाम्प्रतम् ; विशिष्टवस्तुवैक्यपरत्वादेव समानाधिकरणपदसङ्घातरूपवाक्यस्य
प्रामाण्योपपत्तेः । न च वाक्यस्योभयविधानम्, येन वाक्यभेदो भवेत् । व्युत्पत्तिवशेन पदा-
नामेव विशिष्टार्थाभिधायित्वात् । न हि नीलमित्युक्ते नीलिमगुण एव प्रतीयते, किन्तु
तद्विशिष्टं द्रव्यम् । सत्यमुभयोरपि प्रतीतिरस्ति । गुण एव शब्दात्प्रतीयते । अर्थस्य [द्रव्य-
स्य ?] प्रतीतिस्तु तत्सामर्थ्यसिद्धेति न युक्तं वक्तुम् ; नियमहेत्वभावात् । तस्मात्पदैरेव
विशिष्टार्थाभिधानाद्विशिष्टैक्यमेव सामानाधिकरण्यावसेयम् ।

न च विशेषणभेदेन विशेष्यभेदप्रसङ्गः ; विरुद्धविशेषणानामेव विशेष्यभेदकत्वात् ।
अत एव खण्डो मुण्डः पूर्णशृङ्गो गौरित्यत्र व्यक्तिभेदप्रतीतिः । नीलं सुगन्धि महदुत्पल-

मित्यत्र विशिष्टैक्यप्रतिपत्तिश्च । अखण्डवस्तुस्वरूपे तु (स्वरूपपरत्वे तु ?) वाक्यस्य, पदानां स्वार्थपरित्यागेन लक्षणादोषोऽवर्जनीयः । प्रवृत्तिनिमित्तभेदाभावेन सामानाधिकरण्यानुपपत्तिश्च । पदानां पर्यायता च । अभिधेयविरोधिव्यावृत्तिपरत्वेऽप्यभावरूपैर्धर्मैः ब्रह्मणः सविशेषत्वं प्रसज्येत ।

तत्र यदुक्तं जात्यादिविशेषाणामे[मि ?]व व्यावृत्तीनां ब्रह्मस्वरूपत्वान्न ब्रह्मणस्सविशेषत्वमिति ; तदपि न शोभनम् ; जात्यादीनां धर्मस्वरूपत्वात् धर्माणां धर्मान्तरासम्बन्धाच्च तेषामितरव्यावृत्तिस्वरूपत्वं युक्तम् ; न द्रव्याणाम् । न हि घटस्य पटाद्यावृत्तिः स्वरूपम्^१ । घटत्वजातिर्हि तस्य पटाद्यावृत्तिः । ब्रह्मणो द्रव्यत्वादसत्यादिव्यावृत्तयो धर्मा भवेयुरिति तैस्सविशेषमेव ब्रह्म भवेत् । तस्मात् ‘ सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं ब्रह्म ’ इति वाक्यं सत्यत्वादिगुणविशिष्टं ब्रह्म प्रतिपादयतीति निर्विशेषत्वं विरुद्धमेव ॥

किञ्च प्रत्यक्षविरुद्धमिदमद्वितीयत्वम् ; घटपटादिभेदानां प्रत्यक्षसिद्धत्वात् । अथ मतं न प्रत्यक्षं भेदग्रहणसमर्थम् । तथा हि—इतरेतराभावो वार्थान्तरं वा भेदः । उभयथापि तत्स्मरणस्य धर्मिप्रतियोगिस्मरणसव्यपेक्षत्वात् प्रत्यक्षज्ञानस्य क्षणिकत्वेन विळम्बासहत्वाच्च अनेन न भेदो ग्रहीतुं शक्यते । ‘ इदं तन्न सम्भवति ’ इत्येवं रूपो हीतरेतराभावः । तत्र प्रत्यक्षमिदमिति किं विदधाति ? एतन्न भवतीति व्यवच्छिन्नन्ति वा ? विदधदिदं प्रत्यक्षं तत्रैव क्षीणशक्तिकत्वान्न व्यवच्छेदसमर्थम् । नापि व्यवच्छिन्नन्ति ; विधिपूर्वकत्वाद्यवच्छेदस्य ॥

नापि युगपदेव विधिव्यवच्छेदौ करोति ; क्षणिकत्वादेव तस्य क्रमभाव्युभयहेतुत्वासम्भवात् । अर्थान्तरत्वेऽपि भेदस्येतरेतराभावग्रहणपूर्वकत्वात्तद्ग्रहणस्योक्तदोषस्समानः । तस्मान्न प्रत्यक्षं भेदग्रहणसमर्थम् । प्रत्युत देशकालानवच्छिन्नस्य सम्मात्रस्य ग्राहकम् । तथा हि—चाक्षुषज्ञानसमनन्तरं सन्घटस्सन्पट इत्यादयो व्यवहाराः प्रतीयमाना दृश्यन्ते । तत्र सर्वत्र सदार्था घटादयश्च व्यवहियन्ते । तत्र क्रमभाविनोरुभयोरपि व्यवहारयोर्न प्रत्यक्षमूलत्वं सम्भवति ; तयोर्भिन्नकालज्ञानफलत्वात् । प्रत्यक्षज्ञानस्य क्षणिकत्वाच्च । तस्मात्तयोरेकः प्रत्यक्षमूलः, इतरो भ्रान्तिमूल इत्यवश्याश्रयणीयः । इदं रजतमित्यनुवर्तमानस्येदमर्थ-

स्यावभासोऽक्षमूलः । व्यावर्तमानरजतादेरवभासो भ्रान्तिमूल इत्यवगतम् । एवमत्राप्यनुवर्तमानं सदेव प्रत्यक्षेण गृह्यते । व्यावर्तमाना घटादयो भ्रान्त्या अवभासन्त इति निश्चीयते । न च रजतादीनामिव बाधो न दृश्यत इति तत्तदवभासानां कथं भ्रान्तिस्त्वमिति शङ्का युक्ता ; बाधफलभूतानां व्यावृत्तीनामितरेतरबुद्धयोर्दृष्टत्वाद्बाधस्यापि विद्यमानत्वात् । अयं घट इति हि बुद्धौ पटव्यावृत्तिर्भवति । तथा अयं पट इति बुद्धौ घटव्यावृत्तिः । तस्मात्सन्मात्रग्राहि प्रत्यक्षमिति न प्रत्यक्षविरुद्धमद्वैतमिति ॥

नैतदुपपद्यते : भेदस्य प्रत्यक्षसिद्धत्वादबाधितत्वाच्च । तत्र यदुक्तं भेदग्रहणस्य धर्मिप्रतियोगिग्रहणस्मरणसापेक्षत्वात्प्रत्यक्षज्ञानस्य क्षणिकत्वेन विधिव्यवच्छेदव्यवहारहेतुत्वासम्भवान्न भेदः प्रत्यक्षेण गृह्यत इति ; तद्वेदस्वरूपापरिज्ञानविजृम्भितम् । न ह्यस्माकमितरेतर- (रा ?) भावः तद्ग्रहणपूर्वकं इतरेतरभावो वा [कं अर्थान्तरं वा ?] भेदः । किन्तु वस्तुनः प्रकारभूता जात्यादयः । ते प्रकारत्वादेव प्रकारिणा सह प्रथन्ते । प्रकारि वस्त्वपि तैर्विना न प्रथते ; अनुपलब्धेरनुपपत्तेश्च । गौरयं शुक्लोऽयं गच्छत्ययमिति हि सर्वे प्रतियन्ति । नत्विदमर्थमात्रविषया कस्यचिदपि कदाचिदपि प्रतीतिरस्ति । नापि संस्थानेन विना गवाद्यर्थः प्रतीतिगोचरतामासादयति । किञ्च प्रथमत एव सकलेतरव्यावृत्ततयावभासनादेव हि प्रतियोगिस्मरणनिरपेक्षं पुरोवर्तिवस्तुनि तदर्थी प्रवर्तते । तस्मात्प्रत्यक्षं भेदग्रहणसमर्थमेव ।

ननु अयमस्माद्विन्न इति धर्मिप्रतियोगिग्रहणस्मरणसव्यपेक्षं भेदग्रहणं दृश्यते । तत्कथं प्रथममेव भेदो गृह्यत इति । उच्यते—नेदं भेदग्रहणम् ; तस्य प्रतियोग्यपेक्षाभावात् । किन्तु अयमस्मादभिन्न इत्यभेदव्यवहारवत् कश्चिद्वेदव्यवहारः । किमुक्तं भवति ? यथा अयमिति स्वरूपाभेदव्यवहारादृते रूपतः परिणामतः संस्थानतश्च सौसादृश्याभिप्रायेणायमस्मादभिन्न इत्यभेदव्यवहारः प्रवर्तते ; तथायं गौरित्यादि भेदव्यवहारादन्यो द्वयोर्वस्तुनोः परिणामादिनिमित्तवैसादृश्यनिबन्धनोऽयमस्मद्भिन्न इति भेदव्यवहारो भवतीत्युक्तं भवति । तस्माद[द् ?] भेदग्रहणं धर्मिप्रतियोगिग्रहणस्मरणानपेक्षमिति न किञ्चिदेतत् ।

यत्पुनरुक्तं सन्मात्रविषयं प्रत्यक्षमिति ; तदपि स्थवीयः ; तस्य प्रमेयत्वानङ्गीकारात्, चक्षुरिन्द्रियस्य रूपरूपितदेकार्थसमवायिषु कृतशक्तिकत्वाच्च । यदुक्तं सन्धट इति सह्यं प्रतीयत इति ; तत्र यद्वक्तव्यं, तच्छक्तिविक्षेपप्रतिक्षेपाधिकारे वक्ष्यते ।

यत्तु व्यावर्तमानत्वाद्वटादीनां रजतादेरिव काल्पनिकत्वमुक्तम्, तदप्ययुक्तम् ; अप्रयोजकत्वाद्धेतोः । बाधितत्वादेव हि रजतादेः काल्पनिकत्वम् ; न व्यावर्तमानत्वात् । न च व्यावृत्तिमात्रं बाधफलम्, अपि तु यद्देशकालयोर्यद्वस्तु भासते तद्देशकालव्यावृत्तता बाधफलभूता दृष्टा ; तस्माद्धेदस्य प्रत्यक्षसिद्धत्वादबाधितत्वादद्वैतं प्रत्यक्षविरुद्धमेव ॥

यदुक्तं अद्वितीयं ब्रह्म अनाद्यज्ञानतिरोहितस्वरूपं विविधाध्यासोपादानमिति ; तत्र अज्ञानं नाम किमिति वक्तव्यम् ? न तावज्ज्ञानाभावः ; तस्य वस्तुस्वरूपतिरोधायक-त्वासम्भवादध्यासहेतुत्वासम्भवाच्च । न अन्यथा ज्ञानमज्ञानम् ; तत एव ।

अथ स्यात् ज्ञानप्रागभावातिरिक्तं सदसदनिर्वचनीयं तमोमायादिशब्दवाच्यं वस्तुया-थात्म्यज्ञाननिवर्त्यं भावरूपं किञ्चिद्वस्त्वज्ञानम् । तच्च श्रुतितदर्थपत्त्यनुमानप्रत्यक्षैरवसीयते । तथाहि—‘ नासदासीन्नोसदासीत्तदानीम् ’ इत्युपक्रम्य ‘ तम आसीत्तमसा गूढमग्रे ’ इत्यु-क्तलक्षणमज्ञानमभिधीयते । श्वेताश्वतराणामुपनिषदि ‘ मायां तु प्रकृतिं विद्यात् ’ इति मायाशब्देनाज्ञानमभिधीयते ।

‘ तत्त्वमसि ’ इति सामानाधिकरण्यावगतजीवैक्यान्यथानुपपत्त्या तदवगम्यते । विरुद्धयोर्जीवब्रह्मणोरैक्यमज्ञानरूपदोषमूलमन्यतरमिथ्यात्वमन्तरेण नोपपद्यते ।

प्रमाणज्ञानं स्वप्रागभावव्यतिरिक्तस्वविषयावरणस्वनिवर्त्यस्वदेशगतवस्त्वन्तरपूर्वकम्, अप्रकाशितार्थप्रकाशकत्वात्, अन्धकारे प्रथमोत्पन्नप्रदीपप्रभावदित्यनुमानेनाज्ञानं सिद्धयति ।

तथा ‘ अहमज्ञो मामन्यच्च न जानामि ’ इति प्रत्यक्षेणाज्ञानं प्रतीयते । न चेदं ज्ञानप्रागभावविषयम् ; तस्याभावप्रमाणगोचरत्वात् । अस्य ज्ञानस्याहं सुखीतिवदपरोक्षा-कारत्वाच्च । अस्त्वभावः प्रत्यक्षः, तथापीदं न ज्ञानाभावविषयम् ; ज्ञानाभावानुभववेलायाम-हमर्थस्याश्रयतयाभावस्य विषयतया ज्ञानस्य प्रतियोगितया चानुभवस्यावश्यम्भावात् । अनुभवेन सह तदभावस्यावस्थानासम्भवाच्च । अथ आश्रयप्रतियोगिनोरनुभवो नाभ्युपगम्येत, तदा तत्सम्बन्धिज्ञानाभावस्वा[स्या ?]नुभवो न सम्भवतीति सुतरां न ज्ञानाभावविषयं प्रत्यक्षम् । अज्ञानस्य भावरूपत्वे तु न धर्मिप्रतियोग्यनुभवापेक्षा तदनुभवस्य । न हि तमःप्रतिपत्तौ वस्त्वन्तरानुभवोऽपेक्षितः । अथ भावरूपमप्यज्ञानं वस्तुयाथात्म्यावभासरूपेण साक्षिचैतन्येन

विरुद्धमित्यस्य प्रत्यक्षस्य तद्विषयत्वमप्ययुक्तमिति चेत्, तत्र ; वस्तुनः स्वयंप्रकाशत्वेन साक्षिचैतन्याविषयत्वात् । अतो न निष्प्रमाणकमज्ञानमिति ॥

अत्रोच्यते । यदुक्तं 'तम आसीत्तमसा गूढमग्रे' इति श्रुतिसिद्धमज्ञानमिति, तदसत् ; तमश्शब्दस्यान्धकारे चोद्भूततमोगुणे प्रकृतितत्त्वे च लोकशास्त्रयोः प्रसिद्धत्वात् ; अज्ञाने प्रसिद्ध्यभावाच्च । आच्छादकत्वगुणयोगात्तमश्शब्दोऽज्ञाने वर्तत इत्युत्प्रेक्षामात्रम् ; आच्छादकत्वासम्भवस्य वक्ष्यमाणत्वात् ॥

'मायां तु प्रकृतिं विद्यात्' इत्यत्रापि नाज्ञानसम्भव उच्यते ; अपि तु प्रकृतेर्विचित्रार्थसर्गकरत्वं प्रतिपाद्यते । विचित्रसर्गकरवस्तु मायाशब्दवाच्यम् । तच्च द्विविधम्—किञ्चिद्विचित्रं भ्रान्तिज्ञानकरम्, यथा ऐन्द्रजालिकानां मणिमन्त्रौषधादि, किञ्चिद्विचित्रार्थसर्गकरम्, यथा असुरराक्षसास्त्रादि । तस्मात्प्रकृतिरपि महदादिविचित्रार्थसर्गकरत्वान्मायेत्युच्यते ।

यच्चोक्तं तत्त्वमसीत्यैक्योपदेशान्यथानुपपत्त्या अज्ञानं कल्प्यत इति ; तदपि जगत्कारणत्वविशिष्टस्य जीवप्रकारविशिष्टस्य च ब्रह्मण ऐक्योपदेशपरत्वेनान्यथैवोपपन्नत्वादयुक्तम् । किञ्च सर्वज्ञे ब्रह्मणि विरुद्धाज्ञानपरिकल्पनहेतुभूता न काचिदनुपपत्तिर्दृश्यते, येनाज्ञानं कल्प्येत ॥

यच्च भावरूपाज्ञानसाधनतया अनुमानमुपन्यस्तम् ; तदपि न शोभनम् ; तेनैवानुमानेनानैकान्तिकत्वाद्धेतोः । न हि तस्यानुमानप्रमेयस्याज्ञानस्यावारकं भावरूपमज्ञानान्तरमस्ति ; अनवस्थाप्रसङ्गात् । ब्रह्मणस्तिरोधानासम्भवेन जगत्प्रतिभासानुपपत्तेश्च । प्रदीपप्रभायाः प्रकाशकत्वाभावात्साधनविकलश्च दृष्टान्तः । ज्ञानं हि प्रकाशकम् ; तदुत्पत्तिहेतुभूतानामिन्द्रियाणां विरोधिसन्तमसनिरसनमात्रेणोपकारकत्वमेव हि प्रदीपप्रभायाः । तस्मादनुमानमपि नाज्ञानसाधनम् ।

यच्चोक्तं 'अहमज्ञ इति प्रत्यक्षेणाभावरूपमज्ञानं प्रतीयत इति, तच्च नैवम् ; अज्ञानानुभवस्याश्रयविषयभूतप्रत्यगर्थानुभवपुरस्सरत्वात् । मम मद्विषयमज्ञानमस्तीति

द्विज्ञानमनुभूयते । तच्च तत्स्वरूपज्ञाननिवर्त्यमज्ञानं तस्मिन् प्रतिपन्ने कथमिव सम्भवति ? अथ विशदस्वरूपावभासोऽज्ञानविरोधी । अविशदस्वरूपेणास्मदर्थस्य प्रतिपन्न-
तया अज्ञानानुभवो न विरोत्स्यत इति मतम् , तत्ज्ञानप्रागभावेऽपि समानम् । यच्च भाव-
स्वरूपस्यानुभवे तमःप्रतिपत्ताविवान्यापेक्षा नास्तीति, तदापातरमणीयम् ; दृष्टान्तस्य
विषमत्वात् । तमसः स्वरूपेणोपलम्भसम्भवात् । अज्ञानस्य तथाभावाभावात् । अज्ञानस्य
तदन्यतद्विरोधितदभावानामन्यतमत्वात्सर्वथापि ज्ञानोपलब्धिपूर्वकस्तदुपलम्भः । तमस-
श्चालोकविरोधीत्यनेनाकारेण प्रतिपत्तौ आलोकप्रतिपत्त्यपेक्षत्वमस्त्येव । तस्मान्न केनापि
प्रमाणेन भावरूपाज्ञानसिद्धिः ॥

किञ्च आश्रयोऽस्याज्ञानस्य निरूपणीयः । न तावज्जीवाश्रयत्वं तस्य सम्भवति ;
अज्ञानकल्पितत्वाज्जीवानाम् । नापि ब्रह्माश्रयत्वम् ; तस्य ज्ञानसमानाश्रयत्वात् ; ब्रह्मणो
ज्ञानाश्रयत्वानभ्युपगमात् । ज्ञानाश्रयत्वविरहिणां घटादीनां हि नाज्ञानाश्रयत्वं दृष्टम् ।

अपि चाज्ञानेन ब्रह्मणस्तिरोधानञ्च अशक्यप्रतिपादनम् । आच्छाद्यविषयज्ञानोत्पत्ति-
निरोधो ह्याच्छादनशब्दार्थः । अत्र त्वाच्छाद्यस्य ब्रह्मणो ज्ञानविषयत्वानङ्गीकारात्तदुत्पत्ति-
निरोधरूपमाच्छादनञ्च सम्भवति । एवमपि प्रकाशस्वरूपस्य ब्रह्मणोऽज्ञानेन तिरोधानं
वक्तव्यं चेत् , स्वरूपनाश एव तिरोधानशब्देनोक्तस्स्यात् ॥

किञ्चेदमज्ञानमननुभूतं सद्ब्रह्म तिरस्करोति, किं वा तिरस्कृत्य (स्कृत्य ब्रह्म?) अनुभव-
विषयं भवति । न प्रथमः कल्पः , अज्ञानतत्तिरोधानकल्पनयोर्वैयर्थ्यप्रसङ्गात् । प्रपञ्च-
प्रतिभासार्थमज्ञानतिरोधाने कल्प्येते । अतिरोहितस्य ब्रह्मणोऽज्ञानसाक्षित्ववदज्ञानतिरो-
धानाभ्यां विनाप्यज्ञानकार्याभिमतप्रपञ्चदर्शनसम्भवात् । नापि द्वितीयः ; काचादिवत्स्व-
सत्तया तिरस्कृतिकरस्याज्ञानस्य ज्ञानबाध्यत्वाभावप्रसङ्गात् । को दोष इति चेत् , अज्ञा-
नकार्यस्य प्रपञ्चस्य सत्यत्वमेव दोषः ॥

किञ्चेदमज्ञानं केन निवर्त्यते ? ब्रह्मयाथात्म्यानुभवेनेति चेत् , ब्रह्मयाथात्म्यानुभवः
किं ज्ञानस्वरूपं ब्रह्मैव ? उत तद्विषयं ज्ञानान्तरं वा ? ब्रह्मस्वरूपमेवेति चेन्न ; स्वरूपनिवृत्त्या
ज्ञानस्य [अज्ञानस्य ?] स्वस्मिन्नसम्भवात् । अथ ज्ञानान्तरमिति चेत्तदपि न ; निर्वि-

शेषस्य ब्रह्मणः स्वयम्प्रकाशत्वेन ज्ञानविषयत्वासम्भवात् । अनभ्युपगमाच्च ।

अथ ब्रह्मणोऽद्वितीयत्वज्ञानमज्ञानस्य निवर्तकमिति मतम् ; तदपि विकल्पनीयम् ।
अद्वितीयत्वं किं ब्रह्मणः स्वरूपम् ? उत धर्मः ? प्रथमे कल्पे पूर्वोक्तदोषानतिवृत्तिः ।
उत्तरस्मिन् कल्पे ब्रह्मणस्सद्वितीयत्वप्रसङ्गः ॥

स्यान्मतं , प्रपञ्चमिथ्यात्वज्ञानं तन्निवर्तकमिति ; तदप्यसङ्गतम् ; ब्रह्मविषयेणा-
ज्ञानेन तस्य विरोधाभावात् । प्रपञ्चमिथ्यात्वज्ञानस्य तत्सत्यत्वाज्ञानेन विरोधः, न ब्रह्म-
विषयेणाज्ञानेन ।

यदि मन्वीत प्रपञ्चमिथ्यात्वज्ञानमेव ब्रह्मयाथात्म्यज्ञानम् , तस्मात्तेन तदज्ञानस्य
विरोधो युक्त इति प्रपञ्चमिथ्यात्वज्ञानेन ब्रह्माज्ञानं निवर्तत इति, तदपि हास्यम् ; प्रपञ्च-
मिथ्यात्वस्य ब्रह्मस्वरूपत्वासम्भवात् । तस्माद्ब्रह्मातिरोधायकं तदाश्रयं तज्ज्ञाननिवर्त्य भावरू-
पमज्ञानं न सिद्ध्यति ।

यच्चोक्तं ज्ञानस्वरूपं ब्रह्म अविद्याशबलं सज्जगदुपादानकारणमिति, तद्विवेचनीयम् ।
तत्र किं ब्रह्मोपादानं जगदुत अविद्योपादानमथोभयोपादानम् ? न तावत्प्रथमः कल्पः ;
कारणानुरूपत्वात्कार्यस्य जगतो ज्ञानस्वरूपत्वे सत्यत्वप्रसङ्गात् । नापि द्वितीयः ; ब्रह्मो-
पादानत्वश्रुतिव्याकोपप्रसङ्गात् । नापि तृतीयः ; जगतो जडाजडात्मकत्वसत्यत्वासत्यत्वादि-
विरुद्धस्वभावत्वप्रसङ्गात् ।

अथ स्यात् ज्ञानस्वरूपे ब्रह्मण्यविद्यादोषवशाज्जगदध्यस्तम् । अध्यासाधिष्ठानत्वमेव
ब्रह्मण उपादानत्वम् । उपपन्नञ्चैतत् । दृश्यते हि शुक्तिकाशकले रजतमित्यपरोक्षावभासः ।
नायं सम्यग्रजतविषयः ; असन्निहितत्वात्तस्य । न च निर्विषयः ; विषयशून्यज्ञानस्य
क्वचिदप्यनुपपत्तेः । नापि स्वविषयम्(यः?) ; परत्वा[त्वेना?]वभासात् । न चासद्विषयः ; रजता-
वभासात् । न चेदं स्मरणम् ; अनुभवरूपत्वात् । न च शुक्तिकाविषयः ; अतद्रूपत्वात्प्रति-
पत्तेः । भासमानं हि विषयो भवति । तस्मादपूर्वं रजतं दोषवशाच्छुक्तिकायामुत्पन्नमव-
भासते । नेदमसत् ; भासमानत्वात् । न च सत् ; बाधितत्वात् । अतस्सदसद्विलक्षणं
तदभ्युपगमनीयम् । एवं सदसदनिर्वचनीयं जगदविद्ययोत्पन्नमवभासते । निरधिष्ठान-
भ्रमानुपपत्तेस्तस्य ब्रह्माधिष्ठानमवगम्यते । अधिष्ठानत्वमेव तस्योपादानत्वमिति ॥

University Notes

UNVEILING OF THE PORTRAIT OF THE FOUNDER-PRO-CHANCELLOR

On the 4th of December, 1937, M.R.Ry. Dewan Bahadur K. Sundaram Chettiar, B.A., B.L., Retired High Court Judge, unveiled a portrait of the Founder-Pro-Chancellor, Dr. Rajah Sir Annamalai Chettiar of Chettinad, at the New Convocation Hall. The following is the gist of the speech delivered by Mr. Sundaram Chettiar.

He said that the unveiling of the Founder's portrait in this magnificent Hall symbolised the feelings of gratitude towards him swelling up in the hearts of the public of the southern Presidency. This portrait would also serve to inspire the present and future generations to emulate him in acts of generosity and charity. This University was the greatest of his benefactions. What was a barren tract before 1920 had been metamorphosed into a beautiful and picturesque colony of magnificent buildings. The Rajah of Chettinad had viewed the great wealth which God bestowed on him as a sacred trust not only for his own enjoyment and the enjoyment of his family but also for the good of his fellowmen. His benefactions were manysided. He had kept up the ancient traditions of Hinduism in the selections of his charities and had also adapted himself to the needs of modern civilisation. The speaker prayed to God Almighty to give the Rajah of Chettinad many more years of life, happiness and prosperity, so that he might not only see his magnificent charities flourish in this world but also augment them and find fresh avenues for his generosity.

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OPENING OF THE CONVOCATION HALL

On the 4th of December, 1937, the new Convocation Hall was opened and named "The Srinivasa Sastri Hall" by Dr. Rajah Sir Annamalai Chettiar, Founder-Pro-Chancellor. The Founder delivered the following speech on the occasion :

"To the Syndicate of this University many thanks are due for enabling me to associate myself with this opening function. This is a task which gives me particular pleasure as there is nothing which I like more than to join in any tribute to the worth and personality of our distinguished Vice-Chancellor. I think it was a happy thought of the Syndicate to decide to associate the name of the Rt. Hon'ble Srinivasa Sastriar with

this building. The Rt. Hon'ble Sastriar, the guiding spirit of this University, is an embodiment of the best in the culture of the East and the West. I venture to think that this Hall will serve to perpetuate his connection with the University as nothing else can. I am sure, you will agree with me when I say that the Srinivasa Sastriar Hall will be a living reminder of his new ideal of Service and Sacrifice suited to modern conditions of life. You, the present batch of students, are, I should think, peculiarly fortunate in having him, a deep scholar and a perfect master of the English language, as your Vice-Chancellor to teach you and guide you to a purposeful life of endeavour and achievement. What I would call the Sastri Spirit will always hover over here and silently but surely influence and inspire many a young man to make service of country the dominant ideal of his life. Agreeable to the wishes of the Syndicate to give a visible emblem to his name and keep it alive in the minds of generations yet unborn I declare this Hall open and name it The Rt. Hon'ble V. S. Srinivasa Sastriar Hall or to be brief "The Srinivasa Sastri Hall".

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CONVOCATION

Dr. Rajah Sir Annamalai Chettiar, Founder-Pro-Chancellor of the University, presided over the Seventh Annual Convocation of the University on the 4th December, 1937. The Convocation was held in the Srinivasa Sastriar Hall. The Rt. Hon'ble Sastriar, P.C., CH., LL.D., Vice-Chancellor, delivered the Convocation Address. The number of candidates admitted to the several degrees and titles was as follows:—

Name of Degree or Title.	In Person.	In Absentia.	Total.
M.LITT.	1	..	1
M.A.	4	7	11
B.A. (HONS.)	19	1	20
B.A.	16	3	19
M.Sc.	3	..	3
B.Sc. (HONS.)	9	3	12
B.Sc.	25	15	40
Vidvan	3	1	4
Siromani	10	1	11
Sangita Bhushana	5	2	7
Total	95	33	128

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CONFERENCES AND CONGRESSES

The following members of the staff of the University were delegated to attend the Conferences noted below :—

Prof. R. Ramanujachariar	..	The Philosophical Conference at Nagpur.
Prof. Rao Saheb C. S. Srinivasachariar	..	The All-India Oriental Conference at Trivandrum.
Mr. V. A. Ramaswami Sastriar	..	Do.
Mr. A. Chidambaranatha Chettiar.	..	Do.
Dr. B. V. Narayanaswami Nayudu.	The 21st All-India Economic Conference at Hyderabad.	
Prof. A. Narasinga Rao	..	The Indian Science Congress, Calcutta.
Dr. S. Ramachandra Rao	..	Do.
Mr. V. Pasupati	..	Do.
Dr. T. S. Raghavan	..	Do.
Dr. B. Ramamurti	..	Do.
Mr. P. S. Varadachari	..	Do.
Mr. S. Sriraman	..	Do.
Mr. G. V. Krishnaswami Ayyangar.	The First Statistical Conference at Calcutta.	
Mr. K. Nagaraja Rao	..	The All-India Library Conference, Delhi.

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STUDENTSHIPS

The following studentships were awarded during the year :—

Senior Studentships

Mr. V. Vriddhagirisan	..	History.
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Junior Studentships

Mr. R. Mahadevan	..	Philosophy.
Mr. K. Krishnamachari	..	History.
Mr. S. R. N. Badri Rao	..	Economics.
Mr. P. Vaidyanathan	..	Economics.
Mr. B. R. Venkataraman	..	Mathematics.
Mr. B. C. Lingam	..	Tamil.
Mr. S. Venkatakrishnan	..	Sanskrit.

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Conferment of Degrees

The University of Allahabad at a special Convocation held in December, 1937 conferred on the Rt. Hon'ble V. S. Srinivasa Sastriar, Vice-Chancellor of the University, the Honorary Degree of Doctor of Laws.

* * * *

BUILDINGS

The construction of the following buildings was completed during the year :—

1. The Library and the Administrative Buildings and the Srinivasa Sastri Hall.
2. Music College and Dormitory.
3. The Gokhale Hall for conducting the Union and other meetings.
4. Three additional buildings to the Hostel for lodging students and a dining hall.
5. Twenty-four houses for pandits.
6. Men's Club and Guests' Quarters.

The President of the Indian Philosophical Congress has nominated Prof. R. Ramanujachariar to serve on the Executive Committee for a period of three years.

* * * *

Reviews

Physics : An Introductory Text-Book by H. J. Taylor. Oxford University Press. 448 + x pages, price Rs. 5.

This book has been prepared to cover the scope of the Intermediate syllabus of the University of Bombay. The aim of the author has been to give in reasonable compass the fundamentals of the subject and he must be congratulated on having attained this object with much success. The exposition is clear and simple and only an elementary acquaintance of mathematics on the part of the readers has been assumed. The subject matter covered in the book is much wider than the syllabus prescribed for the Madras or the Annamalai University. It is doubtful therefore whether the book under review can replace the well known text-books now studied by our Intermediate students.

An important problem has been raised by the author in his preface. He seems to be of opinion that a text book should not usurp the function of a course of lectures on the one hand and experimental work on the other. One is inclined to take the view that at the Intermediate stage the text-book must aim at some completeness. It must be remembered that the Physics taught for the Intermediate classes is based purely on experimental methods and hence the text-book should aim at a treatment from this point of view. Full practical details and important applications should be given. The solution of simple problems intended to give concreteness to the abstract presentation of theory should also be a guiding factor. The standard text-book of Glazebrook has kept in view all these fundamental requisites.

It would however be unfair to judge a book by standards other than those maintained by the author. Judged from this point of view, the book has succeeded eminently. The theoretical aspects are set forth in the clearest manner. The convention of signs adopted in geometrical optics is based on a recent report on the subject by the Physical Society. The principles of electrostatics are detailed at some length and the more difficult conceptions of electrodynamics are treated with ease and elegance. A chapter on the structure of matter gives useful information about the nucleus and the electron constituting an atom.

The general impression produced by reading the book is one of amazement that the University of Bombay should expect so much from the poor Intermediate students !

S. R. R.

'Maha Yoga', or the Upanishadic Lore in the Light of the Teachings of Maharshi Ramana by 'Who'. Pudukottah: The New Light Publishing Co., 1937. pp. 119. Price Re. 1.

In the ten chapters of this handy volume, dealing with such profound subjects as Ignorance, The World, The Soul, The Egoless state, Devotion, etc., the author, as indicated in the sub-title, makes an attempt to interpret the life and realisations of the Great Sage of Arunachala.

Starting with the position that, 'knowing the *Truth* alone can make one free', and that Sri Ramana Maharishi is one of those rare *Jnanins* who have thus become free, the author proceeds to show that *ignorance* is the root of bondage. There is a very refreshing interpretation of 'Authority' in the fifth chapter of the book. Casting aside the usual mediaeval interpretation, the author says, that the scriptures acquire special authority when the living experience of a living Rishi in our midst testifies to the truth of the scriptural sayings.

Sri Ramana Maharishi's teachings about the World, the Self, and the Over-self are set forth succinctly and lucidly. The bewildering question, whether one who has reached the final egoless state, can yet maintain the individuality implied in possessing a material body, is handled in a commendable manner. 'The sage has neither ego nor mind . . . he is really bodiless, and the body which we see and ascribe to him is an illusion, a part of the world illusion.'

The topic *par excellence* is dealt with in chapters VII to IX. The various stages through which the seeker after truth has to pass are graphically described with several useful practical hints. The Maharishi's answers to questions, judiciously chosen by the author, are very illuminating in this connection. The nature of devotion, of Divine grace and of relationship between the master and his pupil are discussed in the eighth chapter. The last chapter resolves the doubts and perplexities but beset the path of the *sadhaka* in the early stages of his quest for truth.

The addition of this volume to the brilliant but limited list of works on the teachings of the renowned sage of Arunachalā by Messrs. B. N. Narasimhaswami, T. V. Kapali Sastri and Paul Brunton, is to be welcomed. It is gratifying to note that through the selfless labour of his devotees, the influence of Sri Ramana Maharshi is gradually spreading in South India.

P. S. N.

Bhāṭṭacintāmaṇi of Vāñcheśvarayajvan, a Commentary on Khaṇḍadeva Miśra's *Bhāṭṭadīpikā*, chapters I, II and III (1-3 pādas—nivītānta—only), edited by the late Mahāmahopādhyāya Śāstraratnākara Mimāṃsāratna Venkatasubrahmanya Sastrigal, Avl., Madras Law Journal Press, Mylapore, Madras. 1934. [Price Rs. 6—0—0.]

Khaṇḍadevamiśra's *Bhāṭṭadīpikā* is an authoritative work on the *Adhikaraṇaprasthāna* of the Bhāṭṭa school of the Pūrvamīmāṃsāśāstra. No advanced student of this Śāstra ever fails to study this book. Unlike his two other works—the *Bhāṭṭakaustubha* and the *Bhāṭṭarahasya*, this work is brief and terse in style, so much so that a full and proper understanding of the work requires the help of a good and reliable commentary. Fortunately we have in Śambhubhaṭṭa (a disciple of Khaṇḍadeva Miśra) a reliable commentator, whose commentary *Prabhāvali* contains not only a complete exposition of Khaṇḍadeva Miśra's views as embodied in his *Bhāṭṭadīpikā* and other works but also refutations of the views of the authors presupposed by his revered master (pūjya-pāda) Khaṇḍadevamiśra.

Other commentaries have also been written on this work by later authors, of whom two are known, one being the prolific writer Bhāskara-rāya and the other, Vāñcheśvarayajvan, a part of the latter's commentary having now for the first time been published. It is noteworthy that both the commentators presuppose and comment on some text of the *Bhāṭṭadīpikā* on the *tarkapāda* (i.e.) the first pāda of the first adhyāya, which was many years ago incorporated into the Mysore edition of this work; but *its genuineness is doubtful*. Firstly, Śambhubhaṭṭa, the disciple of Khaṇḍadeva, has not commented on it and has summarised the contents of the *tarkapāda* (as explained by the pre-Khaṇḍadeva writers) as a fitting introduction to his commentary on the second pāda of the first adhyāya. Secondly, the major portions of the *Jijñāsādhikaraṇa* I-1.1 and the part in the *Vākyādhikaraṇa* I-1.7 containing the definitions of the three vidhis are only a *verbatim* reproduction of the corresponding portions in the *arthavādādhikaraṇa* I.2.1 and *Mantrādhikaraṇa* I.2.4, respectively. To the credit of the commentaries of Bhāskara-rāya and Vāñcheśvarayajvan it must however be said that they explain the difficult text of the *Bhāṭṭadīpikā* in a lucid manner and are more helpful to the student than Śambhubhaṭṭa's *Prabhāvali*, though the former two are deficient in informativeness as compared with the latter. Unfortunately, Bhāskara-rāya's commentary available in Ms. extends only to the first adhyāya and a part of the second. Vāñcheśvarayajvan's commentary, the latest of the three, is in the first instance explanatory and in some places elaborate too; but it contains explanations of the *Bhāṭṭadīpikā* text which are in some instances *not quite satisfactory*. To take here one instance only: the phrase in the

pūrvapakṣa of the arthavādādhikaraṇa—sad-asadrūpa-siddhārtha-bodhakatvāt—is interpreted by the commentator thus: *sat* means *adhigata* (already known) like *vāyukṣepiṣṭhatva*; *asat* conveys *bādhita* like *grāvaplavana* and *siddha* is taken in the essence of *sāddhyetara* like *svarga* and *brahman*. This explanation as related to arthavādas is no doubt based on the three well-known kinds—*anuvāda*, *guṇavāda* and *bhūtārthavāda*. But does Khaṇḍadeva divide arthavāda here into three? He has inserted the word *rūpa* between *sadasat* and *siddha* with a view to dividing them into two—*sat* and *asat*, which are again brought under one category of *siddha* meaning *sāddhyetara* (that which is different from *sādhya*, the chief import of the *vidhi* and *niṣedha* vākyas).

Vāñcheśvarayajvan was a Kanarese brahmin who settled in the Tanjore district in South India. His paternal great-grandfather was Vāñcheśvarasudhī, otherwise known as Kuṭṭikavi, the famous author of the *Mahīṣaśataka* in which he has vehemently satirised a Maratha ruler at Tanjore, most probably Tulaja I *alias* Tukkoji, who patronised poet Ghanaśyāma and other great poets. Kuṭṭikavi is said to be the son of the grand-daughter of Govinda Dikṣita, the famous prime minister of the Nayak Kings in Tanjore. So the author of the commentary, the *Bhāṭṭa-Cintāmaṇi*, inherited high traditions of sanskritic learning and culture. The late MM. T. Venkatasubrahmanya Sastrigal was a son of the daughter of this commentator; and it is in the fitness of things that he undertook to edit this work, and on his sad demise it was completed by his disciples under the patronage of His Holiness Śrī Śaṅkarācārya of Kāñchi Kāma Koṭipīṭha (Kumbakonam).

The Sanskrit introduction by Pandit N. Ayyaswami Sastri (one of the editors), gives a reliable account of the life and literary career of the commentator who flourished at Tanjore under the reign of Serfoji II during the former half of the 19th Century. The *Viśayā-nukramaṇikā*, the *sūtrānukramaṇikā*, the *anukramaṇikā* of the quotations cited by the commentator and the *adhikaraṇānukramaṇikā*—all these enhance the usefulness of this edition. The list of errata (appended at the end of this Volume), though formidable for its length, is exhaustive and is highly necessary for those who have to constantly use the work for reference or for special study.

V. A. R.

Oriental Literary Digest, Poona—edited by Dr. S. M. Katre, in collaboration with a committee—published by the O. L. D. Association, Poona, Vol. I. Nos. 1-7.

This is a monthly journal devoted to reviews of current publications in all branches of Indology and of Oriental learning which issued its first

number in July, 1937. It aims to give prompt and critical notices of books published in the various branches of Oriental studies, in India as well as outside, and claims "to serve as an indispensable clearing-house of Oriental Learning." Each number has about 8 to 12 book-notices at the hands of reviewers with apt reputation for scholarship in the different branches. Among them are Dr. B. A. Saletore and Prof. B. D. Verma for historical and quasi-historical publications, Dr. S. K. De, Dr. V. S. Sukthankar and Prof. A. N. Upadhye for Sanskrit and Sanskrit learning. We should suggest that greater attention be paid to the reviews of important and comprehensive works, together with a larger evaluation of their merits. Such attention marks the reviews of works like Sankalia's *University of Nalanda* and Mohan Singh's *Goraknath and Mediæval Hindu Mysticism*; but not to books like the *Srikara Bhashya* and Narayana Rao's *History of the Telugu Language*. In passing, it may be pointed out that a mistake like Edward Thompson instead of Edward Thomas, as the author of 'The Chronicles of the Pathan Kings of Delhi'—in column 11 on p. 10 of No. 5, should not have been allowed to get in. If it may be permitted, it can be well recommended that a *subject-war* arrangement of the reviews be adopted in the *Journal* which, we are sure, satisfies the needs of both scholars and librarians.

C.S.S.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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4 3-5

5 1-5

6 1-5

7 2-4

8 1-5

9 1-2

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Man in India Volume XV No. 1 (January-March)

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Chemical Abstracts, Easton P.A.

The Punjab University Gazette.

Journal of the Bombay University.

Quarterly Journal of the Mythic Society.

Publications by the Oriental Library, Baroda.

Publications by Kungl. Universitetes Bibliotek, Uppsala, Sweden.

Publications by Tohoku Imperial University, Sendai, Japan.

Journal of the Madras University.

*Bulletin de L'Ecole Francaise d'Extreme-Orient—Ecole Francaise
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Djwa—Java-Institute, Kweekschoolaan, Jogajkarta, Java

*Varendra Research Society, Rajshahi, Bengal—Annual Report and
Monographs*

Quarterly Journal of the Kannada Literary Academy.

Journal of the Andhra Historical Research Society.

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Scripta Mathematica.

Indian Historical Quarterly, Calcutta.

Publications of the Bombay Royal Asiatic Society.

The Indian Library Journal.

Review of Philosophy and Religion.

U.S.S.R. Society for Cultural relations with foreign countries, Russia.

'Drama' published by the British Drama League, London.

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Bulletin of the Calcutta Mathematical Society.

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